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1.1 The past and future of law and technology?
Between 1811 and 1816 in North of England owners of textile mills found
themselves facing a Luddite uprising. The rioters borrowed their name from
General Ned Ludd, who supposedly had broken stocking frames in anger in 1779
and was claimed to have led the riot from Sherwood forest. The frustrated textile
workers saw no alternative to violent protest against the rapid changes in
production mechanisms that had left them unable to provide for their families.
As the situation grew worse and societal stability came under threat, legislation
was harnessed to restrain the uprising by increasing the penalties for attacks
against the manufacturing houses and equipment. According to the UK’s
Frame-Breaking Act of 1812 (officially The Destruction of Stocking Frames,
etc.), all crimes against the machines were punishable by death:
‘If any person or persons shall, by Day or by Night, enter by Force into any
House, Shop or Place, with an Intent to cut or destroy any Framework knitted
Pieces, Stockings or Lace, or other Articles or Goods being in the Frame, or upon
any Machine or Engine thereto annexed, or therewith to be used or prepared for
that Purpose; … or shall willfully and maliciously, and without having the
Consent or Authority of the Owner, break and destroy any Machinery contained
in any Mill or Mills used or any way employed in preparing or spinning of Wool
or Cotton, or other Materials for the use of the Stocking or Lace Manufactory,
every Offender being thereof lawfully convicted shall be adjudged guilty of
Felony, and shall suffer Death, as in cases of Felony without Benefit of Clergy.’
What really happened in England during the first decades of the nineteenth
century to invoke the need for such drastic legislative measures? It was not simply
the introduction of new technology, although one can pinpoint important mile-
stones on the road to the invention of the spinning jenny or the steam engine.
Instead, the social implications linked with technological innovations led to the
changes in manufacturing, which can be described as the automation of routine
manual labour. The interplay between society, law and technology gave rise to
tensions that burst into violence.
Now, in the twenty-first century, ‘Luddite’ has become a pejorative word for
describing someone who resists technological change. Neoluddites are seen as
old-fashioned fools who are unable to find any reason, other than their own
inability, to oppose technological innovation. However, a look into history
reveals that the original Luddites did not object to advances in technology as
such, but to the social implications inherent in the mechanisation of manual
labour, which left them unemployed and on the verge of famine.
Two hundred years later we are talking about a new chapter in automation,
namely that of non-routine cognitive labour. We are amidst a change the impact
of which expands into the established field of law. The question that arises is,
how should we react to the shifts in the legal system brought on by technology,
especially those transforming the core of many legal practices, dispute resolution?
Should we become luddites and claim ownership of the term, and, in a bid to
preserve the fundamental elements of our old-established practices in the name of
justice, break the new frames of technology? Or are we to embrace the change,
come to grips with it, define its nature, to create a frame for technology inside
law? In order to find answers, we must first understand what are the implications
of this complex and multifaceted change created by the interplay between law,
technology and society. Grasping the meaning of change, especially the meaning
of technological change within an established, long-lasting, and authoritative field
of law, requires a leap of faith. In order to see beyond the devastating threats of
technology painted by the technophobes and the infinite possibilities preached by
the technophiles, we need to place technological innovation in its historical
context to define how the current disruptive trends affect the application of law.
This is a book about on-going technological change in the society, about
digitalisation of legal practices, and about the impact that digital technologies
have on the most quintessential of legal practices, dispute resolution. I claim that
the implementation of digital technologies in dispute resolution creates a dis-
crepancy in the ways in which we have justified the establishment, function, and
appearances of dispute resolution. In pursuing an understanding of technology in
dispute resolution, we enter a world of many questions and few answers.1 This
objective connects with the wider inquiry into what exactly technological
disruption2 means for the legal system. Over recent years disruption has become
almost synonymous with technological innovation, and, although it is probable
that data analytics, AI applications such as neural networks and machine learning
as well as increasing automation will alter the legal profession’s working methods,
it remains open to what extent these emerging technologies will, in fact, disrupt
the essence of legal practice. However, one consequence of legal technologies has
already become visible. Technological solutions developed by non-lawyers to
tackle legal problems are gaining ground and thus challenge the lawyers’ profes-
sional hegemony on deciding how dispute resolution should be organised.
Questions on the implications of technology tend to voice both our hopes and
fears. Will computer judges driven by artificial intelligence soon replace human
intuition? Is human error removed from the equation? Are we finally reaching an
era of true access to justice or are we endangering the stability of society? By
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emphasising digital technologies, are we about to face the gruesome triviality of
case management software, reading too much into these aspirations that should
be regarded simply as instruction manuals? Or are we talking about a funda-
mental change? At the core of all these questions two constants remain: what is
law and how does technological innovation influence it?
Some questions can be, and have already been, answered. However, much
remains to be seen, and there is still a lack of comprehensive analysis of the
intersections between dispute resolution and digital technologies. The role of
scientific examination is first and foremost to formulate necessary questions rather
than simply providing answers to pre-set questions that reflect the threat and
promise of technology. Against this nuanced background, this book evaluates
how digital technology disrupts and changes one fundamental aspect of law,
namely the enforcement of decisions rendered in dispute resolution. The objec-
tive here is to formulate a theoretical framework for evaluating the implications
that digital technologies have for the legal system and then to apply this to
dispute resolution.
The study consists of two main parts. In the first part I focus on the privatisation
of dispute resolution through digital technologies. I demonstrate how the use of
ICT creates new possibilities for privatisation of enforcement and how this devel-
opment, in turn, affects the underlying methods of justifying dispute resolution in
the first place. Through an analysis influenced by social systems theory I describe
how the interactions of law, technology and society contribute to societal change
of digitalisation and how the legitimacy of dispute resolution is created, renewed,
reinterpreted and harnessed within the legal system. This analysis describes how
digital technologies are giving rise to unforeseen privatisation, leading to a justifi-
catory crisis examined in the second part of the study through three justificatory
narratives of sovereignty, consent, and access to justice.
Understanding the delicate interplay between law, technology and society is
the critical first step towards assessing the impact of technology on dispute
resolution. This interplay is embedded in legal structures formulated over time
and through these it defines the environment for future technological innovation.
Thus, one cannot understand the future of dispute resolution technology without
simultaneously looking into the past.
1.2 Interfaces of dispute resolution and digital technologies
In this section I briefly describe different areas where dispute resolution and
technology overlap. Technological innovation for dispute resolution is often
discussed either from the perspective of the courts or from the perspective of
private dispute resolution providers. In the public sphere courtroom technology
has been developed to improve existing practices, whereas in the private sphere of
e-commerce use of digital technologies has enabled automated, scalable processes
often called online dispute resolution (ODR). This two-pronged development and
its implications for enforcement, which is the overarching theme of this book,
brings the relationship between public and private dispute resolution to the fore. In
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addition to these, we can distinguish other interfaces between dispute resolution
and technology, which do not easily fall into either of these categories, such as
technology-specific procedural rules as well as the buzz-words ‘legal technology’.
It should be noted that these categories often overlap and should not be
understood as exclusive. In this study, the term ‘dispute resolution technology’ is
used when referring to all technology applications related in some way to conflict
management, regardless of the public or private nature of the resolution model.
Courtroom technology
Courtroom technology refers to different applications of technology used in
courts and the digitalisation of these existing practices, which often includes civil
justice reforms. These applications include videoconferencing technology, case
management systems, service of documents by email, access to legal information
by electronic means, automated document generation, and e-archiving, to name
but a few. Most of these applications of dispute resolution technology depend on
legislative approval before implementation. These technological applications pre-
serve their close connection with the nation-state, as they are publicly funded and
incorporated into the court system.3 The role of technology is mainly auxiliary, as
it is used to facilitate the adjudicative procedure, although exceptions do exist.
From the legislators’ perspective, technology might provide a variety of effective
measures to combat the shortcomings of national court systems, such as ineffi-
ciency, time and costs. Implementing digital technologies might seem especially
tempting as one-time investments and relatively low maintenance costs may
permanently reduce labour costs.
Issues related to technology-enhanced trials are extensively regulated by and
conform to national procedural rules. As it is, the public court system looks
towards procedural jurisprudence to tackle technology-related issues of
interpretation, and jurisprudence may deliver some insight by applying the
methodology of legal dogmatics. Many of these interpretative problems can be
answered by ex analogia interpretation of the existing provisions. For example,
privacy of email correspondence could be compared with traditional letters by
way of analogy. Another example of analogy is comparing presence via video-
conference to actual presence in the courtroom.
Also, the intersection of courtroom technology is often designed to serve the
needs of national courts and the legal system of a specific country. Thus, the
applications of courtroom technology are not necessarily targeted to the needs of
cross-border disputes. However, some cross-border instruments do exist. For
example, the EU’s Evidence Regulation encourages the use of videoconference
when evidence is obtained from another Member State.4
Online dispute resolution
Private conflict management augmented by technology is often called online
dispute resolution (ODR), although the term is slowly falling out of fashion and
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many developers nowadays refer to their applications as legal technology. In any
case, ODR can be seen as a pioneer of dispute resolution technology, having its
roots in web applications as early as the 1990s.5
Originally ODR was developed as a mechanism for providing some form of
redress for online disputes that would otherwise be left outside the courts owing
to the low value of the claim or the jurisdictional challenges of cross-border
litigation. Typically used in cases concerning e-commerce or other low intensity
disputes,6 ODR processes are often partly or completely automated. Although
there is no uniform definition, ODR is seen as private dispute resolution based on
the consent of the parties, similarly to alternative dispute resolution (ADR).7
Because of this close relation to ADR and its criticism of the existing courtroom
practices, ODR is often examined as part of ADR doctrine. ODR can be
provided by several different intermediaries, such as e-commerce platforms,
private ODR providers, credit card companies, or private actors performing
public functions, as is the case with ICANN.8
It follows from ODR’s nature as private dispute resolution that its develop-
ment has not been burdened by slow legislative, unlike innovations of courtroom
technology; neither is ODR bound by due process criteria like the courts, which
raises questions about the quality of such services. The role of digital technolo-
gies in ODR is often more pronounced than in courtroom technology, especially
in completely automated procedures.
However, regulatory efforts are slowly coming to grips with ODR, in a bid to
assure due process. In the EU, the ODR Regulation and ADR Directive
established a union-wide ODR platform through which individual disputes are
directed to the applicable national ADR entities.9 The EU’s framework is focused
on non-binding ODR.10 Also, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has attempted to draft uniform procedural rules for
both binding and non-binding ODR. However, the work was terminated in
2016 having produced technical notes on ODR.11
Interestingly, ODR has never actually lived up to the expectations regarding its
popularity.12 A single triumph has been named and referenced over and over
again, namely eBay, which solves 60 million e-commerce cases per year through
its Resolution Center.13 In the face of increasing difficulties,14 many ODR
providers have turned towards the public sector in the hope of investment. It
still remains to be seen how the legislative work of the EU will affect the dispute
resolution environment. Nonetheless, despite disappointments and new promises,
the emergence of ODR has signified an important chapter in development of
dispute resolution technology.
Legal technology
Around 2015 the term ‘legal technology’ became the household name for
different applications of dispute resolution technology. Originally this new term
referred to software developed for law firms, such as e-billing systems, case flow
analysis tools and client portals. Recently the definition has become more
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inclusive, encompassing software that was earlier understood as courtroom
technology or ODR applications.15 Discussions on legal technology often focus
on the changes in practice of law enabled by technology, emphasising the
disruption of the legal market.16
Procedural rules for technology disputes
In addition to courtroom technology, ODR and legal technology, another inter-
face can be found in disputes over technology, e.g. conflicts of patent law and
utility model rights. Special procedural rules have been developed for the resolu-
tion of technology disputes. For example, the EU has enacted a directive on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The directive includes rules for
intermediaries such as Internet service providers, precautionary measures and
injunctions.17 However, this interface is excluded from the scope of this study,
as examination of these substantive norms does not contribute to the analysis of
privatisation of enforcement.
In the following section, the overarching theme of this study – how digital
technology increases privatisation of coercion and influences the fundamental
justification of dispute resolution – is approached by describing different exam-
ples of how technology affects enforcement of decisions rendered in different
dispute resolution models.
1.3 Technology and enforcement
Despite their differences in implementing technology, both the private and public
schemes of dispute resolution share the overarching need to provide a mechanism
for executing the decisions rendered in the resolution procedure. Voluntary
compliance may often frustrate the need for any further enforcement, but this
does not suffice. The functioning of markets presupposes a functioning model of
governance complete with a mechanism for coercion, either private or public.18
The need for enforcement becomes tangible when the threat of coercion does
not produce compliance on its own.19
Still, the relevance of enforcement for dispute resolution cannot be reduced to
its practical importance. Enforcement also provides a vantage point to the core of
conflict management and to legal practice, where the legal system’s inherent
nature in legitimising use of force in the society becomes visible. The state’s
monopoly on violence is often organised through the national courts and private
forms of enforcement often challenge this monopoly. The juncture of private and
public enforcement is further escalated by technological advances that enable
increasing privatisation.
In this section, I describe seven examples of encouraging – or forcing –
compliance in private and public models of dispute resolution. By these examples,
I provide an overview of different forms of enforcement and elaborate on how
new technology-driven forms of forcing compliance overlap, cooperate and
challenge the old ones.
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A. Starting point: dispute resolution and enforcement through the
public courts
This first example describes the traditional court-focused approach to enforcement,
in which an unpaid debt is collected with the help of the national courts.
Helsinki-based artist Violetta has bought a used hi-fi amplifier from Bob’s
company Sound Waves, which is located in Berlin, Germany. However, after
receiving the item Violetta has refused to pay the agreed price of €1,000.
According to Violetta, there is a scratch on the amplifier that she was not aware
of at the time of purchase. As they are unable to reach a settlement among
themselves, Bob files a claim on behalf of his company at the district court in
Helsinki. The court assesses that the relatively small scratch does not affect the
price and in its enforceable judgment obligates Violetta to make a full payment
plus interest to Bob. As Violetta refuses to comply, Bob contacts the Finnish
enforcement authorities that collect the debt from Violetta’s salary and transfer
the whole sum to Bob.
In this simple example Bob relies on the public court system to enforce his
legal position. The procedure has two elements: the adjudicative process that
ends when the judgment is rendered, and the additional debt recovery procedure.
As both phases take place within the same public system, the transition from
adjudication to enforcement is straightforward. Also, both parties may trust the
court to follow the due process criteria set in the national legislation.
The downside is that in the worst-case scenario Bob might have to wait for
years to finally receive the payment, and, depending on Violetta’s contesting the
judgment, the adjudicative process may be expensive due to court fees and the
legal costs of using a lawyer. In addition, Bob has taken the matter to a foreign
court at Violetta’s place of residence, which adds to the complexity of the matter
on Bob’s side. In reality, these obstacles may cause Bob to re-evaluate his
situation or even decide not to continue to pursue the matter.20 On the other
hand, the well-functioning interface between the adjudication and the enforce-
ment might increase the desirability of the public courts. Further, the implemen-
tation of technology in different stages of adjudication and debt recovery might
reduce the overall expenses of money and time.
B. Private arbitration and public enforcement through the courts
In this second example the well-established system of international arbitration is used
to resolve the dispute, after which enforcement is sought through the court system.
The experience with Violetta still fresh in his mind, Bob agrees to install a
complete sound system to club owner Jacqueline’s newest club The Peekaboo in
Barcelona. A price of €100,000 is agreed upon and on Jacqueline’s insistence an
arbitration clause is included in the contract between her and Bob’s companies.
There is, however, a problem with the installation and the sound system does not
match the technical specifications agreed upon in the contract. Bob refuses to
compensate the fault and Jacqueline takes the matter to an arbitration procedure
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according to the arbitration clause. After a relatively quick procedure, the arbitral
tribunal decides in favour of Jacqueline and obligates Bob to pay her the
compensation of €30,000. When Bob refuses to pay, Jacqueline contacts the
district court in Berlin where Bob’s company is still located. She asks the court to
enforce the arbitral award in accordance with the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The German court
recognises the award in a summary process and after this Jacqueline has the award
enforced through the public enforcement authorities.
In this example, the dispute resolution is provided by private arbitration
tribunal and the enforcement by the public system. This follows from the
rationale of the New York Convention that entrusts the enforcement of private
dispute resolution to the Contracting States in accordance with the rules set out
in the Convention instrument. By choosing arbitration over the public courts,
Jacqueline saves time, although the costs of arbitration might exceed the legal
costs in courts. The Convention provides a well-functioning interface to the
public enforcement mechanism that limits the time and expense of the recogni-
tion procedure.21 Also, the due process criteria of the arbitration procedure are
evaluated by the public court before access to public enforcement is granted,
meaning that the final say about the use of force still resides within the public
sphere. This means that the parties may place their trust simultaneously in the
expertise of the arbitration tribunal and the quality of the recognition procedure
and debt recovery of public authorities. Nonetheless, full-scale arbitration is often
too expensive to provide a solution for low-intensity disputes often characterised
by their low value.22
C. Coaxing compliance online without enforcement
This example describes the use of alternative mechanisms such as reputational
systems that are often used in an online setting to remedy the lack of actual
dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms.
Montrealer Matthieu browses around an e-commerce site in the hopes of
finding a modular synthesiser for the right price. He finds Bob’s company
Sound Waves and is about to place an order before noticing that the products
are shipped from Germany. He decides to go through user reviews about other
buyers’ experiences with Bob. Seeing that Bob has several reviews complaining
about damage to the products during delivery, Matthieu decides to buy the
synthesiser from another seller.
As trustworthy redress mechanisms might not be available, consumers’ trust in
the reliability of e-commerce is upheld by other means of directing behaviour.
Here, the e-commerce site adopts the perspective of conflict prevention as it
rewards appropriate behaviour by publishing positive reviews and sanctions
unwished behaviour by negative reviews and other possible means, e.g. banning
unwanted users from the site.23
Although this conflict prevention does not address the needs of an already
escalated dispute, such functionalities encourage desired behaviour in the future.
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Also, if there is an ODR service incorporated into the site, a user’s non-
compliance with the ODR decisions can be listed publicly to encourage future
compliance and transparency. However, user review systems can also be used
fraudulently.
D. Dispute resolution and enforcement through chargebacks
This fourth example describes the use of credit card companies’ chargeback pro-
cesses that can at times provide an alternative to dispute resolution and enforcement.
Dutch consumer Pierre orders a sequencer online from Bob’s company and
makes the payment of €400 with his credit card. However, the product never
arrives and Pierre is not able to discuss a settlement with Bob. Pierre then
contacts the credit card company that has issued his card and asks them to
reverse the payment due to non-delivery. The credit card company trusts Pierre’s
description and issues a chargeback that reimburses Pierre’s payment.
In this example dispute resolution and enforcement are organised by a private
third party, the credit card company. The system is funded by payments made by
the sellers to the credit card company and the payment sum varies from seller to
seller depending on how often they have been involved in chargeback proce-
dures. Thus, in addition to providing a redress mechanism, chargebacks enable
steering the future behaviour of sellers. However, chargeback procedures only
enable the reversal of the payment made and they lack any compensation for
damage. Further, their scope of application is limited to specific situations, and
consumers are not necessarily aware of the existence of chargeback procedures.24
The latter issue could be improved by raising consumers’ awareness. Should the
credit card company refuse the chargeback, the consumer needs to turn to out-
of-court redress services dealing with financial services.25
E. ODR and private enforcement on e-commerce platforms
This fifth example describes private dispute resolution and enforcement provided
by an Internet platform based on the platform’s user agreement.
The German sound system expert Bob orders some wires for his home-built
modular synthesiser online from an US-based company, Oscillating Vibes. The
wires, although functioning, are not to Bob’s liking as they are pink and not
black as he supposed them to be based on a listing photo. When no settlement is
reached between Bob and Oscillating Vibes and the company refuses to refund,
Bob decides to settle the issue through the ODR service of the e-commerce site.
After photos provided by Bob are compared to the listing photos, the e-commerce
site decides to refund the cost of the wires and the shipping fees to Bob. Based on
the user agreement, Oscillating Vibes is obligated to reimburse the amount to the
e-commerce site and, if necessary, the sum is then automatically deducted from the
company’s account on the e-commerce site.
In this example, dispute resolution and enforcement are both provided by the
e-commerce site. Both the resolution procedure and the enforcement phase are
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conducted online with the help of technology at the same e-commerce platform
where the disputed transaction took place. This ensures efficient and quick
redress at a low cost. However, this option requires the combination of an
e-commerce site and a payment platform, which means that such private schemes
are feasible mostly to market leaders, such as eBay and PayPal. The mandate to
draw funds from the seller’s bank account is based on the user agreement.
However, there is no certainty or public control as to whether or not the private
provider follows the minimum criteria of due process.
F. Dispute resolution and direct enforcement of ICANN
This sixth example describes the sui generis form of non-binding arbitration and
private enforcement developed for specific dispute category, domain name disputes.
The Spanish club owner Jacqueline has recently gained some fame with her old
band Black Vixens from Outer Space. A booking agency contacted Jacqueline
and complained about not finding the band’s home page although it had
remained the same blackvixensfromouterspace.com for several years. Apparently
Jacqueline had forgotten to renew the registration of the domain name. After this
Jacqueline discovered that the domain name had already been claimed by a dealer
who then wanted to sell it back to the band for a profit. Now Jacqueline wants to
regain the ownership of the band’s domain name and contacts ICANN (Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) that governs the global domain
name system. ICANN redirects Jacqueline’s claim to an approved dispute resolu-
tion service provider who applies ICANN’s specific policy for resolving domain
name disputes, UDRP (Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy). As the decision is
rendered in favour of Jacqueline’s claim, ICANN executes the decision by
registering the domain name to the domain name system.
In this example, the dispute resolution of a domain name dispute is entrusted
to private providers and the decision is enforced by ICANN. No separate public
enforcement is needed. Although the UDRP rules do not prevent parties from
taking the dispute to court, it is unclear whether and how often court proceed-
ings are initiated after the specialised process. Also, ICANN has been criticised
for the lack of due process as well as for the non-existing monitoring of the
private corporation’s functions.26
G. Enforcement through self-executing smart contracts
This last example describes the use of blockchain-based smart contracts, where
Violetta, the Finnish artist of our first example, has composed a particularly
interesting piece of experimental drone music. Alex from the UK is a music
enthusiast and wants to buy Violetta’s new piece for her electronic music collec-
tion. They agree to conclude the transaction by using a new digital technology, a
platform for smart contracts built on the infrastructure of cryptocurrencies.27 Alex
drafts the contract programme and transfers money to it. The smart contract will
automatically transfer the money to Violetta once the piece is downloaded to
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Alex’s computer. The contract verifies that the download has taken place and
completes the transaction without any further action from the parties.
In this example, there is no dispute resolution or enforcement as such, let
alone a dispute. Neither does this scenario direct future behaviour of the parties
or participants as was the case with example C, coaxing compliance through user
reviews. However, there is an element of conflict prevention here, as the
automated contract instrument does not enable the withholding of funds or
other fraudulent behaviour. The example depicts a method of completing con-
tracts that self-execute contractual obligations without relying on the parties to
trust each other in order to do business. Trust is allocated to the technological
infrastructure, not to the authority of the courts, the expertise of the arbitration
tribunal or ICANN, nor to the binding or non-binding sanction mechanisms of
e-commerce intermediaries. Although the challenges and potential of self-execut-
ing contracts deserve more thorough examination later on, at this point it suffices
to draw attention to the private nature of this application of conflict prevention.
New chapter in private governance?
The use of digital technology, together with emerging behavioural models of
Internet users, has contributed to the emergence of new enforcement mechanisms.
Some of these mechanisms make use of existing structures in new situations
(chargebacks), some are more or less new (ICANN, direct enforcement on
platforms). Some alternatives to enforcement highlight conflict prevention (reputa-
tional systems) and in some prevention and resolution coincide (smart contracts).
These examples portray enforcement as a complex phenomenon that cannot be
reduced to court-oriented debt recovery.
Traditional models of enforcement through courts and arbitration proceedings
co-exist with contractual models such as chargebacks and direct enforcement of
e-commerce platforms. Distinctions between the original contract, contractual
obligations, the resolution of a dispute rising from the transaction, and the
enforcement of the decision reached in the dispute resolution are no longer
definitive. The boundaries between dispute resolution and conflict prevention are
dissolving. Also, the demarcation between contractual arrangements and dispute
resolution is becoming more ambiguous.
Chargebacks, private enforcement of e-commerce sites, direct enforcement of
ICANN, and self-executing smart contracts all bypass the nation-state’s monopoly
on violence, as private or internal mechanisms for forcing compliance are sufficient
by themselves and do not require an interface to public enforcement. At the same
time, however, these models of enforcement challenge the state’s traditional
monopoly on violence. From this perspective, it is not relevant whether the
expansion of private regimes to enforcement is a part of a deliberate neo-liberal
agenda,28 or simply an organically evolved solution for situations where public
governance models have not yet been able to provide enforcement measures.
Of course, private governance existed before the emergence of the Internet.
For instance, American legal scholar Lisa Bernstein has examined private regimes
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that predate the current technological development. She discusses examples of
private ordering within the diamond and cotton industries which have both
created their own systems of private law complete with institutions for dispute
resolution and enforcement. Both of these industries rely on their own reputation-
based private legal systems that are considered superior to the public legal system
by the members of the industries.29
Countless other examples of past private regimes can be found in the medieval
lex mercatoria with its market courts,30 in the European trade companies
exercising sovereign power in the colonies,31 and in the Sicilian Mafia,32 among
others. This is to say that the phenomenon of private governance is not new
either within the legal system or outside it.33 Noted private enforcement has
much in common with older models of private governance, as all of them answer
to the need of governance in situations where public governance does not exist or
otherwise does not act.
However, there are differences between these old and new instances of private
governance. Firstly, new models of private governance are no longer limited to
offshore colonies or foreigners but are expanding to the core areas of sovereignty,
to the nation-state’s territorial jurisdiction, and to the monopoly on violence
within its own borders. In other words, private enforcement is bringing new
players to a field that had previously belonged mostly to public institutions. For
low-intensity disputes that do not pass the threshold of costs and time to access
public courts, private ordering and enforcement is becoming the mainstream, if not
the only, option. Also, private enforcement, as it employs use of coercion, goes
beyond the earlier models of private alternative dispute resolution that rely on state
enforcement when necessary. Thus, private forms of governance formulate policies
for online transactions that are cross-border and global by definition, not limited to
certain industries, and bypass the state’s monopoly on violence.
Secondly, the mode of operation of this new private enforcement is more
inclusive than earlier spheres of private governance. Private dispute resolution and
enforcement is not limited to close-knit communities or self-regulating sector-
specific industries that operate based on reputational sanctions. Earlier models of
self-governance have emerged within relatively small homogeneous communities
where sanctions effectively mean exclusion from the community and information
about fraudulent behaviour flows efficiently within the network. But the private
enforcement of e-commerce sites or the domain name system does not function
in such small communities based on trust. They are not limited to professional
practitioners within certain industries but encompass consumers and businesses
that earlier had no entrance point to cross-border commerce. Further, it could be
argued that the freedom of choice within these new private regimes is limited;
participants can mostly choose whether or not to participate but have often
restricted or non-existent possibilities to negotiate the terms of participation.34
Instead, e-commerce communities are not clearly defined or stable and the
adopted sanction mechanisms steer participants’ trust to the intermediaries and
not to the community.35 Also, the distribution of information is at the discretion
of these intermediaries, whose private nature often makes use of coercion
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invisible. In short, private enforcement is changing our understanding of who is
entitled to use force, against whom, on what grounds, and how this coercion is
made visible, monitored and justified.
1.4 Towards a crisis of justificatory narratives
The examples demonstrate that enforcement is changing as a result of digital
technologies but the question remains, what are the implications of privatised
coercion for law, for society and for dispute resolution? Needless to say, the
effects are multifaceted. Adding alternatives to court-based enforcement both
empowers disputants and transfers responsibility for dispute resolution outside
the public court system. Whereas arbitration still relies on the public system
to enforce arbitral awards, other solutions are adopted to serve the needs of
private dispute resolution and enforcement online. In contrast with arbitration,
private enforcement often remains hidden from established legal structures. Yet we
define enforcement through the connection between law and state, the epitome of
which are the public courts, although this model no longer sufficiently explains the
diversity of enforcement.
This development brings about a crisis of justifying coercion in a nation-state.
By this I mean that the new irritant of technology has brought new phenomena
such as private enforcement to the legal system, and the traditional justificatory
narratives do not sufficiently explain these phenomena. The result of this is that
the narratives are losing part of their credibility and adaptability. This means that
the crisis has a negative connotation. The justificatory crisis refers to uncertainty
about how private enforcement should be conceptualised, which then causes
disruptions in the normal functioning of the legal system. If the legal system does
not find a way to react to the privatised coercion, the law’s renewal comes under
threat. However, a crisis should not be reduced only to its negative aspects.
Instead, a crisis may also bring forward necessary changes and development that
might have a positive impact.36 Hence, the claim I make on the emergence of
justificatory crisis is descriptive by nature. Instead of claiming that we should
change the existing justificatory narratives because of digital technology, I under-
stand the narratives to be changing as a result of new technology. However, there
is a prescriptive element: it is necessary for the future coherence of the legal system
that the disruption be resolved, the irritant neutralised, and the justification of
coercion restored.
Although there is nothing new about the tension between private and public
conflict, the emergence of digital technologies has escalated this tension into a
discrepancy. Technology has transformative power, and, if left unaddressed, the
implementation of technology in dispute resolution could have serious implica-
tions, as the invisible use of force would not be predictable for the legal system.
The changes in enforcement brought on by digital technologies call for a
reaction within the legal system. The legal community should take a decisive
stance whether or not private use of coercion is acceptable and whether or not it
should be regulated in more detail. If the transformation of enforcement is not
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acknowledged and private enforcement is not absorbed into the legal system, the
justificatory crisis deepens. In order to answer this challenge imposed by private
enforcement, we first need to understand how public coercion is rendered
acceptable, in other words how it is justified, and then evaluate whether the
same applies to private coercion. The starting point is that law shows itself as
violence in enforcement and this violence needs to be justified. The overarching
objective of this study is to describe how the implementation of digital technologies
into dispute resolution encourages privatisation of enforcement and thus challenges
the justification of law as a legitimised mode of violence.
To this end, it is necessary to examine how we should understand digital
technologies in the context of dispute resolution. Answers are sought from
Marshall McLuhan’s technological determinism, which highlights the disruptive-
ness of technology, and Raymond Williams’s social construction of technology,
which places emphasis on the social element of using technology. In addition to
these, I discuss the agency of technology in the spirit of Friedrich Kittler’s work
on media theory.
Also, it should be noted that the procedural law doctrine operates based on a
distinction between courtroom technology and ODR. However, this book
evaluates the disruptive qualities of dispute resolution technology without
making such differentiations. Based on this emphasis it is suggested that the
doctrinal distinction between different resolution processes, i.e. court procedures
and alternative dispute resolution, is no longer solid. As the use of technology in
these processes is changing the ways in which they are organised, courtroom
technology and ODR applications are slowly converging, even more so than their
counterparts, adjudication and ADR. In addition to this convergence, new
applications of dispute resolution technology, coined legal tech, escape these
previous categorisations. Hence, this study adopts a joint approach to examine
both publicly and privately funded applications of dispute resolution technology.
When we look at the implications of digital technology in privatisation of
coercion, we look at the mechanisms for justifying use of force in the society.
Justification of coercion is not straightforward. To address the issue, it is
necessary to recognise the argumentation used within the legal system to justify
different forms of dispute resolution and enforcement, and after these structures
of argumentation have been rendered visible, compare them to the challenge of
technology and that of private enforcement. I presuppose that private dispute
resolution and enforcement needs to be justified based on the same criteria as
public use of force due to the previously mentioned growing convergence caused
by technology.
I approach the issue of justification by recognising three narratives that are
employed to justify the use of force in dispute resolution: sovereignty, private
autonomy and access to justice. These justificatory explanations are not exclu-
sionary but instead overlap and are interconnected in several ways. In addition,
the preferred justificatory model has varied in different times, societies and
circumstances. It follows from this that the picture I am painting is a freeze-
frame of workings of justification, a theoretical simplification aimed at bringing
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the justificatory narratives out into the open instead of hiding them behind the
façade of doctrinal differences and legal dogmatics. These narratives illustrate that
introducing technology into dispute resolution influences the ways in which the law
functions and the ways in which the law sets its own boundaries. Technology has
implications for the fundamental justification of state intervention in private conflicts
as well as for the argumentative role granted to private autonomy and to access to
justice. It should be noted that in the end, justificatory narratives are argumentation
tools that can be employed to defend or oppose the in casu acceptability of any given
technological innovation, similarly to Professor Martti Koskenniemi’s theory on
ascending and descending arguments in international law.37
The first justificatory narrative examined more closely in Chapter 6 uses the
concept of sovereignty to explain state interests in dispute resolution and how
justification is created, reinterpreted and grounded in the changing environment
of dispute resolution. As a source of justification, sovereignty renders a decision
enforceable when it is reached in a public trial. This first narrative interconnects
with larger social and legal changes often described through legal pluralism and
increasing legal regulation.38 In traditional procedural doctrine, state intervention
is executed through adopting a state monopoly on dispute resolution as a
theoretical starting point. Thus, sovereignty plays a significant role as a justifica-
tory principle in this narrative. However, sovereignty, formulated as the state
monopoly on conflict management, brings the political ideal and agenda of the
modern nation-state into dispute resolution.39
The second narrative is explored in Chapter 7 by asking how consent is seen as
a source of justification in procedural law. Although sovereignty has been the
main justification basis for the state monopoly of dispute resolution since the
formation of the modern nation-state through the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in
1648, state monopoly accepts and gives protection to the parties’ agreement in
litigation. Agreement, i.e. reciprocal consent, became prominent as a justificatory
model after ADR ideology was introduced in the 1970s. An example of consent
as the source of justification can be found in arbitral clauses that transfer
jurisdiction from public courts to private arbitration tribunals. This emphasis on
mutual agreement as a source of justification has partly challenged the old
tradition of founding legitimacy on sovereignty. Current forms of private govern-
ance further challenge the state’s monopoly on dispute resolution, and question
the role of sovereignty as a source of justification. Still, the consent of the parties
as a justificatory narrative conveys the rationality of contractual freedom and
classic liberalism to dispute resolution.
The third narrative examined in further detail in Chapter 8, Access to justice,
draws its justificatory force from the quality of the resolution procedure rather
than the external authority of the state or the parties concerned. As a source of
justification, it would imply that a violation of due process renders the procedure
unjust, inexistent and empty. Or, contrastingly, a high level of due process in the
resolution process renders the decision enforceable. Such justificatory conceptua-
lisations would also be compatible with the joint approach of viewing both state
litigation and ODR simultaneously. As a justificatory narrative, access to justice is
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ethical communication about dispute resolution. In this sense, the concept demar-
cates what is considered to be due process and what is not. It draws its justificatory
strength from the morality of the communication alongside the authority of
institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is
established by sovereign states. As a source of justification, access to justice trans-
forms the question of justification into the content of a single resolution proce-
dure. On a general level, we would be left empty-handed with a bare reference to
human rights whose content can only be decided in casu. If this is our best answer
to the question of justification, what does this tell us about the law?
Based on this examination, I propose the following: the existing justificatory
narratives do not provide an answer for justifying new forms of private enforce-
ment. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate whether these narratives could be
adapted to this task by reinterpretation. The foundational assumption that has
motivated this study is that the justificatory narratives used to demarcate the legally
accepted use of force do not automatically apply to new, emerging forms of dispute
resolution and enforcement enabled by digital technologies, and a re-evaluation is
called for in order to overcome the potential justificatory crisis.
1.5 Existing research and the scope of this study
Different applications of dispute resolution have been the object of study for
several scholars. The work of Professor Fredric Lederer has been paving the road
for courtroom technology,40 and the Cyberjustice Laboratory continues examining
the implementation of technology in courts.41 In addition to these, Dory Reiling’s
comprehensive doctoral dissertation in 2009 has shed light on the many ways in
which IT may assist future judicial reforms.42 Also national legislative reforms, as
well as international studies, have produced important practical information on
courtroom technology,43 although such studies seldom address the more abstract
issues of justification.
ODR has received much scholarly attention. Early monographs on ODR
focused mainly on defining ODR and its uses, adopting a role of advocacy.44 The
majority of research on ODR is published in journal articles, and there is no
established common framework,45 which has led to a strong emphasis on case
examples and to the adoption of a practical approach. Contributions to a more
elaborate research agenda include the 2004 book by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
and Schultz and the compilation of articles edited by Abdel Wahab, Katsh and
Rainey in 2012 have contributed to a more elaborate research agenda for ODR.46
In the UK, Professor Julia Hörnle examines due process standards for online,
arguing for a proportionate model of due process, in which public due process
safeguards would be integrated into private dispute resolution procedures.47
Professor Pablo Cortés provides a detailed proposal for a European legal frame-
work for consumer ODR that consists of regulation, increasing consumer
awareness through accreditation and uniform trustmarks, enabling mandatory
ODR clauses and establishing procedural legal standards.48 In the Nordic
countries, ODR was discussed in Susan Schiavetta’s unpublished dissertation at
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the University of Oslo in 2008,49 and Tapio Puurunen’s dissertation at the
University of Helsinki in 2005.50
Regardless of the growing body of research, enforcement in general, and private
enforcement in particular, have mostly remained peripheral. Cortés touches upon
self-enforcement mechanisms of ODR providers and lists the lack of enforcement
as one of the possible impediments to the development of ODR. Also, he states
that the public enforcement system should complement self-enforcement
mechanisms.51 Thornburg points out that ICANN has found a solution to the
enforcement issue but this solution cannot be adopted in other forms of ODR.52
Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, on the other hand, make a distinction between
indirect and direct self-enforcement. In their definition, indirect self-enforcement
refers to trustmarks, reputation systems, exclusion from the marketplace and other
modes of directing behaviour, whereas direct self-enforcement includes escrows,
chargebacks, insurance mechanisms and ‘judgment funds’ established by ODR
providers or third parties.53 They consider self-enforcement to be the best option
for ODR decisions in case voluntary compliance is not an option.54 Despite these
concise remarks, there is no comprehensive examination of technology-enabled
enforcement.
Although scholarship on the impact of dispute resolution technology on
enforcement is scarce, justification has been, in one way or another, the object
of study of most legal scholars. In the end, the very question of law’s self-
description is a question of justification and legitimacy. The emergence of private
regimes has been discussed in legal theory by the German legal scholars Teubner
and Fischer-Lescano,55 and Calliess,56 among others. Further research on private
governance can be found in several fields of law as well as in economics, political
science and social sciences. These discussions, although illuminating and relevant,
provide limited support to the specific research objective of this study to examine
the theoretical implications of privatisation of coercion brought on by dispute
resolution technology.
This study aims to remedy the relative lack of theoretical research on dispute
resolution technology. Such abstract inquiry is necessary if we are to provide a
framework for assessing how the use of technology changes the practice of law.
Implications of such study are also practical, as the results provide much needed
background information for legislative reforms. The perspective of conflict
management, and ultimately that of access to justice, is a fruitful starting point
for assessing the impact new technology has on the practice of law, as procedural
structures set the frames in which the law functions. In certain respects this means
that the challenge of technology becomes more pronounced in conflict manage-
ment and hence the results found in this context could be extrapolated to the
overall legal system.
This being said, the examination of dispute resolution technology and privatisa-
tion of coercion that these applications enable is entwined with the growing demand
for efficiency many civil justice systems face nowadays. However, efficiency should
not be understood as an end in itself but should be interpreted in connection
with the values reflected in conflict management systems. Canadian researchers
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Fabien Gélinas et al. emphasise the need for a value-based framework for justice
reforms and state that “efficiency for the sake of freeing up resources should be
instrumental to other ends, which need to be researched and identified, rather than
an end in and of itself”.57 This study follows this lead by providing critical insights
into justifying privatisation of coercion and simultaneously lays the groundwork for
addressing the challenge that technology imposes on the legal system.
This study should be read as a hybrid of legal theory applied to the practice of
conflict management, which stipulates a relatively high level of abstraction. This
choice excludes a systematic examination of national procedural systems as well as
multilateral Conventions. I refer to national legislation and case law, and to
Convention-based normative regimes only when necessary for the objective of
examining the justificatory narratives on a general level. Privatisation of coercion
by technology is a global theme but the writer’s perspective is influenced by
Nordic civil law tradition, which might affect the argumentation. Although
justifying private enforcement is closely connected with other issues of govern-
ance, Internet governance and other rules of virtual worlds are excluded from the
scope of this study.58
Notes
1 It should be noted that technology issues have received considerable attention,
especially those related to intellectual property, Internet governance and data protec-
tion. Another issue is that the pace of technological innovation often exceeds that of
legislation creating new challenges for the legal system. See Frank Fechner, Medien-
recht (12th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2011) 346; Greg Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New
Laws of Online Worlds (Yale University Press 2010) 71–73.
2 Harvard Business School Professors Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen explain,
through their theory of disruptive innovation, why leading companies fail to maintain
their success when markets change. According to their theory, market leaders are
fixated on fulfilling their existing customers’ needs to sustain their market share and
are thus unable to predict the needs of potential customers in the future. In turn,
outsiders to the existing markets are equipped to develop technology for unestablished
markets, which in time may lead to disrupting the existing markets as well. See Joseph
L Bower and Clayton M Christensen, ‘Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave’
(1995) 73 Harvard Business Review 43.
3 See e.g. Fredric I Lederer, ‘Wired, What We Have Learned About Courtroom Technol-
ogy’ (2010) 24 ABA Criminal Justice 18; Karim Benyekhlef, Emmanuelle Amar and
Valentin Callipel, ‘ICT-Driven Strategies for Reforming Access to Justice Mechanisms in
Developing Countries’ (2015) 6 World Bank Legal Review 325; For a general overview
of implementing technology to the law of evidence see David Wotherspoon and Alex
Cameron, Electronic Evidence and E-Discovery (LexisNexis Canada 2010); On the
ramifications of technology to courts and judicial ethics, see Karen Eltis, Courts,
Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and Practice (Irwin Law 2012).
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between
the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial
matters 2001; For an overview on the application of the Regulation see Vesna Rijavec,
Tomaž Keresteš and Tjaša Ivanc (eds), Dimensions of Evidence in European Civil
Procedure (Kluwer Law International 2016).
5 The first articles on ODR were published by Ethan Katsh as early as 1996. See Ethan
M Katsh, ‘Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace’ (1996) 28 Connecticut Law Review
20 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
953; Ethan M Katsh, ‘The Online Ombuds Office: Adapting Dispute Resolution to
Cyberspace’ (1996); Katsh and Rifkin published the first monograph on ODR in 2001
focusing on analysing the role of technology as the fourth party of dispute resolution
proceedings. Ethan M Katsh and Janet Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving
Conflicts in Cyberspace (Jossey Bass 2001).
6 In literature, e-commerce disputes have usually been described as low value, high
volume. On ambiguity of this terminology see Karim Benyekhlef and Nicolas Vermeys,
‘Low-Value, High-Volume’ Disputes: Defining the Indefinable’ (Slaw – Canada’s
online legal magazine, 29 January 2014) available at http://www.slaw.ca/2014/01/
29/low-value-high-volume-disputes-defining-the-indefinable (accessed 15 June
2018); However, this characterisation is very much entwined with e-commerce and
may overlook other applications of dispute resolution and technology. The Laboratory
of Cyberjustice of University of Montreal uses the terminology of low intensity
disputes to describe the characteristics of disputes that would be suitable for ODR.
This terminology has the advantage of expressing the relatively low and simple
interests of the parties without labelling them simply as e-commerce disputes. See e.
g. Karim Benyekhlef, Valentin Callipel and Emmanuelle Amar, ‘La Médiation En
Ligne Pour Les Conflits de Basse Intensité’ (2015) 135 Gazette du Palais 17.
7 See e.g. Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Business. B2B, E-Commerce,
Consumer, Employment, Insurance, and Other Commercial Conflicts (Jossey-Bass
2002) 45; Aura Esther Vilalta, ‘ODR and E-Commerce’ in Mohamed S Abdel
Wahab, Ethan Katsh and Daniel Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory
and Practice. A Treatise on Technology and Dispute Resolution (Eleven International
Publishing 2012) 115; Hörnle sees ODR as an out-of-court resolution in the spirit
of ADR. See Julia Hörnle, Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution (Cambridge
University Press 2009) 75; On defining ODR see also Pablo Cortés, Online Dispute
Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge 2011) 53; Although
technology-augmented litigation and ODR are often conceptually separated, some
authors have suggested a joint approach. See Arno R Lodder and John Zeleznikow,
Enhanced Dispute Resolution Through the Use of Information Technology (Cambridge
University Press 2010) 170.
8 ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) is responsible for
the distribution of unique Internet Protocol (IP) address spaces which are an essential
part of the structure and functioning of the Internet. ICANN has established its own
dispute resolution model called Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) in
cooperation with World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). ICANN gives a
binding decision in domain name disputes which is also directly enforced by ICANN.
Because, in the end, ICANN is a private organisation entrusted with responsibilities of
public interest, it has been criticised for its lack of adequate accountability mechanisms.
See Rudolf W Rijgersberg, The State of Interdependence: Globalization, Internet and
Constitutional Governance (TMC Asser Press 2010) 69–217.
9 Regulation (EU)No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21May
2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) 2013;
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013
on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) 2013.
10 However, some of the ODR providers listed on the EU platform do offer processes
that are binding by default, upon agreement or biding for traders. Of the around 280
ADR entities listed, about a third provide some type of binding decisions. See Riikka
Koulu, ‘Improving Consumer Protection through Technology: The Challenge of
Compliance’ in Immaculada Barral (ed), La resolución de conflictos con consumidores:
de las ADR a las ODR (Reus 2018) 70.
Introduction 21
11 ‘Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions.
Technical Notes on Online Dispute Resolution’ (UNCITRAL, Working Group III
2016) A/CN.9/888, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/odr/
V1700382_English_Technical_Notes_on_ODR.pdf (accessed 19 June 2018).
12 Tania Sourdin and Chinthaka Liyanage, ‘The Promise and Reality of Online Dispute
Resolution in Australia’ in Mohamed S Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh and Daniel
Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice. A Treatise on Technology
and Dispute Resolution (Eleven International Publishing 2012) 471–472; Poblet and
Ross’ empirical findings on the status of ODR shed light to the current situation. See
closer, Marta Poblet and Graham Ross, ‘ODR in Europe’ in Mohamed S Abdel Wahab,
Ethan Katsh and Daniel Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice. A
Treatise on Technology and Dispute Resolution. (Eleven International Publishing 2012).
13 E.g. Mohamed S Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh and Daniel Rainey (eds), ‘Introduction’,
Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice: A Treatise on Technology and Dispute
Resolution (Eleven International Publishing 2012) 2.
14 E.g., Benyekhlef and Vermeys state that ‘true ODR … is having trouble to say the
least’. See Karim Benyekhlef and Nicolas Vermeys, ‘The End of ODR’ (Slaw Canada’s
online legal magazine, 10 January 2015), available at http://www.slaw.ca/2015/10/
01/the-end-of-odr/ (accessed 15 June 2018).
15 In his article, Markus Hartung makes the important distinction between general purpose
office tech and legal tech in the narrow sense, which are considered to refer to
technologies that replace tasks previously or currently conducted by lawyers. However,
as Hartung points out, such distinctions are not always easy to make and academic
debates about their exact meaning are, at least sometimes, pointless. In any case,
applications such as online dispute resolution, blockchains and artificial intelligence are
discussed in the articles of this important pioneering compilation, emphasising the
inclusivity of legal tech terminology. Markus Hartung, ‘Gedanken Zu Legal Tech Und
Digitalisierung’ in Markus Hartung, Micha-Manuel Bues and Gernot Halbleib (eds),
Legal Tech. Die Digitalisierung des Rechtmarkts (Verlag CH Beck 2018).
16 In their 2014 article, McGinnis and Pearce discuss the impact machine intelligence will
have on the legal profession and the practice of law, arguing that data-driven legal
technologies will increase process automation and contribute to the disintegration of
lawyers’ monopoly on legal service production. John O McGinnis and Russell G
Pearce, ‘The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role
of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 3041.
17 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 2004.
18 Avinash K Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton
University Press 2004) 1–4.
19 As Cortés points out, ‘consumer protection in e-commerce is meaningless unless
effective enforcement mechanisms are provided’. Cortés (n 7) 35.
20 The complexity, cost and time of cross-border court proceedings might prevent
consumers, especially, from pursuing their rights, which has been acknowledged by
the EU. These difficulties of public redress mechanisms are partly the reason behind
the EU’s regulatory project on ODR. The objective is to provide more efficient means
for redress through non-binding ADR and the ODR platform. See ‘Executive Sum-
mary of the Impact Assessment on Directive on Consumer ADR and Regulation on
Consumer ODR’ (European Commission 2011) SEC (2011) 1409 final 1; See also
Immaculada Barral-Viñals, ‘Consumer Trust and Business Benefits with ODR’ in
Colin Adamson (ed), Online Dispute Resolution: An International Business Approach
to Solving Consumer Complaints (Author House 2015).
21 The success of the New York Convention has also been emphasised within the EU.
Because of this success and worries from stakeholders, provisions regarding arbitration
22 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
were not included in the recast Brussels I Regulation that governs the circulation of
court judgments within the Member States. See preamble (12) of the Regulation (EU)
No 1215/2012 on the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (recast) 2012. However, it is possible that the decision is set aside
in the recognition procedure. The New York Convention stipulates the reasons based
on which Contracting States may refuse to recognise an award.
22 This is not necessarily the case, however, regarding online arbitration which could
lower the expenses while maintaining the interface with public enforcement. The
question whether ODR could be enforced as online arbitration is still unanswered.
This discussion has been ongoing in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III. For an
overview, see ‘Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the
Work of Its Thirtieth Session (Vienna, 20–24 October 2014)’ (UNCITRAL, Working
Group III 2014) A/CN.9&827 §§ 33–37, 47–52. The issue of enforcing ODR
decisions as arbitral awards is not a simple one. If the decision is made for ODR as
arbitration, several providers could potentially rename their services without making
other changes, e.g. without incorporating the due process criteria stipulated by the
New York Convention. This could increase the caseload at public courts and lead to
awards being set aside on procedural grounds. Further, enforcing ODR as arbitration
does not remove the issue of court costs which might still prove to be too high for
low-intensity disputes.
23 A different issue is the users’ ability to contest such sanction mechanisms. For a short
introduction to an ODR mechanism intended for disputes on fraudulent user reviews,
see e.g. Katherine G Newcomer, ‘Online Dispute Resolution Decision Making – A
NetNeutrals Practitioner’s View’ in Colin Adamson (ed), Online Dispute Resolution:
An International Business Approach to Solving Consumer Complaints (Author House
2015).
24 The legal basis for requesting a chargeback can be found in EU directives or in the
operational rules of credit card companies. Directives authorise the request for charge-
back in cases where the transaction was not authorised by the consumer, the trader
does not respect the consumers’ rights, or in the case of bankruptcy. See Directive
2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on
payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC,
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC 2007; Directive
2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC 2008.
Operational rules provided by MasterCard and Visa enable chargebacks in cases of non-
delivery and non-conformity. See ‘Chargeback in the EU/EEA. A Solution to Get Your
Money Back When a Trader Does Not Respect Your Consumer Rights’ (The European
Consumer Centre’s Network ECC-Net (undated)) available at http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/ecc/docs/chargeback_report_en.pdf (accessed 15 June 2018).
25 There are instruments that can aid a consumer to take a chargeback dispute to an ADR
scheme. For example, FIN-NET is a network of financial dispute resolution schemes
that directs consumers to the correct authorities. See ‘FIN-NET Financial Dispute
Resolution Network’, available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/fin-net/index_en.htm
(accessed 15 June 2018).
26 Monika Zalnieriute and Thomas Schneider, ‘ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the
Light of Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Democratic Values’ (Council of
Europe 2014) DGI (2014) 12, available at http://www.coe.int/t/informationsoci
ety/icann-and-human-rights.asp (accessed 15 June 2018); See also Rijgersberg (n 8)
69-NaN, 215; Elizabeth G Thornburg, ‘Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons
from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process’ (2002) 6 Computer Law Review and
Technology Journal 89.
Introduction 23
27 In Chapters 3 and 8 I discuss the example of using cryptocurrencies for self-enforcement.
See also Riikka Koulu, ‘Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts as
an Alternative to Enforcement’ (2016) 13 SCRIPTed 40.
28 For example, Lister et al. acknowledge the neo-liberal agenda behind the promotion of
ICTs both by state and corporate actors. Martin Lister and others, New Media: A
Critical Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge 2009) 11.
29 Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115; Lisa Bernstein,
‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724; for case
studies of private governance from the perspective of economics, see Edward Peter
Stringham, Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life (Oxford
University Press 2015); Dixit (n 18) 25–29; on the relationship between public policy
and private governance, see Catherine E Rudder, ‘Private Governance as Public Policy:
A Paradigm Shift’ (2008) 70 Journal of Politics 899.
30 However, it is unclear how autonomous the medieval private regime actually was. See
Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Lex Mercatoria’, ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies
No. 52 / 2015, available at ssrn.com/abstract=2597583 (accessed 15 June 2018).
31 For example, The Dutch East India Company was granted sovereign rule over
Indonesia. See e.g. Wieze van Elderen, ‘The Dutch East India Company’ (european-
heritage.org) available at http://european-heritage.org/netherlands/alkmaar/dutch-
east-india-company (accessed 15 June 2018).
32 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard
University Press 1993).
33 The emergence of private governance within the legal system, although not necessarily
called governance, has received much attention in legal literature. The discussion is linked
to the emergence of alternative dispute resolution, the decline of civil cases in the courts
known as the vanishing trial phenomenon, and the apprehension about renewal of case
law without precedents. These phenomena are discussed in the following chapters. For an
overview on privatisation of justice, see e.g. Fabien Gélinas and others, Foundations of
Civil Justice: Toward a Value-Based Framework for Reform (Springer International
Publishing 2015) 81–104; Tracy Walters McCormack, ‘Privatizing the Justice System’
(2006) 25 Review of Litigation 735; Trevor CW Farrow, ‘Public Justice, Private Dispute
Resolution and Democracy’ in Ronalda Murphy and Patric A Molinari (eds), Doing
Justice: Dispute Resolution in the Courts and Beyond = Règlement des conflits: la justice
n’appartient-elle qu’aux tribunaux? 2007 (Canadian Institute for the Administration of
Justice/ Institut canadien d’administration de la justice 2007); For an overview on private
governance from the perspective of economics, see Stringham (n 29).
34 It is possible to argue that this is also the case within reputation-based industry
regimes. However, technology-enabled private regimes are potentially significantly
more inclusive and extensive than small professional communities, though participants
also shape the social norms and best practices in the latter.
35 Some applications of private enforcement go further than others. For example, the
rationale behind cryptocurrencies was to form trustless public networks where transac-
tions do not rely on the past or future behaviour of the parties or the authority of
central banks or other intermediaries. The architecture of cryptocurrencies is examined
in more detail in Chapter 9.
36 The etymology of crisis comes from the Greek word krisis, which can be literally
translated as ‘judgment’, ‘result of a trial’, ‘selection’. See ‘crisis (n.)’ ‘Online Etymol-
ogy Dictionary’ available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=crisis
accessed 15 June 2018. Communication theorists Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer define
organisational crises as follows: ‘specific, unexpected, and nonroutine events or series
of events that [create] high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an
24 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
organization’s high-priority goals’. Matthew W Seeger, Timothy L Sellnow and
Robert R Ulmer, ‘Communication, Organization, and Crisis’ in Michael E Roloff
(ed), Communication Yearbook 21 (Routledge 1998) 233. Within the same context of
crisis communication, Venette attaches an element of change into the definition:
‘Thus, crisis is a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be
maintained’. See Steven James Venette, ‘Risk Communication in a High Reliability
Organization: APHIS PPQ’s Inclusion of Risk in Decision Making’ (North Dakota
State University 2003) 43. These definitions reflect the uncertainty and element of
change inherent in crises, although they deal with a context other than the legal
system. Hence, they provide a sufficient starting point. I return to the description of
the justificatory crisis and deal with it in more detail in Chapter 4.
37 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument. Reissue with a New Epilogue (Cambridge University Press 2005) 59.
38 On pluralism, see e.g., John Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 18 The
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; Surya Prakash Sinha, ‘Legal Poly-
centricity’ in Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle (eds), Legal Polycentricity: Conse-
quences of Pluralism in Law (Dartmouth 1995) 31; Günther Teubner, ‘The Two Faces
of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443.
39 Similarly, on the conceptual dominance of the nation-state within the legal system, see
Günther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in
Günther Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth 1997).
40 See e.g., Fredric I Lederer, ‘The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of
Today’s – and Tomorrow’s – High-Technology Courtrooms’ (2009) 50 South Carolina
Law Review 799; Lederer, ‘Wired, What We Have Learned About Courtroom Techno-
logy’ (n 3); Lederer, ‘The Courtroom 21 Project: Creating the Courtroom of the Twenty-
First Century’ (n 3); Lederer, ‘Technology-Augmented Courtrooms: Progress Amid a Few
Complications, or the Problematic Interrelationship Between Court and Counsel’ (n3).
41 For scientific articles, see, e.g., Benyekhlef, Amar and Callipel (n 3); Nicolas Vermeys,
‘Fostering Trust and Confidence in Electronic Commerce: Will the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Really Effect Change?’ (2015) 20
Lex Electronica 63; Karim Benyekhlef and Nicolas Vermeys, ‘ODR and the Courts’,
Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice. A Treatise on Technology and Dispute
Resolution. (Eleven International Publishing 2012); François Senécal and Karim
Benyekhlef, ‘Groundwork for Assessing the Legal Risks of Cyberjustice’ (2010) 7
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 41.
42 Dory Reiling, Technology for Justice: How Information Technology Can Support Judicial
Reform (Leiden University Press 2009).
43 See e.g. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), ‘Use of
Information Technology in European Courts’ (Council of Europe) 24, available at
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/series/default_en.asp (accessed 16
June 2018); On videoconferencing, see Sabine Braun and Judith L Taylor (eds),
Videoconference and Remote Interpreting in Criminal Proceedings (Intersentia 2012);
Ulf Andreas Nissen, Die Online-Videokonferenz Im Zivilprozess (Peter Lang GmbH
2004); for Canadian and US approaches see e.g. Amy Salyzyn, ‘A New Lens:
Reframing the Conversation about the Use of Video Conferencing in Civil Trials in
Ontario’ (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 429; for a Finnish perspective, see
Riikka Koulu, Videoneuvottelu rajat ylittävässä oikeudenkäynnissä. Sähköisen oikeuden-
käynnin nousu (University of Helsinki Conflict Management Institute 2010).
44 See e.g, Katsh and Rifkin (n 5); Rule (n 7).
45 The need for a more comprehensive theory formation is acknowledged within the field
by Wing and Rainey. See Leah Wing and Daniel Rainey, ‘Online Dispute Resolution
and the Development of Theory’ in Mohamed S Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh and
Introduction 25
Daniel Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice. A Treatise on
Technology and Dispute Resolution (Eleven International Publishing 2012) 25.
46 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Thomas Schultz, Online Dispute Resolution: Chal-
lenges for Contemporary Justice (Kluwer Law International 2004); Mohamed S Abdel
Wahab, Ethan Katsh and Daniel Rainey (eds), Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and
Practice. A Treatise on Technology and Dispute Resolution. (Eleven International
Publishing 2012).
47 Hörnle (n 7) 217–219.
48 Cortés (n 7) 191–206.
49 Susan Schiavetta, ‘Electronic Alternative Dispute Resolution - Increasing Access to
Justice Via Procedural Protections’ (University of Oslo 2008); See also Susan Schia-
vetta, ‘The Relationship Between E-ADR and Article 6 of the European Convention
of Human Rights Pursuant to the Caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights’
(2004) 2004 Journal of Information, Law & Technology, available at https://www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2004_1/schiavetta/ (accessed 16 June 2018).
50 Tapio Puurunen, ‘Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce’ (University
of Helsinki 2005).
51 Cortés (n 7) 82, 204.
52 Thornburg (n 26) 106.
53 Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (n 46) 223–233.
54 ibid 168.
55 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung
Des Globalen Rechts (Suhrkamp Verlag 2006); Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-
Lescano, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of
Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999.
56 Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and
the Civilisation of Private Law’ (2002) 23 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 185; Gralf-
Peter Calliess, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a Global Market
Place’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 647; Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jörg Freiling and
Moritz Renner, ‘Law, the State, and Private Ordering: Evolutionary Explanations of
Institutional Change’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 397; Gralf-Peter Calliess and
Moritz Renner, ‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Govern-
ance’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 260.
57 Gélinas and others (n 33) 105.
58 For regulating cyberspace and sovereignty, see e.g. Lastowka (n 1) 226; Lawrence Lessig,
Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) 27, available at http://codev2.cc/download
+remix/ (accessed 16 June 2018). It should be noted, however, that the problematic
issue of governance of virtual worlds and the need to find other means of governance than
national legal systems and multilateral Conventions originate from the same emergence of
technology and online activity as the challenge of justifying increasingly privatised
enforcement. Technological change creates new unique challenges for most normative
systems where it is applied. In terms of procedural law, the examination is focused on civil
and commercial cases, in which parties are given more extensive contractual freedom. In
the Finnish context this means that only dispositive civil cases are examined and non-
contentious cases that are initiated according to Ch.8 of the Finnish Code of Judicial
Procedure (4/1734) are excluded. Thus, cases where the parties can find redress only
through the public court system (e.g. family cases and criminal cases) will not be discussed.
26 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
2 Understanding law and technology
The introduction discussed different interfaces between dispute resolution and
digital technologies and presented examples of how the use of technology is
increasing private enforcement. In this chapter, we pave the way for a more
nuanced approach to technology-enabled private enforcement by depicting law as
a system of legitimising coercion that interacts with the social uses of information
and communication technologies (ICT). This understanding of law by social
systems theory perceives law as a social subsystem of society, whereas the on-
going technological change is interpreted as the emergence of yet another social
system, namely the social system of the use of ICT.
This chapter explains the ontological and methodological choices adopted in
this study. This examination is divided into two parts, the first of which focuses
on understanding law and the second on understanding technology. Using social
systems theory as a starting point, the chapter describes how law renews itself
autonomously while simultaneously remaining open to influences from other
systems, including the system of ICT use.
2.1 Understanding law as legitimised coercion
This study examines how dispute resolution technology – and particularly the
shifts towards increasing privatisation it creates in enforcement – affect law.
Almost by definition any change from ways things have traditionally been done
forces us to decide how we should react to it and why. This means asking
whether there are good reasons for preserving the status quo or whether we
should embrace the change. In this study, technological innovation alters the
organisation of enforcement by enabling new forms of private coercion that
bypass and thus challenge the state’s perceived monopoly on violence. This
change gives rise to the question of how dispute resolution and enforcement is,
and should be, organised, by whom, and why. In short, how our current model
of state-governed enforcement is justified and whether increasingly privatised
enforcement could be justified to the same extent?
In order to accomplish the objective, we need to define the key concepts
involved. First, we need to understand what law and technology are, in order to
ask how technological innovation in the form of increased privatisation of
coercion changes the role law plays in the society. Secondly, a framework for
explaining the interaction between law and technology is called for: how does
technology enter the legal system’s operations? Thirdly, we need to know the
justification for the legal system and how it is created for dispute resolution.
Choices regarding these definitions pave the way to providing well-grounded
answers to whether privatisation of coercion is problematic from the perspective
of the legal system. In other words, an ontology is needed, a way to ask and
answer these questions.
What makes enforcement interesting for theoretical analysis is justification. As
taking matters in one’s own hands is harmful for society overall and therefore
forbidden, legally regulated enforcement is necessary for the stability of society.
In enforcement law reveals itself as a legitimised form of violence. It should be
noted that law’s coercive nature should be read not as a normative but as a
descriptive claim. One could go even further and claim that dispute resolution
and the threat of enforcement are the tools for fulfilling law’s function in society.
A point of interest is that the doctrine of procedural law seldom touches upon
these theoretical dimensions of dispute resolution. Instead, justification is an
elusive and dormant structure rarely discussed and can be deduced only by close
readings of procedural texts. It appears as hidden assumptions and values that are
considered to be self-evident. Demanding to know how coercion is made
acceptable by the legal system quickly opens up another set of questions about
the extent and methods of these justification-creating moves.
In other words, the question of law’s inherent violence is a formulation of its
ontological foundation: what is at the bottom of law, on what grounds are its
foundations built? Is there a normative foundation which separates the accepta-
ble, recognisable force of law from coercion by force? How is such a distinction
made in the legal system? Suddenly this enquiry into private enforcement
becomes a question about law’s boundaries, which procedural doctrine is unable
to address. This study endeavours to remedy this lack of doctrinal self-reflection
through a theoretical analysis of technology-driven change in justifying
enforcement.
Law’s paradox is that, in the end, it can be construed simply as legitimised
violence. In order to provide societal stability, however, this paradoxical nature of
law needs to be hidden from sight. To really understand the nature of increasing
privatisation of coercion enabled by technology, it is necessary to momentarily
reveal the paradox and to ask what strategies we have for hiding it yet again. This
study makes use of social systems theory to accomplish this objective. Making
law’s paradoxical nature as legitimised violence visible is a deconstructive move of
sorts that enables the evaluation of possibilities for reconstruction, to borrow
German legal scholar Günther Teubner’s thoughts on the surprising connection
points between German sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and the
French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction.1
Why would a systems theory approach provide insight into the shifting forms
of private enforcement? There are several reasons for the choice. Firstly, the idea
of law as a historical continuum seems to provide one possible explanation to
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how justification of dispute resolution has been formulated – and changed – in
the course of time by continuous reinterpretation. Of course, the idea of law as a
historically sedimented societal structure is not limited to systems theory and
other theoretical frameworks would provide equally satisfactory entrance points
to this type of examination, which brings us to the second point. Secondly,
systems theory perceives law’s social function to be that of upholding expecta-
tions regardless of disappointment. This function provides tools for upholding
law’s normativity on a very fundamental level without resorting to the content of
material norms of legislation, case law or doctrine. By making the claim that the
expectation x is and will be valid on a general level although in casu the
expectation is not fulfilled positions systems theory beyond mere description,
although at first glance systems theory may appear to be mere description without
normative claims. However, this interpretation should not be read as contesting
the established body of literature on Luhmann’s theory. Instead, it is simply
pointed out that law’s function is not dependent on these deliverables of regulation
and case law, that law’s normative nature transcends the normativity of these
utterances.
Thirdly, this novel approach to law’s normativity provides a useful standpoint
to evaluating how external influences, such as that of technology, enter and
influence the legal system. This means that systems theory enables us to hold on
to an internal perspective of the legal system while simultaneously looking
beyond law’s boundaries. The theory’s descriptive force is useful for explaining
how the legal system interacts with other social systems in society. In other
words, the theory explains law and at the same time makes room for analysis of
the disruptive qualities of technology. And lastly, universal theory provides a
broad framework for examining the interplay with very distinct rationalities of law
and technology. Then again, the universality of the theory also opens it up to
criticism and there is the danger that the examination based on such theory will
disintegrate owing to its ever-expanding scope. However, the analysis is con-
tained by the perspective of imminent critique, which – unlike fundamental
morality-based criticism which imposes a challenge from its external perspective –
is internal to the legal system.
2.2 Defining law through systems theory
2.2.1 Law as a stability-preserving social system
In order to apply Luhmann’s theory to the examination of privatisation of
coercion undertaken here, it is necessary to present the reader with a brief
overview of the focal concepts and ontology it presents, as the theory provides a
model for understanding the interactions between law, technology, and society.
Luhmann’s work is not known for its easy-to-understand nature owing to its
abstractness. Despite the high level of abstraction, the premises of social systems
theory are relatively straightforward. At the core of the theory is functionally
differentiated society, which has over time divided into several subsystems to
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sustain increasing complexity. For Luhmann, the distinction between a system
and its environment is the decisive building block of social order. Thus, the most
constitutive claim of systems theory can be narrowed down to the fact that
systems exist. Interestingly, UK Professors Michael King and Chris Thornhill
argue that social systems theory has constituted a Kuhnian scientific revolution,2
as Luhmann abandons the human subject as the centre of social observations for
communication.3 Luhmann’s theory also contests traditional legal positivism, as
its inherent distinction between the law and morals does not lead to anything
more than a paradox of simultaneously holding on to the distinction between the
two and being unable to reconcile it.4
Luhmann’s theory reflects an understanding of a world which is socially
constructed through communication,5 making communication, transmission of
information, the focal concept through which functional differentiation is
achieved. For Luhmann, society, like all social systems, consists of interlinked
communication that increasingly leads to functional differentiation of different
subsystems. By differentiation into subsystems such as law, economics and politics,
the overall system is able to make more varied connections by interlinking
communication, which, in turn, provides for the system’s existence. If these
connections were to stop, the system would seise to exist. 6 Thus, Luhmann
places communication at the core of all social systems. This starting point is useful
for our objective, which is to perceive how the use of information and commu-
nication technologies are changing dispute resolution and enforcement. Niklas
Luhmann’s theory of social systems strives to provide a generalised theory of
society and in social systems theory the existence of society, its evolution and
communication merge into one another. Luhmann describes the evolution
of society as the outcome of continuously increasing complexity, where
complexity is reined in by communication. In other words, increasing specialisa-
tion, i.e. functional differentiation, helps to reduce the devastating effects that
increasing complexity would otherwise have. Functional differentiation explains the
boundaries between different functions in society, e.g. law, politics and economics,
and continuous communication upholds the identities of these separate subsys-
tems. Functional differentiation provides a model for examining the interrelation-
ship between law, technology and society while simultaneously holding on to the
legal system’s distinct identity in the society.
Functional differentiation is achieved by specific communication that is unique
for every differentiated subsystem. By delegating complexity through functional
differentiation to the subsystems, the system is able to add to the overall
complexity within itself. Continuous functional differentiation describes how the
legal system is constantly becoming more complex, continuously making new
distinctions to provide more nuanced communication about what is law. However,
we cannot examine the effects of functional differentiated subsystems without
asking the reasons why exactly these systems have developed their own identity
within society. The legal system, which is the object of study here, provides
stability for society. The legal system maintains this stability by creating and
maintaining normative expectations. In simple terms, one may trust that the law
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is on one’s side and the more often other people’s similar expectations have been
fulfilled by the courts, the stronger one’s expectation of legal protection can
and should be. Normative expectations connect with law’s nature as legitimised
coercion. This means that one can expect to have the public enforcement at one’s
disposal but this expectation has further criteria – first, the court has to decide in
one’s favour, to acknowledge the expectation and to label it as acceptable.
But what happens when one’s expectation of legal protection is not fulfilled;
what if the court does not grant access to enforcement? What makes social systems
theory interesting for the study of law is that law’s function of maintaining
expectations is not dependent of their fulfilment. Instead, law maintains expecta-
tions regardless of disappointment. This means that despite legal protection being
refused this time, one can still count on its protection in the future. Although
Luhmann’s theory has often been criticised its descriptive nature, law’s function of
upholding expectations even when these expectations are disappointed holds a very
distinct approach to normativity. Expectations are normative communications
about the future. When an expectation is upheld despite disappointment, the
dismissal simultaneously communicates that the expectation is right even though
in this case it is not. Simply put, the dismissal should also be read as a claim that a
specific norm should be upheld in the future although this time it is not upheld.7
The counterfactual substantiation of the norm’s future relevance positions
Luhmann’s theory away from simple description. One could say that, deep down,
social systems theory has a normative component because expectations are norma-
tive, but this normativity functions differently from that usually associated with the
term, on a more foundational level.
If we are to understand law as a functionally differentiated subsystem that
provides stability by upholding expectations, we should then ask what law is and
how it is created. This is also necessary for perceiving how law interacts with
other systems and how technology can influence the legal system. According to
Luhmann, law, like all social systems, is communication: the legal system consists
of ‘all social communication that is formulated with reference to law’8 and this
communication distinguishes it from its environment and other subsystems. It
follows from this that law creates itself by continuous flow of legal communication,
individual communicative operations, that reproduce and renew the legal system’s
boundaries over time in a cycle of self-production called autopoiesis. Luhmann
defines autopoiesis as the system’s self-production where the system produces itself
through its internal operations.9 This means that only the legal system defines what
belongs to it and what does not,10 no external communication can directly enter
the legal system.11
How does the functionally differentiated system recognise which communica-
tion belongs to its self-production? Law, as well as all the other subsystems,
upholds its specific identity by applying a system-specific code for deciphering
which communication belongs to it. The code is a medium around which all the
communication within a system revolves, it represents the system’s rationality of
sorts. The code is always a distinction between binary oppositions, and the
functional differentiation is achieved through its application. Depending on
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which system-specific code is applied, operations are ‘coded’ as belonging within
or outside the system. For example, money (Geld) is the medium for the
economic system, and the code of economics paying/not paying defines which
operations belong to the economic system. The legal system, in turn, operates
through the medium of law (Recht), and the application of its code legal/illegal
prescribes operations belonging either to the legal system or outside of it.
Similarly, power (Macht) is the medium of the political system, which applies
the code power/opposition. The science system operates based on the medium
of truth (Wahrheit). According to Luhmann, the medium itself cannot be
deciphered cognitively but only the form that follows from it. In other words,
the code itself provides only a form for making distinctions but does not produce
information for the distinction.12 In turn, programmes, which can be understood
as structures formulated over time, regulate which side of the code is applied to a
given operation. 13 In the legal system, programmes such as case law or legisla-
tion stipulate which expectations are upheld. Programming gives leeway that the
strict binary coding does not, programmes balance out the harshness of the
code.14 These tools, the code and programming, help explain how the legal
system upholds its boundaries by itself and how external influences such as the
use of digital technologies in dispute resolution develop specifically legal identity.
Thus, the legal system is a functionally differentiated social subsystem that
produces its boundaries from its environment as well as its identity by applying
the code legal/illegal to all its operations. Self-production grants autonomy to
the system and simultaneously closes it to external influence. However, this
operative closure is complemented by cognitive openness, which explains how
external references are able to enter the legal system and to enrich its self-
production. This combination of closure and openness is elemental for our
examination of technology’s impact on one of law’s central structures, namely
dispute resolution, as it explains how the legal system maintains control of its
boundaries while simultaneously remaining open to other systems.
2.2.2 Closed and open law and mechanisms of external influence
We have now established the starting points of systems theory: functional
differentiation and the system’s self-production, which are both established
through system-specific coding. Only the legal system’s operations define the
legal system, creating an operationally closed system. However, without making
room for external influences, the legal system cannot adjust, cannot evolve, its
continuous operations would slowly start withering and the circular referential
loop of self-production would eventually lead to tautology, inability to maintain
the system’s boundaries and existence. Simply put, the legal system needs to be
open to influences but it needs to limit their impact, which also explains how law
reacts to the disruptive qualities of digital technologies. Instead of complete
openness, Luhmann solves this shortcoming of operative closure by breaking
the self-referential circle and opens the system’s information gathering to its
environment. This cognitive openness means that the system can enrich its
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autopoiesis with external influences while simultaneously controlling its bound-
aries independently, a delicate interplay between openness and closure.15 Still, the
system regulates how it reacts to impulses from its environment and by controlling
these impulses the system controls itself.16
Impulses from environment and other subsystems cannot be directly included
in the legal system, as they often follow a different coding and the legal system
only recognises its own coding. Cognitive openness is enabled by two distinct
mechanisms: interpenetration which enables the system to borrow computational
resources from another system but has connective value only within the system,17
and structural couplings between different social systems, where an operation has
value within both systems although in accordance with each system’s binary code.
These mechanisms are important for the discussion in Chapter 4, when we
examine how justification is created within the legal system and how technology
is challenging this justification in private enforcement.
Interpenetration refers to a specific connection between two separate systems
that have evolved together over time. In interpenetration both systems offer their
internal complexity for the other system to be used in its system-building.
Interpenetration increases the system’s independence by introducing further
complexity, or so to speak computational power, but simultaneously the systems’
mutual dependence is strengthened. Interpenetrating systems are in a way
co-determined, but not converged.18 This follows from the autonomous inter-
pretation both systems give to the events they share. Although the events are the
same, both systems give different meaning to them and connections made in
both systems lead to different consequences. Thus, interpenetration only has
meaning separately in each system. When describing interpenetration Luhmann
often gives examples of psychic or biological systems: nerve cells that share
information between the brain and human consciousness or consciousness and
communication.19 Still, interpenetration is also possible between jointly evolved
social systems. For example, in the legal system the external motives and interests
of legislation often influence norm interpretation in legal decision-making. How-
ever, these motives are internally filtered before their inclusion – e.g. if a
legislative act results from political manoeuvring, its origins are not usually
discussed in a legal decision applying the act.20
Another mechanism for welcoming external influences to social systems is
structural couplings (strukturelle Kopplung) that do not require joint evolution.
Instead, structurally coupled operations conform simultaneously to the coding of
two systems and belong to both systems, each system interpreting the operation
autonomously on its side. Structural couplings relay external influences and
enrich a system’s autopoiesis. For example, contract and property are structural
couplings between law and commerce; constitution is a coupling between law
and politics.21 Thus, a contract or property can be evaluated in accordance with
law’s binary code of legal/illegal and recognised by the legal system as belonging
to it as its own operation. Simultaneously, a contract abides by the code of
paying/not-paying of the economic system and is recognised within its symboli-
cally generalised meaning medium, i.e. money.22 Comparatively, a constitution
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applies the binary code of the political system, which is power/opposition
functioning through the medium of power, in addition to the code of the legal
system.
Interpenetration and structural couplings both provide external influences for a
system’s self-production and thus balance the effects of operative closure. Cogni-
tive openness brings irritants from the environment into the legal system and the
legal system’s efforts to include them in its operations immunise the system against
external threats.23
Luhmann’s social systems theory seems to provide useful tools for assessing the
interplay between law and technology while preserving law’s normative autonomy.
However, the use of technology in social practices such as dispute resolution is an
extremely multifaceted phenomenon that can hardly be subsumed into external
information any more than dispute resolution technology can be distanced from
the reality of technological artefacts, their production mechanisms, and cultural
meaning-creation. This brings us to question the limits of systems theory; is the
picture provided by the theory too abstract, so that it loses sight of social reality?
2.2.3 Limits of systems theory and law’s paradoxes – law’s futile quest for
justice, why systems theory – this is necessary for A2 narrative
Although Luhmann’s social systems theory provides useful tools for assessing the
interplay between economic gain, political power, ethical discourse and legal
decision-making, it has been criticised for various reasons. Lack of tools for
examining power relations, lack of normative content, and the focus on coherence
instead of paradoxes have all been criticised. This criticism has focused on law’s
relationship with politics and ethics. Understanding how law strives towards
unattainable justice exposes the limits of systems theory and is essential for the
discussion in Chapter 7 that examines how access to justice perspectives could be
used to justify private enforcement.
These notions are by no means new. The notorious Luhmann/Habermas
controversy focused on the communicative nature of Luhmann’s theory as well
as the strong distinction between law and politics. German sociologist Habermas
considered Luhmann’s theory descriptive to a fault, the ‘Hochform of techno-
cratic consciousness, the “apology” of the status quo, meant to preserve the
latter.24 By a rather technical application of the code, political elements of the
legal system are trivialised. As Thomas McCarthy formulates it, systems theory
then ‘promotes a depoliticization of the public sphere by defining practical
questions from the start as technical questions’.25 However, counterarguments
have also been voiced and social systems theory’s view of law complemented.
Teubner has addressed systems theory’s shortcomings in perceiving power rela-
tions by development of what he calls reflexive law, where the legal system is
more open to interaction with other systems and thus more able to address social
behaviour, more prone to social engineering. According to Teubner’s conceptua-
lisation, law is moving from formal law to substantive law and then onwards to
reflexive law, which imposes procedural and constitutive limitations to legal
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development. This means that reflexive law does not provide any specific material
values or criteria for desired outcomes.26
Luhmann disagrees with Teubner’s vision of including reflexive elements in
systems theory, as in his view reflexive approaches to be too far-reaching in their
search for a synthesis of critical-emancipatory approaches, responsive dogmatics
and sociological analysis.27 Drawing on Teubner, Professor John Paterson aims
to reconcile systems theory with reflexive elements by introducing different
scenarios that might enlarge the scope of structural couplings between law and
other systems.28 However, as Professor King points out, the question of reflexive
elements in systems theory, and ultimately that of the legal system’s openness, is a
question of the theory’s limits. Simply put, law can only understand law and can
only regulate that which can be regulated by law due to its coding. However,
immense areas that might affect the fulfilment of regulatory objectives remain
invisible to law.29 King perceives Teubner as well as Paterson striving to improve
the legal system’s performance of regulating social behaviour, which he does not
consider Luhmann having ever been interested in. Instead, this expanded open-
ing through inclusion of reflexive elements does disservice to the theory, which
King regards best used as a ‘way of emphasising its limitations, self-deceptions
and paradoxes of law and politics in their various operations’.30
This being said, the strength of systems theory in explaining how the legal
system works is in its ability to give impression of coherence despite incoherence,
to focus on appearance of control while hiding its foundational paradox. In other
words, law is legitimised violence and this paradoxical nature becomes visible
when coercion is used in enforcement. It is argued here that digital technologies
used for private enforcement reveal law’s inherent violence to the extent that this
foundational paradox cannot be disguised.
For Luhmann, all self-description of the legal system is based on paradoxes,
there can be no normative criteria similar to Kelsen’s Grundnorm, or even the
concept of justice on which law could be grounded. Foundational paradoxes
result from the self-observation of the system that always participates in the
system’s operations, from applying the code to itself. Without downplaying or
deparadoxifying this tautology, the foundational paradox would lead to paralysis
of the system’s operations and autopoiesis would stop. Through deparadoxifica-
tion, i.e. by introducing new distinctions, the system is able to pretend that its
operations are not based on self-observation.31 Michael King and Chris Thornhill
exemplify deparadoxification within the legal system through distinctions
between reasonableness/unreasonableness and constitutional/unconstitutional
that may be substituted for the problem whether the law may be justified by
universal morality or by natural law.32
Although the legal system’s autopoiesis would cease in lack of deparadoxifica-
tion, these paradoxes seem to reveal another side of the legal system, the
conflicts, contradictions and crises, the underside of law. These paradoxes are
also inherent and necessary for law, which becomes visible in the face of conflict.
Teubner raises globalisation as an example of a crisis which begins a ‘hectic search
for new bases of normative validity’.33 The constant race for evolution, for
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change, for reconstruction, renewal and new selections are crucial for the
existence of the system. If the system cannot renew itself through its autopoiesis,
its immune system deteriorates and in the end it ceases to exist. Based on this,
Teubner considers self-contradictions, anomalies and paradoxes to be essential for
self-renewal. Thus, it is this unquestioning, voracious need for change that draws
us closer to law’s paradoxes, forcing us to ask what is behind them, what they are
made of. Unravelling law’s paradoxes might prove out to be useful for examining
the challenge imposed by technology-driven private enforcement, as identifying
the pain-spots of deparadoxification mechanisms sheds light to the relationship
between law and technology.
Within science and technology studies, the focus is often on interplay between
different social practices. For example, Indian American Professor Sheila Jasanoff
suggests that technology, science and social practices such as law co-produce
themselves. According to Jasanoff, ‘knowledge and its material embodiments are
at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society
cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without
appropriate social supports’.34 Similar to this, Friedrich Kittler, a German media
theorist known for the dystopian overtones of his writings, perceives that media
technology defines human interaction, to the point that ‘what remains of people
is what media can store and communicate’.35 German legal historian Cornelia
Vismann, in turn, emphasises the impact of a written form, of files (Akten), in
shaping legal practices throughout history.36
It seems that media theorists focus on the interactive elements between law
and technology, which then become entwined. Taking these media-theoretical
viewpoints into consideration in evaluating the relationship between law and
technology does not necessarily contradict the operative closure of societal
subsystems. For example, we can perceive media as having impact on the internal
functioning of the subsystems both by providing new irritants for the subsystems
to manage and by providing a reflection of the overall system that is applied
internally in the subsystems.37
Moreover, we can consider the challenge of dispute resolution technology as
the necessary evil that has the function of accelerating law’s renewal. Instead of
crisis, the new irritant is reworded as a possibility. Instead of hiding the paradox,
we may embrace its disruptive force. As Luhmann focuses on deparadoxification,
critical systems theory advocated by German legal scholar Andreas Fischer-
Lescano focuses on revealing instead of hiding law’s foundational paradoxes.
Critical systems theory ‘regards real contradictions as the societal engine’ and
aims towards the demystification of these paradoxes.38 By implementing elements
of critical theory to systems theory, it could be possible to reveal deconstructively
the political elements.39
In addition to this emphasis on paradoxes, critical systems theory is sensitive to
political controversies within social orders, which seems to imply that comple-
menting social systems theory with these critical insights might address some of
its apparent shortcomings.40 Fischer-Lescano recognises two types of critique
enabled by critical systems theory that are relevant to law. These are value critique
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and critique of statism. Through value critique, the theory is able to perceive how
social conflicts are hidden behind the façades of values and principles and thus
rendered unrecognisable. In turn, a critique of statism allows the theory to
recognise usurpers of societal autonomy other than politics.41 The politically-
orientated critique of statism is especially useful for examining technology-driven
private enforcement. As Fischer-Lescano puts it, critical systems theory provides
methods for understanding societal struggles from an internal perspective without
losing sight of law’s normativity.42 By tuning systems theory towards a more
sensitive understanding of political struggles, critical systems theory is able to
answer Habermas’s critique. In other words, attention is redirected towards the
paradoxes that without the critical stance would be hidden in order to preserve
operational continuity.
According to Finnish legal theorist Tuori’s view, immanent critique aims at
introducing an ‘inter-subjectively acceptable substantive criteria’ for the validity
of law. As Tuori points out, fundamental criticism contesting the whole coercive
nature of law and its legitimacy, e.g. on Marxist or anarchist grounds, is possible
only from outside the field of law and thus fundamentalism forms the limits for
internal critique. Immanent criticism holds on to normativity of law, judging
law’s borders and validity based on its own promise of what law is and should
be.43 This perception of immanent critique comes close to Luhmann’s internal
observation. According to Luhmann, external observers perceive law differently
and internal observation is more limited in what it may say about law. These
limits provide stability and security for the system at the same time as they limit
what can be observed internally.44 Also, this study strives for immanent norma-
tive critique of law, which is to be separated from such fundamental criticism that
aims at the abolition of the legal regime.
Hence, in its critical endeavours this study simultaneously adds to law’s
legitimacy in its totality, renewing its normativity and strengthening its stance as
a societal practice. Discussion on how justificatory structures are engaged in
relation to dispute resolution technology emphasises the significance of justifying
law, and law’s need to perceive itself as coherent. As Finnish legal scholar Thomas
Wilhelmsson states, ‘microcriticism can lead to macrolegitimation’.45 It follows
from this that the mechanisms of deparadoxification, including justificatory
narratives, which create the impression of control within the legal system,46 take
on a decisive functional role in the examination of private technology-driven
enforcement. In the spirit of critical systems theory, the examination of depar-
adoxifying elements of the justificatory narratives becomes a critical project in
which the focus is on revealing the paradoxes instead of hiding them.
2.3 Methodological challenge of private enforcement
This study combines socio-legal studies and particularly social systems theory to
evaluate dispute resolution technology and particularly how the privatisation of
coercion as it is accelerated by technology affects the justification of coercion.
Because of the focus on dispute resolution, this study could be claimed to address
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procedural law. However, this study does not take advantage of legal dogmatics,
as the research objective takes place on a more abstract level, in the structures of
doctrine formation. In other words, this study participates in the doctrinal
discussion of procedural law but approaches its subject from the somewhat
unconventional angle of applied legal theory.
Here, the challenge of digital technologies is understood both as an external
irritant and through disruptive qualities, which call for a reaction from the legal
system. In other words, the question of justifying private enforcement leads us to
question the relationship between law and technology and law’s ability to
accommodate technological change. As the challenge of technology cannot be
understood only internally within the legal system, influences from communication
theory and history of technology are welcomed to provide a more comprehensive
picture of technology. Thus, this study could be labelled ‘legal technology studies’.
Owing to the relative newness of dispute resolution technology, the amount of
case law and legislation on different applications is scarce. Due to both the lack of
interpretative materials and the objectives of this study, this work focuses on
identifying different justificatory narratives in the procedural doctrine and evalu-
ating them critically against the challenge of technology-enabled private enforce-
ment. These narratives have been formulated and slowly sedimented into law’s
self-description over time, for which social systems theory provides a functional
vantage point. From social systems theory’s perspective, structures are formulated
over time by repetitive operations, and although they are necessary for law’s
operations, they do not define law’s identity.47 This means that the examination
of these timeless and context-transcending elements of dispute resolution
becomes the centre of attention. Such analysis resembles Norwegian sociologist
Vilhelm Aubert’s studies of legal anthropology on the historical development of
conflict management in different tribal communities and the commonalities
between these practices. For example, Aubert identifies the inclusion of the
external third party to resolution processes as a decisive element which transforms
the dyad of conflicting parties into a triad.48
We identify justificatory narratives by observing how law’s self-understanding
changes as a response to the challenge of technology. Instead of evaluating these
changes directly, we evaluate how doctrinal self-understanding is capable of
reacting to these changes, which tools are engaged to systematise technology,
and how different rationalities from other subsystems direct these reactions. This
means that there is a deconstructive element in my analysis, although I do not
use deconstruction as a methodological tool. Instead, we employ influences from
systems theory, from the critical and political stance of critical systems theory,
social constructivism and the sociology of technology to examine how justificatory
narratives can be engaged for systemising multifaceted social reality.
Defining technology for the needs of the legal system necessarily participates in
social meaning construction. American physicist and philosopher of science
Thomas Kuhn claims that the emergence of technology has often played a
significant part in creating new sciences.49 Kuhn’s initiative towards epistemological
change of scientific practices has also paved the way for the sociology of scientific
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knowledge, which examines science as a social activity in which political, cultural
and economic fluctuations may create points of convergence or ambiguity. This in
turn has strongly influenced science and technology studies in the 1980s.50 The
interdisciplinary aspiration of understanding technology beyond its reflections in the
legal system is enabled by two steps. First, legal science has dual citizenship as it
belongs simultaneously to the legal system operating with the coding legal/illegal
and to the science system, which operates through the symbolically generalised
medium of truth (Wahrheit).51 Secondly, systems theory itself enables interdis-
ciplinary influences, as operations can be shared by several systems through structural
couplings.
As applications of technology-driven private enforcement are by definition
private and often also global regimes, no fixed sources doctrine can be applied
in this study, but instead focus is on global private regimes that have their own
specialised norm production.52 In the absence of hard law, soft law adopts a
significant role in these private yet normative regimes. Thomas Schultz discusses
the same issue from a different perspective: he focuses on the processes through
which social structures transform into private legal systems. According to his
analysis, the ICANN and ODR platform of the e-commerce site eBay establish
themselves.53 These conceptualisations demonstrate that ways in which private
social practices turn into legal regimes are particularly interesting at the conver-
gence point of private and public, namely in dispute resolution that is changing as
a result of technology. Emphasising the role of such practices instead of sources
doctrine directs observation towards identifying these new regimes as belonging
to the legal system despite their unconventional origins. In other words, we ask
how these regimes come to be seen as legally relevant.54
This interdisciplinary approach, together with internal immanent critique,
opens the identified justificatory narratives to value critique and critique of
statism, which is enabled by critical systems theory’s sensitivity to political
controversies. Critical close reading of deparadoxifying mechanisms replaces
sources doctrine as a methodological tool in this study. This interpretation of
justificatory narratives exposes their function of deparadoxification and thus
enables critical evaluation of how they adapt to the challenge of technology.
Despite its many merits, Luhmann’s social systems theory has shortcomings;
the theory does not leave room for social engineering, nor does it accommodate
analysis of power balances. Although the theory acknowledges the inherently
paradoxical nature of law, this is hidden through deparadoxification. Hence, this
theoretical framework is complemented with influences from critical systems
theory that strives to combine systems theory with critical theory. This vantage
point enables the examination of justificatory narratives as historically formulated
structures of the legal system. Before this, however, we need to understand how
technology interacts with the legal system.
This examination departs from the turn to technology in social sciences in the
1980s and from the classical theories of media theorists Marshall McLuhan and
Raymond Williams, as traces of both McLuhan’s technological determinism and
Williams’s social shaping of technology still affect conceptualisations of
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technology. These positions are then complemented with elements from Friedrich
Kittler’s agency of technology. It is argued that the social element embedded in
the use of technology is becoming more pronounced and that technology itself
has become a social object in communication. This development, in turn, may lead
to the emergence of yet another social system, namely the social system of the
use of ICT.
2.4 Understanding technology in dispute resolution
2.4.1 Definition deficit of dispute resolution technology
In order to assess the consequences of technology-driven privatisation of coercion,
it is necessary to formulate an overview of what is meant by technology in this
context. Although it would be tempting to provide a universal definition of dispute
resolution technology and a comprehensive take on its acceptability, such an
approach would lead to oversimplification of the various functions performed by
different applications of dispute resolution technology. We must content ourselves
with assessing the impact of technological change on a macro-level of society and
complement this overview with case-by-case analysis of the functions of different
applications. At the danger of sounding too obvious, legal technology or even
dispute resolution technology should not be considered good or bad, as such
generalisation overlooks how technology is used in a given situation and the
implications of this usage.55
Before proceeding to dispute resolution technology, it is necessary to place it
within the broader societal development called digitalisation. Nowadays the term
‘digitalisation’ is widely used to describe the various changes taking place in society
that are related to the use of modern information and communication techno-
logies. The terminology is not well defined; digitalisation is used to explain
relatively small-scale shifts in working methods and business models as well as
large-scale disruptions of whole industries and societies. In this latter meaning
digitalisation refers to the transformation towards a post-industrial information
society, which is defined by the growing socio-economic and cultural importance
of information instead of the mass production of the previous era.56 The emphasis
on the social implications of digitalisation creates conceptual distance from a
neighbouring term, ‘digitisation’, which refers to the processes of transforming
information into a digital format that facilitates computer processing.
Although digitisation is the prerequisite for the digitalisation of society, this
connection is somewhat downplayed here for a reason. This study revolves
around the technological change of society that results from the use of digital
technologies and argues that such technologies are increasing privatisation of
coercion. This being said, we are primarily interested in the ways in which the
tools of technology are used in enforcement and what implications these uses
have for overall conflict management. This claim is closely linked to societal
transformation of digitalisation but its connection with the transformation of
information formats of digitisation is only secondary. In its original meaning,
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‘digital’ describes the technical execution of signal transmission: digital signals
present information in discontinuous, discreet format, and are contrasted with
continuous analogue signals. At best, this distinction is irrelevant for examining
the implications of technology use such as private enforcement, and at worst,
confusing, as signals can be translated from analogue to digital.57 Instead, the
societal transformation of digitalisation is more accurately defined by the
immense increases in computational power that digital signal processing enables.
Interestingly enough, computation per se does not presuppose digital information
processing – in fact, mechanical equipment has been used for computational
purposes from rudimentary abacuses to the sophisticated design for a mechanical
general-purpose computer presented by the English mathematician Charles
Babbage as early as 1837. Computational power, however, enables the expanding
use of computation in new fields, and intensifying automation of information
processing, which contribute to societal transformations of digitalisation.58
This means that the terminology ‘digital technologies’ does not provide a
useful description of the scope of this study. However, we are not addressing all
potential technologies, but are interested in information and communication
technologies and their use in dispute resolution. Some of these ICT applications
are data-driven but not all, and some rely heavily on automation, while others tap
into the potential of the Internet to provide instant communication regardless of
time and space. As no single communality between different applications of ICT
in dispute resolution can be found beyond their reliance on computational
power, they are simply referred to here as dispute resolution technology.
Surprisingly, dispute resolution technology has gained only minor attention,
although some applications are discussed and evaluated extensively. Even legisla-
tion policy documents that regulate and direct the use of technology in dispute
resolution offer little support for formulating an overview of what exactly is
meant by it. This definition deficit is most likely the result of a more functional
orientation where the emphasis is placed on the tasks entrusted to technology
rather than to its formal definition.
For example, the EU’s ODR Regulation (524/2013) does not include a
definition of ODR or even mention technology. However, in the recitals the
lack of efficient electronic means for dispute resolution is acknowledged and
remedied by the establishment of an EU-wide ODR platform, which ‘should take
the form of an interactive website offering a single point of entry to consumers
and traders seeking to resolve disputes out-of-court which have arisen from
online transactions’. The platform should provide information on out-of-court
resolution arising from online sales and services and means for submitting claims
in all official languages, direct the claims to competent national alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) entities and provide case management tools. These
functionalities are described in further detail in Article 5 of the Regulation, which
also stipulates that the platform should be user-friendly. In short, the Regulation
describes the specific functions and desired objectives of the platform but nothing
is stated about the role of technology or how it should be implemented.
Naturally, such examinations cannot be considered mandatory for legislative
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instruments and they could also bring additional complications for streamlining.
The chosen approach accentuates the principle of technological neutrality. How-
ever, the role of technology, what it means in the context of the Regulation, and
its implications for human interaction in dispute resolution processes are not
discussed in the impact assessment accompanying the Regulation either.59
A similar functionalist approach has been adopted in other policy documents.
For example, UNCITRAL’s working group on ODR has discussed definitions of
ODR and technology and agreed that any definition should be sufficiently
inclusive not to exclude future developments of technology. The working group
has also acknowledged the importance of preserving the principle of technological
neutrality.60 As policy-makers avoid setting certain technological solutions in stone
for good reason, the unfortunate side effect is that the definition deficit of dispute
resolution technology cannot be remedied with these authoritative sources.
However, there are some initiatives that aim to produce information for future
policy setting. In the UK, the Civil Justice Council is responsible for overseeing
and co-ordinating the modernisation of the civil justice system. In February
2015, the Council’s ODR Advisory Group produced a background report that
includes examples of ODR, detailed recommendations, and suggestions for ODR
piloting. The report recognises four areas in which future technological development
will further revolutionise dispute resolution: 1) systems to help analyse legal
problems, 2) systems to assist in negotiations, 3) systems to assist in decision-
making, and 4) systems that make decisions. According to the report, advancements
in artificial intelligence, big data, affective computing, crowd sourcing, machine
learning, what-if analysis, and virtual meeting rooms will all contribute to the future
development of ODR. The report also predicts that legal applications of artificial
intelligence will function as “intelligent agents for judges” in the 2020s, although
the advisory group does not anticipate AI systems replacing human judges.61 The
functionalities discussed in the report provides a useful overview of the use cases for
dispute resolution technology.
Also, ODR literature presents discussions on the role of technology in dispute
resolution, although these assessments often focus on the similarities between
ODR applications and ADR methods. The starting point is often Ethan Katsh
and Janet Rifkin’s analogy of the technology as the fourth party of the resolution
process, in which technology is seen as assisting the third party.62 Drawing from
the fourth party analogy, Professors Arno R Lodder and John Zeleznikow analyse
different types of ODR and discuss the convergence of the third and fourth
parties when software is used for decision-making.63
Furthermore, the changes in communication brought on by technology have
received scholarly attention, which most likely results from ODR’s ideological
roots in ADR and the importance of communication in non-binding resolution
mechanisms.64 Also Professor Cortés considers the lack of face-to-face (F2F)
communication to constitute the main difference between ADR and ODR. As
ADR mechanisms often emphasise the importance of such communication,
Cortés points out that distance and lack of physical interaction does not necessarily
signify poorer quality, as sometimes distance may be beneficial and new substitutes
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for F2F are continuously developed. Cortés accentuates the role of technology,
especially in the absence of physical meeting place.65 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
and Thomas Schultz place the discussions on similarities and lack of F2F in a
broader context. According to their analysis, two existing views diverge on the
issue of ODR’s uniqueness. One of these views maintains that ODR is only online
ADR and should replicate F2F communication as closely as possible, whereas the
other solution emphasises the new opportunities provided by technology and
consider ODR as a sui generis type of dispute resolution.66
Professor Hörnle accentuates the ‘transformative power of technology’ in her
examination of different technologies used in online mediation and arbitration.67
She recognises six characteristics of this transformative power: 1) overcoming
spatial and temporal distances through communication technologies; 2) empow-
ering communication through visual aids and access to legal sources; 3) saving
human labour cost through artificial intelligence, such as automated translation
software, negotiation systems, and online forms; 4) the psychological effect of
technology, i.e. both the negative and positive consequences of the lack of F2F
communication; 5) overcoming the jurisdictional problems of cross-border dis-
putes through the extra-judicial nature of ODR; and 6) faster information
processing enabled by technology.68 Similarly to this, Professor Richard Susskind
has identified ODR as one of ‘disruptive technologies’ that fundamentally
challenge the existing status quo.69
In summary, the disruptive qualities of dispute resolution technology have been
widely acknowledged but the specifics of this disruption in general are seldom
addressed. ODR technology is often addressed as supplementary, as the neutral
third’s assisting tools, which might result from the relative lack of successful
applications, as legal technology has only recently started gaining momentum.
However, the transformative power of technology and the role of technology as a
set of new tools provide very different, even contradictory perspectives into dispute
resolution technology. If we are to look for the implications of dispute resolution
technology, we cannot focus on how well technological tools perform their task,
but instead we need to evaluate how they reflect disruption of the ritualistic
features of dispute resolution processes.70
2.4.2 Different approaches to technology
Dispute resolution technology includes a multitude of different tools, the impli-
cations of which can only be properly assessed contextually. For example,
videoconferencing and document cameras have relatively few disruptive ramifica-
tions in comparison with algorithmic decision-making tools. Before discussing
such examples in further detail, it is necessary to ask what is meant by technology,
to demystify the disruptive force of dispute resolution technology by asking what
exactly causes a given technology to become disruptive in the first place. It is
important to bear in mind that in 1995 Bower and Christensen used the term
‘disruptive technology’ to describe shifting power balances in markets resulting
from innovation.71 In this meaning the specifics of technological innovation are
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almost secondary, as the focus is on market change. It follows that technology is
not simply a question of technological artefacts or know-how but also involves
structures of designing, manufacturing, marketing and using these artefacts;72 in
short, the social practices of society are entwined with technology.
The etymology of technology is in the ancient Greek word meaning craftsman-
ship or art (tékhnē) and from the word study (-logia, originally légō, ‘I speak’).
As such, the use of fire, the invention of the wheel, and the development of
agriculture, which led to the Neolithic Revolution,73 are all technologies in the
original meaning of the word. However, in the meaning of dispute resolution
technology we refer to techniques, practices, and devices that can be used for
purposes of information and communication without exact knowledge of how
they work. For example, using the EU Commission’s ODR platform does not
require any knowledge of domain names or hypertext protocols. Thus, examina-
tion of disruptive qualities of dispute resolution technology deals with social
interaction that creates meaning for new ICT.74 At the core of ICT is the ability
to process vast amounts of information, which, in turn, leads to power struggles
over control of information between states, corporations and other actors.75
The ways in which information is controlled has also impacted the formation of
the legal system. As a mechanism of institutionalised power, law’s function is
deeply connected with controlling and managing information, which in turn calls
attention to the changing forms of holding and storing information. German
legal historian and media theorist Cornelia Vismann discusses this historical
relationship between law and information by examining archived legal files and
legal practices, which she considers mutually constitute one another. Deriving
several historical examples from the Roman Empire to the formation of Prussia as
a sovereign state and to the excavation of the destroyed Stasi files of 1990s,
Vismann deduces that record-keeping and handling of files shape the formation
of legal procedures and the focal conceptualisations of truth, state, and subject.76
The files themselves have changed in the course of time; from being the tools of
legal administration to being administered by legal regulation on privacy, according
to Vismann’s genealogy. This means that the changes of form in record-keeping
from the old paper files to computer icons constitute a change from material media
to handling of data (instead of files) – a change that enables us to question how the
battle over control of information is mutating.
It follows that conceptualisations of technology simultaneously reveal and hide
perspectives, and participate in ideological struggles and formation of social
processes. But the question remains, what is the relationship between the techno-
logical application and its use? Early answers to this question were sketched by two
main approaches of media theory, the technological determinism of Canadian
philosopher Marshall McLuhan and the social shaping of technology presented by
Welsh academic Raymond Williams. It should be noted that both McLuhan’s and
Williams’s major contributions to media studies took place before the emergence
of the World Wide Web in early 1990s, although both approaches remain relevant.
The theories differ in the extent to which they consider media technology to have
the capability of transforming society and culture. Whereas McLuhan emphasises
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fundamental change enabled by technology, Williams perceives technology as
reflecting existing social stratification, wealth, and power.
McLuhan’s technological determinism considers technological artefacts as
‘extensions of man’, where the form of technology itself has more fundamental
influence on human behaviour than the message that is related through
technology.77 It follows from this ‘extension thesis’, as it is called by Lister
et al.,78 that McLuhan does not make a distinction between the terms ‘media’
and ‘technology’; both are extensions of our senses, tools in our hands. In a
famous example McLuhan depicts how the simple technology of light bulb has
transformed society by creating a new environment, i.e. the use of night-time for
activities, although the bulb itself is empty of content, it is merely the medium.
Similarly, he claims that the impact of television on society does not depend on
the content of television shows, i.e. the influence is identical regardless of
whether the shows are children’s shows or illustrated violence.79 The strong suit
of technological determinism is that it brings the disruptive element of ICTs to
the front by considering the emergence of new media as a fundamental change of
society. Shortcomings of technological determinism boil down to its lack of
sociological sensitivity. McLuhan’s position is not interested in sociological
analysis of power relations, wealth, and social norms present in technology.
Hence, Williams’s critique hits a spot as he brings attention to McLuhan’s
reductionist overtone where the complicated social history of the media is
brought down simply to their effects.80
Contrary to McLuhan’s narrow determinist focus on technology, Williams
insists on human agency and calls attention to the social and ideological practices
that he considers relevant to the impact of new technology. Instead of funda-
mental change, he downplays the disruptive nature of modern technology and
sees hegemonic and existing ideologies, social classes, and social norms more
decisive for reception and use of media than any specific form of technology.81
By asking why and how certain technology is achieved, Williams is able to
establish a more nuanced approach that is more sensitive to ideological elements
involved in the acceptance of technology. At the same time, however, technology
becomes an extension of already existing social practices and has little disruptive
value beyond this scope.
Due to its sociologically comprehensive approach, Williams’s theory has
become the mainstream of media and communication theory.82 Still, McLuhan’s
more generalised and provocative remarks have their value as his theory accent-
uates the radical change brought on by new media. Later on, the multidiscip-
linary field of science and technology studies (STS) has adopted an understanding
of technology, which combines William’s constructivist approach with elements
of McLuhan’s theory. In this tradition, French philosopher Bruno Latour com-
bines elements of both approaches in his actor network theory, which allows
agency to physical objects as parts of networks of humans and objects.83 In any
case, McLuhan’s and Williams’ work on theorising media has paved the way for
later developments of media theory and still provides a point of reference for
these discussions.84
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For example, the German media theorist Friedrich Kittler expands on McLuhan’s
determinism by stating that ‘media determine our situation’85 but contests the
notion of media as extensions of man by highlighting the autonomy in techno-
logy. Kittler perceives humans as extensions of technology, where machines have
required the skill to connect and manage information without any reference to
human consciousness.86 In one of his interviews Kittler reverses the importance
of the Internet for promoting human interaction by stating that ‘the develop-
ment of the internet has more to do with human beings becoming a reflection of
their technologies . . . after all, it is we who adapt to the machine. The machine
does not adapt to us’.87 Kittler’s autonomy of technology, which acknowledges
the disruptiveness of technology even further than McLuhan, demonstrates that
the relationship between technological form, culture and human interaction is
multifaceted and reciprocal, if the distinction between technology and humans is
even feasible any longer.
In summary, conceptualisations of technology should include elements of both
deterministic and constructivist approaches but these should not be considered
exhaustive. Focus on disruptive qualities emphasises McLuhan’s determinism, but
disruptive qualities are often created through interplay between technology,
markets, law and society. The constructivist approach detaches the examination
from the technical artefact to its social implications, which is vital for our
examination of dispute resolution technology, as we are interested in the ways
in which this technology reflects and changes existing ideologies embedded in
law’s justificatory structures. Highlighting that the disruptiveness of technology
results from its social element, that the use of technology is created through
communication, is necessary for understanding how technology becomes relevant
within social systems such as the legal system.
2.5 Technology and systems theory
2.5.1 How does technology enter law?
Surprisingly, Luhmann discusses the relationship between technology and social
systems relatively briefly. In The Reality of Mass Media Luhmann considers
the system of mass media as its own social system that operates based on the code
information/non-information. For Luhmann, media provide the means for creat-
ing a portrait of reality that other social systems can then tap into without losing
their internal stability; media adopt the role of memory, in a manner of speaking.
However, Luhmann sees mass media as the one-sided relationship between sender
and receiver, where there is no real interaction between the sender and receiver.88
As discussed in the previous section, such notions disregard the complexity and
reciprocity of technology and society. Although Luhmann downplays the impor-
tance of technology by perceiving them as ‘invisible machines’, he admits that any
societal theory needs to reserve sufficient place for further technological develop-
ment and its impact on society. This necessary indeterminacy, theoretical space for
future technology, can be found in structural couplings:
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If we ask whether computers are machines that work analogously to con-
sciousness and can replace or even outdo consciousness systems, we are
putting the problem wrongly and probably playing it down. Nor is it relevant
whether the internal operations of the computer can be understood as
communications. We must presumably leave aside all analogies of this sort
and ask instead what consequences it would have if computers could estab-
lish a quite independent structural coupling between a reality they were able
construct and consciousness or communicative systems. This question
deserves greater attention; it is impossible to judge at present what conse-
quences it would have for the further evolution of the societal system. At any
rate, any theory of society should reserve an indeterminacy position for the
issue, and the structural coupling concept offers such a possibility.89
The possibility of using structural couplings to secure indeterminacy seems to
vacate a space in social systems theory for future inclusion of technology. It
remains unclear, however, between which systems these structural couplings
would emerge. The system of mass media does not accurately describe the social
complexity of technology use during the last decades, as the development of the
World Wide Web and rise of social media have detached information production
from established mass media. Could the answer, perhaps, be found in evaluating
technology as an autopoietic system in its own right, as the German sustainability
researcher André Reichel suggests? Reichel applies systems theory to what he
considers to be the core of technology, the technological artefact, which
then connects with its physical and social environment and with the human
user.90 He considers three options for including technology in systems theory:
technology as a social system with coding work/fail; technology as a part of other
systems; and technology as a sui genesis autopoietic system. He opts for the third
option, as the first two would fail to actualise the full potential of technology.
Technology as a self-producing but not social system would be distinct from
society and humans. This would depict technology as non-physical and non-
living reproduction, as ‘technological’ instead of social.91
Although perceiving technology as a sui generis autopoietic system might be
tempting, there are several issues against it. Reichel’s technological system is not
a social system and as such it is not based on communication, but instead
operates through information.92 However, he still connects technology to social
systems and psychic systems through the use of language, through meaning and
communication,93 which only social systems are able to do.94 The interpretation
also disregards the social interdependencies between artefacts, markets and
cultural elements, the impact of regulation and financial incentives that all
reciprocally affect the development of technology. If we separate technology
from human interaction, the picture of technology becomes one-sided. Also,
without the social element, different subsystems in society cannot form structural
couplings with technology.
Another option is to consider the social practices related to technology, the
social element, as an internal programme of a social subsystem. However, this
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interpretation does not entirely convince, as this would mean each subsystem
would manage such a programme independently from others based on its own
coding, which would fall short in explaining the simultaneous technological
disruption of several systems. Yet another possibility suitable for explaining
the relationship between law and technology would be to examine the social
elements of technology as a new social subsystem. If technological operations are
networked to one another in a continuous web, which then produces the
distinction system/environment, then use of ICTs could perhaps be considered
an emerging new social system. However, such interpretation would require us to
identify the code candidate of the system and its generalised medium.
2.5.2 Use of ICT as an emergent social system
It is suggested here that the social implications and increasing conventions related
to technology use can be reconciled within systems theory by interpreting this
social dimension as an emergent new system. Such interpretation would provide
tools for analysing how the continuous development and use of dispute resolution
technology enters the legal system as a disruptive irritant, while simultaneously
respecting the theory’s limits. The fact that these social implications are not limited
to any single subsystem in the society seems to support the interpretation of use of
technology as a social system. This wide-spread nature of technological change
would imply that the social dimension of technology goes beyond the role of
internal programme and would explain the plethora of diverse yet connected
interpretative issues arising from the digitalisation of societal practices in different
subsystems.95 In other words, use of ICT has brought on changes in methods,
discourses and practices within a wide variety of different fields, and has created the
need to react in several scientific, political, legal and economic ways to new
complicated phenomena.
Such widespread social changes following development of new technology are
not unprecedented. For example, the development, commercialisation and imple-
mentation of the printing press led to the Printing Revolution in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, which had wide-ranging consequences for circulation of
information, journalism and the democratisation of knowledge. However, it took
several centuries before the technology had spread around Europe and before
action from the courts and legislation became indispensable. Compared to this,
the pace of change in development of information and communication technology
is significantly more rapid. Also, the technology we are addressing here is different
from changes in manufacturing processes. Modern technology or digitally inter-
active new media encompasses possibilities for creating new social realities, as
information management and communication are at the core of their function. It
is this rupture of social meaning creation that leads to the perception of funda-
mental change and suggests the emergence of new functional differentiation in
the society.
Of course, this emphasis on the social element of modern technology gives
only a partial picture as the examination of the technological artefacts is absent in
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such conceptualisations. However, the physical artefacts and the social element of
technology cannot be examined as a single unit while doing justice to the
complexity of both aspects. Our focus here is on the social reality surrounding
technology use, but the artefacts are increasingly becoming entwined with the
social dimension, to the point where these two become impossible to distinguish,
for example in augmented reality or artificial intelligence applications. One way of
reconciling this difference between the physical and the social is to understand
technology through Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, which has gained
popularity in science and technology studies.96 Actor-network theory considers
physical objects as parts of social networks and attributes agency to both human
and non-human actors. Thus, the role of technological artefacts could be
considered through such networks that participate in social meaning creation.
However, this simultaneous cohesion of the social dimension surrounding use
of technology and the increasing distinction between social and technological
elements is still under way, which suggests that we are talking about an emergent
social system. The emerging social system can be found in the communicative
social interactions, where the context of using ICT creates meaning and this
use relays communication as a communicative act. This emergent social nature
related to technological communication can be addressed as the system of use of
ICT, for lack of a better label, to separate it from the non-communicative
technology.
This conceptualisation portrays the use of ICT as an emerging social system
which is functionally differentiating from other subsystems to form its own
distinctive autopoiesis through communication. This way of understanding ICT
explains why the earlier forms of technology have not constituted a similarly
extensive crisis within society.97 It simultaneously places this study and conse-
quences of new dispute resolution technology within the context of new media.
Also, this enables us to address the communicative element of technology with-
out resorting to descriptions of pilot projects or policy objectives. The emergent
nature of this new social system illustrates why the use of ICT also calls for
reactions within the legal system. The social system enters the legal system
through structural couplings and is used in operations within the boundaries of
law. At the same time, the physical elements of technology, the non-communicative
side, may enter the legal system as simple brute facts of a legal case (e.g. in
contractual disputes over delivery of technology) but these facts are not operations
in the meaning of social systems. The technological side is left with the role of a
bystander in the legal system, but the social side of technology accumulates a more
pronounced role as another functionally differentiated social system that links with
the legal system through its cognitive openness.
The emergence of a new social system requires the development of system-
specific coding that grounds all communication around the system’s symbolically
generalised medium and thus creates the boundaries between the system and its
environment. What would be this medium and code for the use of ICT? In his
interpretation of technology as a sui generis autopoetic system, Reichel suggests
distinction between work/fail as the code.98 Luhmann, in turn, suggests that the
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code of mass media systems is information/non-information.99 When examining
the social dimension of ICT and the transfer of data on different levels of
hardware, programming or online interactions, communication and information
become interwoven, or even converge. It seems that the use of ICT even outside
the mass media context operates around transmission of information, which
could suggest distinction between transmission and non-transmission as a possible
candidate for the system’s code.
Another option is to look at the infrastructure surrounding this transmission,
which creates the possibility of social meaning creation. In this case, the medium
for the use of ICT could be located in functionality, operability, information relay
or even elegance of the solution. Elegance of the code infrastructure might be a
considered as the key element in the system’s functionality, as elegance could
make it more adaptable to its environment. However, no clear-cut answer is to be
found as to the content of code by examining the social dimension surrounding
the use of ICT. This ambiguity might be the flipside of the system’s emergent
nature: the code and the medium might still be work in progress, if the system’s
cohesion had not led to a sufficiently powerful way of establishing system
boundaries. In fact, the difficulty of finding the code can be read as a sign of
the emergence. Also, this could explain why the distinction between the social
system of use of ICT and the non-social technology is not always lucid.
How would this conceptualisation of the use of ICT as an emergent system
facilitate the task at hand, which is to assess the technology-driven privatisation of
coercion? This approach enables us to perceive the disruptive qualities of tech-
nology from a perspective internal to the legal system, as it permits us to focus on
the social dimension of dispute resolution technology on a general level without
oversimplification. Also, it would provide an explanation to why this technologi-
cal change poses a fundamental challenge for law, an irritant that the legal system
must address in its operations. In short, it gives a more nuanced framework for
assessing the relationship between law and technology on a macro level without
placing the focus on any individual technological application.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have laid out the theoretical framework which I employ in order
to answer how the implementation of technology in dispute resolution challenges
the justification of law as a legitimised mode of violence. Law is a stability-creating
social subsystem of society that upholds normative expectations regardless of
disappointment. The previous section discussed the theoretical premises of this
study and established law as a stability-creating social system that upholds norma-
tive expectations regardless of disappointment. Law reproduces itself independently
from other social systems through continuous flow of networked communication
that conforms to the system-specific coding of legal/illegal, the legal system’s
grammar that safeguards its boundaries and identity. This operative closure,
where other systems cannot interfere with the legal system’s operations and its
self-production is balanced by cognitive openness, which explains how external
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references may enter law’s operations. One such mechanism are structural cou-
plings that may emerge between different systems when an operation applies codes
of two systems.
It is argued here that the relationship between law and technology could be
interpreted as interaction between two distinct systems sharing operations through
cognitive openness. This claim departs from an analysis of the reciprocal and
complicated relationship between technological artefacts and the culture surround-
ing their use, suggesting that the social dimension of technology use could be
perceived as communication. Based on the social and disruptive properties, it is
suggested that the use of ICT be seen as an emergent social system. The next chapter
asks how this growing social importance of technology relates to dispute resolution,
how it contributes to privatisation of coercion and thus creates a justificatory crisis.
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3 Emerging crisis
The previous chapter examined ways of conceptualising technology and concluded
with the suggestion that the social meaning creation embedded in the use of
information and communication technology (ICT) could be considered as a new
emergent social system. This chapter draws a picture of the crisis the use of ICT
has provoked within the legal system by enabling increasing privatisation of
enforcement. First, different concrete examples of dispute resolution technology
are discussed to provide an overview of existing applications. Second, the need to
categorise these applications is addressed by introducing a taxonomy for dispute
resolution technology. After this, the shortcomings of the analogy of technology as
the fourth party of dispute resolution procedure are examined before moving on to
the second part of the chapter which explains the changes in enforcement.
Privatisation of coercion is then placed in the context of private regimes and then
discussed in relation to dispute resolution before continuing with examples of
private enforcement including direct enforcement of e-commerce sites, ICANN’s
UDRP procedure for domain name disputes, chargebacks, user reviews, trust-
marks, and smart contracts. It is argued that enforcement is crucial for all dispute
resolution and this possibility of coaxing compliance without reference to the
state’s monopoly on violence is the most fundamental difference between old and
new private regimes of dispute resolution.
3.1 Technology in dispute resolution
3.1.1 Examples of dispute resolution technology
Dispute resolution technology should be understood as an inclusive definition of
ICT applications that facilitate different aspects of conflict management. Such
applications may ease access to legal help on a general level through legislation and
case law portals, diagnostic tools and chatbots, or expedite resolution of a dispute
through case management systems, communication tools and user portals, decision
support tools, videoconferencing, to name but a few. In addition to such func-
tions, legal design is increasingly becoming an aspect of the development of
different user-friendly applications that place the experience of law’s end-users
ahead of that of the legal profession,1 a trend that is connected with the often
unsustainable costs of legal presentation and the increase in self-presentation, as well
as the growing importance of conflict prevention instead of conflict resolution.2
Dispute resolution technology forms a diverse field and different applications
often overlap, which means that distinctions between courtroom applications, legal
tech and ODR become impossible to maintain. Also, the field is continuously
evolving and descriptions of current state of the art applications will without fail be
outdated within couple of years. However, the development of dispute resolution
technology is not linear or progressing similarly in different countries.3 Instead,
different court practices and needs of the stakeholders call for different solutions
and one system design does not necessarily follow different work methods and
cultures elsewhere.
Recently, civil justice reforms have introduced several technology applications
in the public courts that aspire to improve access to justice. Launched in 2014,
the Dutch Rechtswijzer portal is one of the forerunners of public dispute
resolution technology. The online platform designed for self-presenting layper-
sons facing divorce, unemployment, consumer protection or other private law
issues provides information and diagnostic tools, step-by-step plans for conflict
resolution, negotiation and communication tools, and interfaces to payment
systems and e-identification. Empirical studies show that users generally consid-
ered their experience with the website positive and the information provided
trustworthy.4 The findings underlined the importance of access to information as
most visitors in divorce cases stated a need for problem-focused help rather than
emotional or social help.5 Whereas the Dutch initiative focuses on end-user
experience, the Finnish justice reform AIPA initiated in 2010 adopts a more
court-based approach to digitalise the working methods in the court system while
simultaneously creating an extensive case management system with decision
support tools.6 The case management system is designed for all court cases
ranging from precautionary measures and petitions to criminal and civil proce-
dure. The system has interfaces with legal aid offices, enforcement officials, and
prosecutors to enable swift case flow and in the future will also include a citizen
portal.7 In turn, the Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia provides an
ODR tool backed up with the public court system for litigants in small claims or
strata disputes.8 The tribunal strives for user-centred design of early ODR for
activating people in solving their disputes.
Dispute resolution technology is discussed also outside civil litigation. In
Canada, fines could soon be contested and parking ticket disputes resolved
through online platform.9 However, adoption of dispute resolution technology,
especially in criminal cases, has strong ethical implications for the administration
of justice, as the recent debate on the feasibility of the decision support tool
Northpointe Compas demonstrates. The software that applies artificial intelli-
gence to find renewable patterns in vast amounts of statistics is used in courts in
Wisconsin, US, at sentencing to assess a defendant’s risk of recidivism. As it is
unclear how the software produces its assessment and claims have been made of
its ethnic bias,10 a defendant sentenced with the algorithm contested its use
based on due process. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that due
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process standards do not prevent courts from considering the software’s
assessment.11 As this example demonstrates, use of dispute resolution technology
may strengthen the existing power structures and biases and make decision-making
less transparent.
In addition to court-focused initiatives, some legal tech companies provide
services for consumers to aid them in reaching their legal rights without inter-
vention from lawyers or courts. For example, consumers may use the chatbot app
DoNotPay to contest their parking tickets or FlightRight to claim compensation
from airline companies for flight delays they are entitled to, based on EU
Regulation 261/2004. Such dispute resolution applications could be considered
as access services, as their goal is to lower the threshold for legal help while, of
course, making a profit from these relatively marginal use cases. Another aspect of
such services is access to legal information in an easy and user-friendly manner.
Online legislation and case law portals as well as information design and social
media play a role in making law more accessible and, at times, more transparent
to laypeople.
A point of interest is that while some applications of dispute resolution
technology focus on improving legal processes and facilitating access through
relatively simple solutions such as chatbots, legal design and user portals, others
experiment with artificial intelligence, machine learning and data analytics
towards algorithmic decision-making. Despite differences in technology, most
applications strive for automation of routine legal labour, of those tasks that do
not require far-reaching in casu consideration, those relatively easy cases that have
little variation. Law firms are experimenting with automation of legal research
and argument with the help of machine learning-based applications such as
Lawyer Ross, a customisable software built on IBM’s computer system Watson
that can answer questions posed in natural language.12
When compared to these recent developments, it seems that the emphasis of
dispute resolution technology has shifted away from ODR. Naturally, this shift
does not trivialise the importance early ODR research has played in establishing the
field. Early ODR applications included communication platforms and complaint
management systems as well as settlement support tools such as blind bidding
systems, where parties suggest a monetary settlement sum without the other party
seeing and the algorithm generates an agreement when both enter the acceptable
range.
The EU’s ODR platform is a prominent example of current ODR applications.
The platform directs consumers’ claims against online traders to national ADR
entities. Since February 2016, over 46,000 complaints have been filed through
the platform13 – a surprisingly small number when taking into consideration that
the EU’s Single Market accounts for 500 million consumers and 21 million small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).14 Another, often quoted example of
successful ODR is eBay’s Resolution Center, which is claimed to handle around
60 million e-commerce disputes annually.15 eBay is an online marketplace where
the sellers list items for sale and buyers may bid for the items and thus enter into
a binding agreement with the seller for the sale of goods. As conflicts may arise
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when the payment is not made or the buyer does not receive an item, eBay has
included an ODR process on its website. In addition to ODR, the platform
includes the possibility of private enforcement enabled by the connection
between eBay and its payment mechanism, PayPal. However, the coercive
nature of dispute resolution and private enforcement has been downplayed by
collectively referring to these as the Money-Back Guarantee.
The relative lack of success of most private ODR providers corresponds with
the shift in dispute resolution technology described above. The reasons for this
are various but most probably the difficulties in funding private ODR, the lack of
enforcement options outside market leaders such as eBay, complexity of redress
options and the low level of consumer awareness all play a role. Because of this
lack of success of private ODR, civil justice reforms have become an essential
venue for ODR functionalities.
The publicly funded ODR schemes also have the potential to extend their
usability through interfaces to payment mechanisms, identity verification, public
land registers and other public databases. To conclude, the field of dispute
resolution technology is continuously evolving and different examples reveal
different sides of the complex phenomenon. However, such examples reveal
only a partial truth, as we often lose sight of the overview when focusing on
specific functionalities.
3.1.2 Possible taxonomy for dispute resolution technology
As the development of dispute resolution technology is often fragmented, over-
lapping, shifting in focus and multi-voiced, different applications are often difficult
to categorise and the overview is missing. Still, a taxonomy of dispute resolution
technology is necessary for evaluating the broader context beyond individual
examples, for perceiving the change in dispute resolution brought on by techno-
logy, and for examining technology-driven private enforcement. One option for
taxonomy would be to follow the doctrinal distinction between ODR and court-
room technology,16 but as the shift away from private ODR and the potential of
public dispute resolution technology demonstrate, this distinction seems to provide
little value for categorisation. Although the tension between private and public
ODR models remains, we might as well ask whether the differences between
models are, in fact, as definite as the doctrinal divide would lead us to believe.17
The preservation of the doctrinal distinction in debates about dispute resolution
technology may hamper in-depth analysis of its potential for both forms of dispute
resolution and hide the convergence points from sight. Despite doctrinal differ-
ences, conflict management in both the public and in the private sphere carries a
public function in the end,18 places value on fairness of outcomes and requires
tools to encourage sustainable digitalisation of dispute resolution.
The emerging social system of the use of ICT converges the ways in which
different dispute resolution models are used and dilutes the differences when it
comes to the role granted to technology in the procedure. When courtroom
technology and ODR are discussed separately from each other, only in connection
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with their traditional equivalents, the role of technology diminishes. This may
cause the false perception that technology’s impact on dispute resolution is minor
at best, which does not reflect the technological disruptiveness already affecting
dispute resolution. As some applications of legal technology (e.g. access services)
do not easily follow this doctrinal distinction, it is suggested here that we abandon
the terminology of courtroom technology and ODR for dispute resolution
technology to emphasise their overlap and convergence.19
The delicate balance between reification of technology and taking technology
seriously is hard to maintain. Also the danger of imposing universal invariables is
looming, as it is tempting to define dispute resolution technology through
generalisations that downplay the need for case-by-case analysis. Instead of all-
encompassing theory on the impact of technology on dispute resolution we need
to content ourselves with the overview of current developments in addition to
more detailed in casu analyses.
Another option is to categorise dispute resolution technology based on the
trends and development of the field over the past decades. As such chronological
categorisation would provide more tools for context-based evaluation and help in
understanding individual applications as parts of a historical continuum, this
categorisation strategy is suggested here. This means dividing different function-
alities of dispute resolution technology to three distinct categories based on the
role of technology and time of their adoption. The first, preparadigmatic phase of
dispute resolution technology ranges from 1960s to the end of 1980s, the second
phase characterised by the introduction of World Wide Web that popularised the
Internet from the early 1990s to the end of the 2000s and the third phase
defined by the rapid advancement of technology from 2010s onwards.
The first preparadigmatic phase of dispute resolution technology was related to
the increasing automation of data processing that resulted from the breakthroughs
in computer technology and its commercialisation. As mainframe computers
became the norm for processing bulk data, legal scholars saw advantages to be
gained from the new technology, especially for case law research and analysis.20
Towards the end of 1980s, improvements in word processing, as well as the
introduction of video depositions and in some cases electronic terminals in court-
houses for e-filing, signified the beginning of dispute resolution technology. In this
first phase technology was mostly auxilliary to legal processes, its potential mostly
in making data processing easier.
In the second phase the possibilities of newly discovered cyberspace signified
both challenges and possibilities for national legal systems. The World Wide Web
enabled online databases for legal information, whereas email and later videocon-
ferencing technology gave rise to early ODR applications.21 Internet-based legal
services emerged to provide help for laypersons in need of legal documents without
lawyers and contributed to the growing demand voiced by the ADR movement for
making law more accessible. In the second phase the role attributed to technology
became more pronounced, but applications were still mostly there to assist lawyers.
In the third phase, which we are currently living, rapid technological changes
are increasingly felt as a pressure to redesign legal services and re-evaluate the role
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of the legal profession. Applications of artificial intelligence, machine learning and
big data all contribute to automated decision-making. Whereas pattern recognition
based on neural networks provides new tools for prediction and risk assessment,
contract automation, practice management and compliance challenge traditional
law practices. It remains to be seen what are the applications of blockchain
architecture behind cryptocurrencies, which provides tools for decentralised trust-
less transactions in general and for self-executing smart contracts in particular, in
law, as they can potentially remove the need to place trust in any intermediaries be
it an e-commerce site, credit card company, escrow service, or the public courts.22
As technological advances make automated decision-making more science and less
fiction both in routine cases and at some point also in hard cases, the role of
technology becomes constantly more autonomous, giving rise to completely
automated procedures and new legal practices.
This chronological taxonomy provides an overview of dispute resolution
technology, in which continuous development has led from early data processing
to autonomous decision-making, making use of artificial intelligence and block-
chains. As the role of technology is constantly changing also in the legal system,
it becomes apparent that there can be no universal definition of dispute resolu-
tion technology any more than there can be a straightforward and simple
description of its consequences for the legal profession.
3.1.3 Problems of the fourth party analogy
At this point it has become necessary to address the famous analogy of technology
as the fourth party in dispute resolution, as this conceptualisation has been very
influential in ODR literature. Although the analogy provides an easy to understand
and even elegant conceptualisation, it oversimplifies the multiformity of dispute
resolution technology described above.
The fourth party analogy is a word play, where the configuration of dispute
resolution, the triad of parties and the neutral third, a judge or an arbitrator, is
complemented with an additional fourth party, namely technology.23 Originally
Katsh and Rifkin considered the fourth party in the context of cross-border online
disputes, where technology would be working with and assisting the neutral
third.24 The analogy builds on McLuhan’s determinism, where the use of technology
fundamentally impacts its use, in this case the dispute resolution process.25
The shortcomings of the analogy become clear when taking into considera-
tion Williams’ criticism on the neglected social dimension of McLuhan’s
technological determinism. Williamsite focus on social dimension of technology
provides a critical counterpoint for evaluating determinist approaches. For
Williams, the determinist conceptualisation of the medium’s focal impact on
its reception – the medium is the message – presents objectification of essential
social practices. Borrowing from Marxist theory, this objectivisation, or reification,
reduces social relations to relations between traded objects, which leads to trans-
forming such objects into subjects and, vice versa, rendering human subjects into
passive objects.26
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Such critique reveals how determinist approaches to technology attain univers-
alist nature and how universalist arguments about technology may lead to
attributing agency to technology that is not there. This thingification of techno-
logy and objectification of persons takes the form of the fourth party analogy in
ODR literature. Generalised claims about dispute resolution technology’s impact,
in turn, mystify technology, distancing its use and functionalities from the
concrete practice of dispute resolution, highlighting rather than downplaying its
role while simultaneously leaving aside further analysis of its various conse-
quences. Instead of contextual analysis of individual use cases, dispute resolution
technology becomes a decisive element in the whole process.
If we are to understand technology as the fourth party, its use then
becomes a participant in the resolution process, linguistically equivalent to
other participants but unable to meet the expectations of such agency. Thus,
we are left with a procedure which has several participant roles, but one of
which is permanently vacated. By such stances, the technology of dispute
resolution is reified into subjectivity, and consequently action and active role
are allocated to technology instead of the parties. Through attaching agency
to technology, the resolution process is alienated from the actual social
relations between the parties. In other words, agency is shifted from the
participants to the technology, making it difficult to assess those social factors
that are also relevant to the dispute resolution process, e.g. power imbalances
or lack of access.
Similar warnings about mystifying technology has also been voiced by the
American academic Lawrence Lessig, who emphasises that technology should not
be dogmatised. Lessig argues that technology can be remade and thus its function-
ing can be changed by rewriting its code. This aspect is often disregarded by the
rhetoric of cyberspace emphasising technology’s innate regulation-averse nature.27
Despite these shortcomings of objectification and dogmatism, we need to
consider the feasibility of the fourth party analogy for describing the changing
autonomy of dispute resolution technology as well as its role as a metaphor for
revealing the networked structures behind its adoption. Although these insights
do not follow from the original conceptualisation of Katsh and Rifkin, they may
reveal possibilities for future theory development.
If we apply the embedded suggestion in the fourth party analogy that
technology has an active and autonomous role in dispute resolution to the
taxonomy described in the previous section, we notice that the role attributed
to technology has changed significantly since 1960s data processing to applica-
tions of legal artificial intelligence in 2010s. Although the agency of technology
is far-fetched for first-generation and many applications of second-generation
dispute resolution technology, this may not hold true for autonomous decision-
making that employs machine learning and neural networks. After all, third-
generation applications possess a higher degree of autonomy than the first
generation of dispute resolution technology. However, there is a difference
between autonomy and agency. Unlike autonomy, agency suggests the ability
to interact in social structures. Although third-generation dispute resolution
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technology may give the impression of social interaction, of being able to create
social responses, this does not necessarily mean there is social interaction. At the
moment, portrayal of interaction does not constitute mutual recognition of the
other’s subjectivity, that fundamental essence of communication. Despite
advances in neural networks and pattern recognition, artificial general intelli-
gence capable of consciousness is still not on the horizon – much to the relief of
those worried about singularity.
Another possible use for the fourth party analogy could be in its ability to
describe the networks embedded in its adoption. For example, Lodder and
Zeleznikow have developed the analogy further by adding a fifth party, namely
the service provider.28 If we are to consider other subject positions present in
dispute resolution technology, we might include the programmer behind the
code to the analogy as the sixth party, or the Internet service provider.
Interpreted this way, the fourth party analogy might help in conceptualising
the human intention that is always present in programming. Such further
theorisation bows towards the French sociologist Bruno Latour’s actor-network
theory, in which the social world is created by the networked interactions of
human and non-human actors, such as concepts, ideas, processes and artefacts.
Combining these elements with the fourth party analogy could provide a
solution for maintaining the analogy while overcoming the critique of social
shaping of technology. In this spirit, agency would be created in a network of
human and non-human actors and thus there would be enough room to discuss
the social actions created by such networks without attributing agency to
technology itself. However, it is unclear whether such a theoretical exercise
would indeed be true to the analogy’s original meaning or provide sufficient
added value to justify it. Also, conceptualising such complexity through party
metaphors ties the examination to the actual dispute resolution process, which
limits its applicability.
To conclude, the analogy comes burdened with certain embedded ambiguity
and the need to make further, often problematic distinctions between different
uses of technology that the analogy does not leave room for. Based on this, it
seems that the theory of technology as the fourth or fifth party is not sufficient
for describing the complexity. Technology is not a party to the resolution
procedure, but a structure which frames the process. Although the metaphor of
the fourth or fifth party is appealing, it is an oversimplification that hides the
complexity of dispute resolution technology. Instead of using the analogy, a
more context-orientated approach is needed to create a more nuanced picture of
dispute resolution technology with added explanatory power.
In addition, the fourth party analogy focuses on the resolution process, which
means that technology-driven changes in enforcement and the theoretically
interesting shift towards privatisation of coercion have remained in the margins
of literature on dispute resolution technology. By simultaneously holding on to
the overview of technological change and the contextual approach of different
functionalities, this privatisation development is made visible as an example of the
rupture brought on by dispute resolution technology.
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3.2 Reflections of rupture in dispute resolution
3.2.1 Emergence of private regimes
As suggested by the contextual approach advocated in the previous section, the
impact of dispute resolution technology should be evaluated based on the change
its implementation creates within the legal system. One of these consequences is
that the introduction of dispute resolution technology accelerates the emergence
of private regimes, as is the case with private ODR such as eBay’s Resolution
Center or chargeback procedures of credit card companies, both of which provide
redress mechanisms. Such alternative mechanisms of redress and enforcement
become essential when the national legal systems are unable to provide court-
based public enforcement for low-intensity disputes. The emergence of private
regimes and its connection with the increasing importance of technology form the
background for evaluating private enforcement.
The reason why private regimes are capable of providing redress where public
systems cannot is that they are not as bound to the nation-state as national court
systems by definition are. This means that private regimes are gaining more
momentum at the expense of the public regimes. The tension between private
and public, as well as other contradictions, are embedded in law, which is by no
means a harmonious system – the legal system’s function of upholding normative
expectations even when those grounded expectations are disappointed attests to
this. At times, this tension between public and private escalates into conflicts and
disputes, and the battle for hegemony becomes visible. Enabling, safeguarding
and reinterpreting these embedded tensions of the legal sphere are a central part
of law’s operation, of the ways in which autopoiesis is achieved.
Professor Thomas Schultz discusses legal pluralism by examining how private
Internet regimes become private legal systems by attaining normativity. Autono-
mous legal systems emerge when they acquire autonomous jurisdictional powers
of prescription, adjudication, and enforcement, which enable formal legal institu-
tions to recognise it. By evaluating the prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement
institutions of ICANN and eBay’s Resolution Center, he argues that they should
be recognised as autonomous private legal systems despite modern legal theory’s
close attachment to the concept of political sovereignty.29 Schultz’s examination
explains how the tension between private and public is embedded in our under-
standing of law only in connection with the nation-state and how the emergence
of the Internet is contributing to this tension.
Similarly, the German legal scholar Günther Teubner discusses the conceptual
dominance of the nation-state in relation to debates on the legal nature of lex
mercatoria, the medieval body of commercial law applicable throughout Europe.30
Teubner claims that lex mercatoria as a privately emerged legal system challenges
the close connection between law and state by enabling the formation of private
legal orders without state intervention. In addition to this ultimate challenge of the
state’s prescriptive power, lex mercatoria, by becoming de facto transnational, also
ascends the regional scope of the nation-state and the traditional method of
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formulating cross-border rules by international politics.31 According to Teubner,
lex mercatoria locates itself in the periphery of law and thus finds its dynamic
stability by means other than creating a centre, which is typically a practice of
national legislation. Such differences between private regimes and national legal
systems are not necessarily defects; they are simply differences.32
In addition, Teubner addresses the collision between law and technology that
results from differences in their scope of application; law as we understand it is
closely interlinked with the political system of the nation-state, whereas technology
forms a global system. These self-producing subsystems of society, such as techno-
logy, compete with the politics of nation-states in the formulation of a global
autonomous society.33 This interpretation explains why the increasing privatisation
of coercion that results from the use of dispute resolution technology is proble-
matic from the perspective of the legal system, as the two systems are not
compatible, the tensions between private and public, global and regional, unrec-
onciled. The social implications of legal privatisation are not easy to predict, as the
American law professor Elizabeth Thornburg demonstrates in her assessment of
different forms of privatisation. By examining ICANN, notice-and-take-down of
websites, digital rights management, and mandatory B2C arbitration, she points
out that privatisation does not automatically hamper the rights of either party.
However, she finds that privatised systems do transfer procedural advantage to one
party and ‘circumvent meaningful due process protections that are implicit in a
court of law’.34 Thornburg’s analysis seems to suggest that the perspective of
dispute resolution rather than material law may prove to be a fruitful vantage point
for evaluating the tension between private regimes and public legal systems.
3.2.2 Why enforcement matters in dispute resolution
Why should we approach dispute resolution technology through the tension
between private and public, through privatisation of coercion? As enforcement is
at the core of sovereign power and its privatisation is contradictory from the
perspective of nation-state law, privatisation of coercion can reveal the essence of
technological change. Technology-driven private enforcement calls attention to
the ways in which legal practices are changing and how this change impacts our
understanding of law. In short, use of force is the window through which the
disruptive qualities of dispute resolution technology can be observed.
The Oxford Dictionary defines enforcement as ‘the act of compelling obser-
vance of or compliance with a law, rule, or obligation’.35 This definition sheds
light to the most interesting element of enforcement, i.e. to compelling compli-
ance. In layman’s terms enforcement may refer both to law enforcement and to
enforcing judgments or rights. From the internal perspective of the legal system,
enforcement may present itself simply as the technical implementation of a
decision, where the resolution process carries more weight than the after-treatment.
As the possibility of coercion is an instrumental part of the legal system, enforcement
is well established in the doctrine – to the point where its exact definition is seldom
discussed or problematised. In its recommendation on enforcement, the Committee
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of Ministers of the Council of Europe sums up the general definition of enforcement
as follows:
‘Enforcement’ means the putting into effect of judicial decisions, and also
other judicial or non-judicial enforceable titles in compliance with the law
which compels the defendant to do, to refrain from doing or to pay what has
been adjudged;36
In this study, enforcement is referred to in this general meaning of legitimised
obtaining of funds based on an existing legal decision. In other words, this
examination targets the core area of enforcement, where the use of the legal
system provides legitimisation of the use of coercion. A point of interest is that
indirect ways of coaxing compliance may involve similar use of coercion as state-
governed enforcement. The social pressure of tribal communities and the follow-
ing social sanctions, which Norwegian sociologist Vilhelm Aubert has studied,37
are also methods of forcing compliance, and thus it can be seen as an alternative
to enforcement.
As compliance is the social expectation, enforcement is a question of exception.
Most decisions reached both in litigation and ADR procedures are carried out
voluntarily and there is no need for coercive measures. From this perspective,
enforcement is always a glitch in the system, although a necessary one, as
economic action requires the safety valve of enforcement. This means that the
importance of enforcement is not decreased by its exceptionality.
In addition, private enforcement epitomises the tension between private and
public and provides a peephole to the engine room of law, as difficulties in
justifying private coercion through state-bound law become apparent. Law’s
inherent violence cannot be hidden when decisions are put into action by force.
As it is, enforcement reveals something relevant about law on a linguistic level, an
issue raised already by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. As Derrida points
out, the English idiom of ‘enforcing the law’ and its relation to ‘enforceability’
do not hide the use of force in applying law, unlike the French equivalent of
‘appliquer la loi’. Derrida states that
‘The word “enforceability” reminds us that there is no such thing as law
(droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its
concept, the possibility of being “enforced”, applied by force. There are, to
be sure, laws that are not enforced, but there is no law without enforce-
ability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force,
whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or
interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or regulative,
and so forth.’38
This means that, in enforcement, law cannot hide its embedded violence. We can
claim that law ceases to be law if the coercive element that provides for normative
expectations is removed. As the paradox cannot be downplayed, we face the abyss
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of its deconstructive power. Simply put, violence has to be justified but at the
same time it cannot be justified. Into this gap we fit justificatory structures and
hope that they function as mechanisms of deparadoxification.
Enforcement is relevant for finding justification of dispute resolution for two
reasons. First, enforcement is a vital part of legal decision-making. This does not
undermine the ADR emphasis on voluntary compliance with the decision, as
ADR ideology accentuates the need to meet the actual needs of the parties,
which then render enforcement irrelevant. However, the effects and significance
of a decision depend on its actualisation by force in the end. If the debtor does
not pay the debt voluntarily, the creditor is entitled to get the money she has
lent. She may realise her right by resorting to the institutionalised violence of the
state machine as a last resort. If a consumer bought a vinyl record-player from the
corner shop but the player did not work as promised, she is entitled to call off
the deal, return the player, and have her money returned. She may engage the
district court and enforcement office if needed. If a person has paid a monthly bill
twice by mistake, she is entitled to have the extra payment reimbursed and may
turn to dispute resolution and enforcement to reach this outcome.
It is the ‘if’ in making voluntary payments that underline the necessity of
enforcement. There is no dispute resolution without the possibility of actualising
the outcome. Different jurisdictions have different rules for who and which cases
are entitled to access enforcement. However, the coercion, the violence, the
consequences of non-compliance are shared by most as they are constitutive
elements of law. Law is use of force, as becomes apparent in enforcement.
Dispute resolution is law, law is use of force and use of force has to be justified.
Second, the same discussion gains significance in relation to the online
environment. Online, if the buyer does not receive the office chair she purchased
on an e-commerce marketplace but a kitchen chair instead, she should have
access to redress. She should have the possibility to cancel the transaction, get her
money back and return the unwanted kitchen chair. If the state mechanism is not
available, the question arises, what alternative systems would be applicable? This
leads to the emergence of ODR, private enforcement, and its alternatives such as
escrows,39 chargebacks, and reputation systems. These mechanisms cannot be
considered simply as contractual issues because they deal with the other side of
dispute resolution – they deal with the violence. A point of interest is that the
rhetoric does not start from the claim that there should not be use of coercion in
these situations. Instead, the question is, whose coercion and by which means?
Another layer is added but the paradox itself does not disappear.
For decisions rendered in the private sphere, the situation has been exactly the
opposite. Traditionally, ADR procedures promote easy access to conflict resolu-
tion, which is guaranteed by the relatively low fees and light structure of the
process and by focusing on party interests instead of black-letter law. However,
ADR decisions struggle with accessing enforcement in those cases where the
decision is not followed on a voluntary basis. Traditionally, ADR decisions had to
resort to the state’s enforcement mechanism, which meant that they were
subordinated to ex ante control of due process before being enforced. This
Emerging crisis 71
strange interaction between the private and the public takes place within enforce-
ment, in accessing enforcement. However, it is specifically at this stage where
private enforcement comes to the fore and shuffles the deck.
Privatisation of enforcement makes law’s inherent violence visible, reveals the
grounding paradox of law, makes it a good vantage point for examining the
disruptive qualities of technology. Privatisation of coercion connects with justifi-
cation, as private enforcement mechanisms bypass the state’s monopoly on
violence, which forms the basis of national court systems as well as the focal
concept for modern understanding of law. The internal private enforcement
mechanism is not based on international Conventions or national legislation but
instead it leads its jurisdiction from user agreements and other consensual
models. Why, then, examine private enforcement as a procedural and theoretical
issue and not simply as a question of acceptable contract terms? There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, privatised enforcement is nevertheless use of force, even if
we call it by another name, and use of force has to be justified. Secondly, in the
absence of efficient public enforcement mechanisms, there is no actual choice
besides resorting to the offered private mechanisms, which calls to question how
consensual these mechanisms actually are.40 This does not contest that there is a
question of contract law entwined within ODR, but private autonomy is very
much a part of ODR, as will be discussed in the following chapters.
Rather than claiming that private enforcement is one or the other, it is more
reasonable to state that both perspectives can be employed, but they produce
different types of information. Arguments about the importance of material
norms, pacta sunt servanda, or freedom of contract, cannot be countered but
they reveal another side of the reality of e-commerce. From this perspective, the
protection of the weaker party is guaranteed by the material norms of national
legislation on sale of goods. From the perspective of procedural law, protection
of a weaker party calls for procedural safeguards, which cannot be sufficiently
provided for in material norms on valid contract terms. If a standard contract
includes norms on the method of resolving disputes related to the activities
arising from the contract, then there is an element of procedure. Along the
element of procedure, come the requirements for access to justice. If there is a
private enforcement mechanism, there is use of force, which traditionally has
belonged to the nation-state. If the nation-state is bypassed, we need to ask who
caters for access to justice.
The contractual perspective might claim that corporate responsibility is a
sufficient tool for providing procedural protection. Access to justice can be
guaranteed by the horizontal effect of human rights, which requires the corpora-
tions to assume a role in protecting the effective realisation of human rights
alongside the states and individuals. The contractual lawyer has an interesting
point here, which however is not convincing to the procedural researcher. The
argument comes down to the liberalist argument that individual action on
protecting one’s own interests is profitable to the larger community. The claim
presupposes that the freely operating markets benefit society in its entirety and,
following this line of thought, the ODR industry standards would take care of
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access to justice without the need for state intervention outside the material
norms. The argument employs the metaphor of the invisible hand, but it is not
sufficient safeguard from the procedural perspective. As private enforcement is a
matter of technological infrastructure but also holds a function of procedural law,
material norms do not hold the answer for extending state control beyond its
territorial scope to the Internet.
3.2.3 Private enforcement mechanisms and their alternatives
After establishing that private enforcement goes beyond contractual terms despite
its jurisdictional basis on consent and private autonomy, an overview of existing
private enforcement mechanism is needed. These private mechanisms, however,
should be evaluated against the established framework for granting access to
public enforcement for private decisions.
Although it is unclear whether the New York Convention 1958 on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards would apply to ODR
decisions, the mechanism demonstrates how the interface between private dispute
resolution and public enforcement is organised by multilateral Convention with-
out bypassing state control.41 The Convention is intended for international
commercial arbitration, where cases are often of high value, which affects the
organisation of the recognition procedure. Court fees for recognising an award in
an exequatur procedure in the country of enforcement is not a significant thresh-
old for multi-million awards, but might pose an insurmountable threshold for
low-intensity cases, making this established interface mechanism unsuitable for
most of them.
Chargeback procedures have been proposed as another functional equivalent of
enforcement, especially for B2C transactions in the US. Chargeback means that
the credit card company assumes responsibility for allocating money after a
decision is reached within an ODR procedure. The credit card company forcibly
reverses the payment made and returns the money to the buyer if the ODR
decision considers that the seller did not follow through with her contractual
responsibilities.42 The system is funded through the chargeback fees that busi-
nesses engaging in sale of goods have to pay in order to accept payments made
through the payment method. The amount of these fees depends on the track
record of the business and the amount increases if the seller has reoccurring
chargebacks on its transactions.
Chargebacks are an enticing solution for disputes arising from e-commerce,
especially for the typical cross-border, small-value disputes on sale of goods. As
Ichiro Kobayashi states, such disputes are difficult to predict and to enforce,
which has resulted in unique business models in comparison to traditional sale of
goods. It follows from this that ‘cost engineering’ is at the heart of e-commerce
business models. According to Kobayashi, in B2C relations the target is to lower
the ex post enforcement costs.43 Based on this, it is evident that chargeback
models comply well with the logic of the market, with the rationality of
e-commerce, as they subsidise the costs in dispute situations. However, it is still
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unclear whether the scope of chargebacks could be expanded beyond their
current use.
In addition to chargebacks, different types of reputation systems have been
suggested to address both the need for compliance with the rules of the market
place and the need for increasing customer trust in the market. Feedback systems
are one such option, and they are included in most e-commerce market plat-
forms. After the transaction is concluded, both parties, seller and buyer, have the
possibility to leave positive or negative feedback. The idea is that sellers with the
best user ratings will have more transactions in the future and sellers with bad
reviews are either forced to improve their behaviour or discontinue their activ-
ities. There are several difficulties with feedback systems, but first and foremost
their effectiveness may be questioned on the ground that negative feedback does
not necessarily describe what has actually been the issue with the transaction. It is
stated that negative feedback can be left out of spite or positive feedback can be
manipulated.44 However, the main issue with feedback systems is that they do
not provide redress for individual cases but try to affect future behaviour at the
market place.
Another form of reputation system tries to provide a trust mark for those
market places with a functioning ODR system that follows certain criteria of
access to justice. Ponte suggests that these trust marks be granted by a transna-
tional authority, which would be established by the cooperation of governmental
institutions. Such trust mark would include an enforcement function as well as
minimum criteria for due process. Trust marks would be granted to businesses
that follow the rules of such an international Convention. Non-compliance with
an ODR decision would lead to temporary or permanent loss of the trust mark.45
However, there are several difficulties with creating a system of trust marks. If the
intention is to create a transnational system similar to the New York Convention,
government action is needed. Until now, the success of engaging different states
in developing ODR standards has been low. Also, there is an issue related to
Internet governance. Ponte suggests that a non-complying merchant would be
banned from e-commerce altogether – a task that is not an actual option when
taking into consideration the disharmonious infrastructure of Internet. Regard-
less, trust marks have a similar inherent problem as feedback systems: they
regulate future behaviour, but outside a Convention for enforcement they do
little for the singular case.
However, technology enables also more exhaustive means of forcing compliance
than reputational systems, namely direct self-enforcement. eBay’s enforcement
mechanism is enabled by its easy access to a payment mechanism, but also other
applications do exist, such as ICANN’s supremacy over the domain name system
and self-executing blockchains.
For example, ICANN’s dispute resolution procedure emerged from the need
to solve disputes arising from a new global infrastructure of the domain name
system. ICANN is responsible for distribution and maintenance of the global
domain name system. ICANN has established a Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organisation
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(WIPO) to resolve domain name disputes. Such a dispute may rise when a
complaint is filed that someone has registered in bad faith a domain name that
is confusingly similar to the complainant’s own trademark (also known in the US as
cybersquatting). The UDRP provides for a mandatory administrative proceeding in
domain name disputes. ICANN also upholds a list of approved providers of UDRP
resolution. At the time of writing, these are the Asian Domain Name Centre,
National Arbitration Forum, WIPO, the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration
Center for Internet Disputes, and the Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute
Resolution.46 The registrar does not intervene in the work of the administrative
panel and the UDRP resolution process does not prevent the parties from accessing a
court of jurisdiction. However, if the panel’s decision is rendered and no documen-
tation about initiation of court proceedings is shown within 10 days, ICANN will
implement the decision to the domain name system.47
ICANN enforces arbitral awards given in domain name disputes through its
authority over the domain name system, whereas blockchain applications of
cryptocurrencies give rise to self-enforcing programmable smart contracts, where
the contract executes contractual obligations, e.g. allocates money, once the
contractual terms are fulfilled. All these models of private enforcement have far-
reaching consequences for the legal system, as they provide new means of
coercion that do not rely on the state’s monopoly on violence.
The difficulty with chargebacks, trust marks and feedback systems is that they
do not speak in terms of law. Instead they follow the rationality of the market
place. In terms of systems theory, these operations are recognised through the
coding of the economic system, which is pay/not-pay, but they do not conform
to the coding of the legal system. Chargebacks come down to a reversal of an
earlier transaction and provide redress for an individual dispute. However,
chargebacks seldom extend to questions of damages. Also, trust marks and
feedbacks are communications of the economic system. Their decisive force for
the legal field does not convince the procedural researcher, although there is
value in additional courses of action. This lack of credibility can be explained by
the coding. The participant in the legal system does not recognise the redress
mechanisms that employ the coding of the economic system.
Although chargebacks, trust marks and feedback systems communicate about
law, about being alternatives to enforcement, the legal system does not recognise
them as valid, as belonging to itself. The paradox of law, the coercion it hides,
does not exist in these alternatives. They communicate about law but they do not
produce law. They might enter the legal system as facts (the fact that a payment
was reversed through chargeback has meaning for a later legal procedure) but
they are not independent operations within the system. The feedback system or
multilateral trust marks may facilitate commerce and increase trust and even
create better business practices, but in the end they are not the functional
equivalent of engaging law’s coercion. They follow a different rationality from
the inherent violence of law. Chargebacks come the closest, as the reversal of
payment does indeed return money to the buyer. But depending on the content
of the chargeback, these systems either present problems similar to private
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enforcement, i.e. the issue of making a normative decision and enforcing it
without the ex post control of due process, or they are reduced into payment
mechanisms with additional fees for certain types of behaviour.
Unlike the other alternatives, both options of enforcing ODR decisions as
arbitral awards and private enforcement mechanisms are interesting for the legal
system. Both these models employ the familiar code through which the legal
system recognises them as belonging to its sphere. Although both options are
relatively new phenomena, mostly unregulated, the legal system recognises the
element that makes these operations communications about law. Both of these
models are communication about law but also produce legally interesting com-
munication. They are about upholding expectations, regardless of what the legal
system decides to do with them. In other words, these are legal phenomena and
it does not matter whether we come to the conclusion that ODR is arbitration or
that it is not, or whether private enforcement is allowed or not. Even if the
programmes within the legal system decide that the side of ‘illegal’ will be applied
to these, they are relevant communication about law. They are irritants, impulses,
mutineers that demand action from the legal system. Using Luhmann’s language,
such irritants are vital for the future development of the legal system, as they
bring new elements for the autopoiesis. The legal system faces two options.
Either it is able to cope with the irritation and improve its immune system by
addressing such demands, or it ceases to exist.48
Excursion 1: The case of eBay’s user agreement
Private enforcement mechanisms base their jurisdiction on consent of the parties,
which is often given by the acceptance of the user agreement. Acceptance of the
standard contract terms is the condition for using the service. In eBay’s case both
sellers and buyers are required to accept the user agreement and obey its rules on
private enforcement before commencing commerce on the market place. Inter-
estingly enough, eBay’s Resolution Center, which renders the decision concerning
a dispute that has arisen on the marketplace, was reworded as Money Back
Guarantee around 2014. Despite the rewording in the user agreement, eBay’s
Resolution Center still exists and renders decisions on the Money Back Guarantee,
although the Resolution Center is no longer mentioned in contractual terms.
Hence, the Money Back Guarantee corresponds to the internal enforcement
mechanism of the Resolution Center.
It should be noted that eBay is not simply a market place with an add-on
Resolution Center/Money Back Guarantee for buyer protection. In addition to
providing an e-commerce platform for sellers and buyers, eBay has access to the
world’s largest Internet payment company, PayPal, which has been a subsidiary of
eBay since 2002.49 The combination of access to the payment method and
internal dispute resolution procedure is necessary for producing an effective
private enforcement mechanism.
By the user’s acceptance of the user agreement of 1 November 2017, eBay has
the user’s permission to make the final decision on whether or not a buyer is
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reimbursed in a dispute. The contractual terms give eBay the right to request
PayPal to remove funds from a seller’s account or charge the amount reimbursed
to the buyer by eBay’s decision from the seller’s payment method.50 In addition,
the seller has to agree to eBay using other collection mechanisms such as
collection agencies in case they cannot get the reimbursement directly. Based on
eBay.com’s request, PayPal may decide on restricting the user’s funds according
to PayPal policies. This restriction policy of PayPal has been criticised both for its
arbitrariness and its controversial nature.51
This private enforcement mechanism is directed against the seller. The con-
tractual relationship is stipulated in the user agreement, which grants eBay access
to the seller’s PayPal account. Thus, the contractual terms enable enforcement of
the final decision on the transaction between the seller and the buyer that eBay
renders through its Resolution Center. The final decision is made in eBay’s
Resolution Center through an automated ODR procedure. This means that the
possible claims that can be initiated at the ODR phase are limited to the typical
issues related to e-commerce; the buyer did not receive the item or received an
item that does not match the description, the seller did not receive the payment
or needs to cancel the transaction. In addition to these, some other issues may be
resolved through the Resolution Center. It is noteworthy that automation forms
an integral part of the mechanism, which also explains the huge number of cases
resolved annually.
As is clear from the above, the private enforcement mechanism of eBay and
PayPal is undeniably an economic mechanism created for protecting consumer
trust in the e-commerce market place. It conforms to the rationality of the
markets and we could perceive well-functioning ODR in a similar manner to
advertisements or user reviews. This is further emphasised by the casual wording
of the ODR procedure, which downplays the element of coercion embedded in
the mechanism. However, this is not the sole function of Resolution Center and
Money Back Guarantee.
As it allows the use of force, the Money Back Guarantee conforms to the logic
of the legal system. If a final decision against the seller is rendered by the
Resolution Center, then eBay may demand the transfer of money from the
seller’s PayPal account. Here, eBay both renders the final decision and also
de facto deducts the money, based on the terms in the user agreement. Instead
of underlining this as enforcement, which would be hazardous from the perspective
of separation of powers, this is rephrased as an ‘allocation of liability’, a contractual
matter between the seller and eBay, who had to reimburse the buyer through the
Money Back Guarantee. However, this claim is not credible as a function of
procedural law is inevitably included in the decision of allocating responsibility. If
we consider ODR and private enforcement simply as a matter of contractual law, we
face the danger of making it into a grey area, a legal no-man’s land, where the sole
option of redress is to look into the material legislation of the ODR provider’s place
of domicile. As such redress to state courts would be impossibly expensive, the
argument leaves much to be hoped for. The redress from material legislation is easily
illusionary, if there is no de facto redress mechanism.
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The example of eBay’s direct enforcement mechanism seems to challenge our
way of conceptualising enforcement only in relation to the law of the nation-
state, and to the nation-state’s monopoly on violence. Hence, the tension
between private and public becomes emphasised, the need to find justification
for privatised coercion immanent.
3.3 Reacting through justification
How, then, does the legal system go about justifying the use of coercion, the
basis of its authority? How is this authority changing as a result of changes in
social practices? Gélinas et al. discuss the role of judicial ritual and architecture in
legitimising dispute resolution. Through historically oriented analysis they
describe how the visible symbols of justice, i.e. the courthouses, have transformed
from early outdoor gatherings to secular cathedrals and symbols of power. The
authority of justice is reflected through these outward symbols:
Throughout time, societies have invented and reinvented social practices,
including rituals based on the understanding that the power of rituals derives
from the State, society, ancestors, God, or other external sources. For
example, it is the authority of the State and the constitution that makes
people rise as the judge enters the courtroom. People do so not because they
feel like it or because they particularly respect one individual judge, but
rather because they recognize the authority bestowed on the figure of the
judge. Judicial rituals may thus be subject to change because their normative
force is viewed as a function of external, cultural considerations, rather than
based on factors internal to or inherent in the form a particular ritual itself.52
As the demand for efficiency of judicial proceedings gains ground, Gélinas et al.
draw attention to the possible repercussions of legitimacy. They suggest that
efficiency could diminish the role of judicial rituals and judicial architecture,
which traditionally have contributed to public confidence in civil justice.53 How-
ever, the foundation of legitimacy is not straightforward. In contrast to public
dispute resolution, arbitration proceedings usually put less emphasis on ritual and
focus more on active participation of the parties. Thus, the active participation, the
feeling of being heard, which the seminal studies of Lind and Tyler have proven
central to the perceived fairness of judicial redress,54 compensates for the lack of
ritual and restores legitimacy. Based on the example of arbitration, Gélinas et al.
suggest that legitimacy of judicial institutions could be founded on partly contrasting
grounds, the ritual and participation of the parties.55
As this example depicts, changes in social practices impact law’s justification, law is
unable to remain indifferent to societal ruptures. At this point, it is possible to sketch
an overview of the challenge posed by technology-driven private enforcement and
how its emergence intensifies the tension between private and public. As private
enforcement challenges the boundaries of state-bound law, the need to justify
private use of coercion and the inability to do so leads to a justificatory crisis.
78 Theoretical implications of dispute resolution technology
From the Luhmannian perspective adopted in this study, the introduction of a
new emergent social system of technology, which refers to the use of ICT as a
communicative operation (rather than technology as combination of physical
artefacts and social elements), constitutes a point of crisis. This new social
system is located in society, in the environment of other functionally differen-
tiated, established social systems such as legal, political and economic systems.
The social technological system has an impact on these other subsystems.
Programmes emerge from the new system and function as irritants in other
systems. The political system talks about surveillance and technology in relation
to power, as is apparent from the NSA discussions of 2015.56 The economic
system addresses the possibilities of monetising technological innovation.57 Even
the question of finding passion through online dating is an example of how an
existing social system, in this case the love system, converses with irritants from
the social system of use of ICT.58
The emergence of the social system of technology has led to a rupture, which
affects most if not all subsystems of society. Technological innovation causes
reflections in society, the need to adapt.59 If a social system is not able to react
and immunise itself against the new irritant, it faces the danger of stagnant
autopoiesis and losing the system/environment difference, which constitutes its
existence. In other words, the social systems affected by the use of ICT need to
adapt in order to defend their identity.
In order to overcome the challenge, the subsystems need to include themes,
programmes and operations which deal with the irritation. However, adaptation
takes time. Different systems have different ways of engaging their immune
systems, which may result in differences in reaction times. The legal system,
characterised by a slow pace of change in order to preserve its objective of
safeguarding expectations, does not adapt quickly. The economic system, how-
ever, might be more prone to improve overall efficiency by reacting promptly to
new possibilities. Still, the affected systems aim to answer the societal rupture. If
left to its own devices, the rupture caused by technology creates a significant risk
to the overall cohesion of society, which then threatens social society. The
affected systems do not have an option, but instead they need to defend
themselves. In other words, they need to be immunised, changed and adapted
in order to preserve their distinct identity, to uphold their system/environment
difference.
Thus, the legal system also receives an aftershock and needs to respond to the
irritants from the social system of technology. As the operation of law, commu-
nication about the application of the code, has changed, this is also reflected in
the legal science. Legal science participates both in the legal system and the
science system simultaneously, but the changes in the object of its study, e.g. the
communication about the code, translate into the demand for finding answers on
the theory level. The irritants enter the legal system in different ways, but in
procedural law this has led to the emergence of ODR and private enforcement.
In the research of procedural law, this technological rupture has led us to the
issue of justifying dispute resolution.
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Justification is a logical reaction to a new irritant. Law, as much as other social
systems, has to provide itself with a narrative of its existence in order to validate
its operations, to find the roots of its rationality. In the legal system, this story
connects with the question of justice, with law’s transcendence, and the issue of
legitimacy and justification. Justification is the form that the origin myth and the
need for validation take on in the legal system. By longing for justification, the
legal system reacts to the irritant and tries to accommodate the new influences
within its own rationality. Needless to say, the legal system (like other systems)
has to react to the crisis of technology in a way that is in accordance with its
internal rationality. This is the connection point where justification emerges as
the legal system’s method of reacting to the change. This is the context in which
law’s quest for justification starts off. This is the crisis and the challenge that the
legal system needs to face and answer.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter concludes the first part of this study, which has focused on
theorisations on law, technology and social change that all interact in dispute
resolution technology. It presented an overview of the developments that have
given rise to technology-driven private enforcement and are leading to the
justificatory crisis, which will be discussed in further detail in the second part of
this study. The first part of this chapter focused on examples of dispute resolution
technology, whereas the second part addressed the theoretical implications of
increasing privatisation of coercion enabled by the use of dispute resolution
technology. In the first part, the examples of different applications depicted the
diversity of dispute resolution technology, whereas chronological categorisation
of their development over the past decades provided insight into how the role of
technology is changing towards increasing autonomy. In the second part, the
discussion on dispute resolution technology is combined with theorisations on
the emergence of private regimes that confound the modern conception of law as
connected to the nation-state. The tension between public and private, as well as
law’s inability to detach from the nation-state, become visible particularly in
private enforcement, as justifying the use of coercion reveals the basis of law’s
authority. Thus, the pursuit of justifying private enforcement provides a vantage
point for assessing the societal change brought on by the use of ICT.
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4 Heading towards justification
In Chapter 2 the new social practices involved in using modern technology were
seen as an emerging social system named the use of information and commu-
nications technology (ICT), which explains how the disruptive elements of
technology enter the legal system as external irritants. In Chapter 3 this overview
of technology was applied to dispute resolution in order to demonstrate how
public enforcement is slowly becoming a redundant means of providing conflict
management for low-intensity cross-border disputes.
This chapter connects the theoretical framework of systems theory with the
changing private forms of coercion enabled by technology. Here, it is argued that
technology-enabled privatisation of coercion is challenging the state’s monopoly
on violence and thus creates a justificatory crisis for conflict management. The
chapter begins with a description of how the difference between public and
private dispute resolution was originally reconciled in the aftermath of the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement. This reconciliation in a peaceful
coexistence and cooperation is called the Traditional Ideal Model, referring to
the public acceptance of private ADR as long as the state’s monopoly on
enforcement is preserved. However, the use of ICT is increasing privatisation of
coercion, which, in turn, challenges the status quo portrayed through the
Traditional Ideal Model and creates a justificatory crisis. After establishing this,
the function of justification within the legal system is discussed and it is argued
that justification should be understood as a structural coupling between the legal
system and other societal sub-systems that transmits external rationalities to the
legal system’s operations. The chapter concludes with a brief description of
existing justificatory narratives that will be discussed in further detail in the
following chapters.
4.1 The breaking point of consensus
4.1.1 Traditional ideal model and cross-border disputes
Traditionally, the courts have constituted the only official access point to the
state’s monopoly on violence and going through the courts has been the primary
method of accessing enforcement. Surprisingly, this state of affairs has not
changed significantly after the introduction of ADR in the 1980s. Instead, ADR
methods have been incorporated into the traditional model of understanding the
state as the gatekeeper of enforcement, creating an intricate cooperation system
between the private and the public dispute resolution mechanisms.
The emergence of the nation-state in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War
was also a milestone for dispute resolution in national courts. The Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 introduced respect for national boundaries and the principle
of non-interference in domestic affairs. However, from the perspective of dispute
resolution, its most significant provision was that of territorial jurisdiction.
Territorial jurisdiction formulates the basis of international procedural law even
today and promotes the state agenda in dispute resolution. A monopoly on
violence is the most visible signifier of the state’s jurisdiction.
Later on, the 1980s brought in their wake the ADR movement and the
justification of dispute resolution had to be revisited. Instead of territorial
jurisdiction, ADR derived its foundation from the agreement of the parties, in
other words from the principle of contractual freedom. The differences were
reconciled by accepting the coexistence of both litigation and ADR. This
reconciliation preserved the state’s primary role, at least in theory. The coex-
istence meant that, from the perspective of the state, ADR was tolerated as
delegation of power, its role ancillary to help overcome the caseload of the
public courts. However, the key element of the territorial jurisdiction remained
the sole domain of the courts. The decisions of public courts have direct access
to enforcement but ADR decisions are not granted a similar easy access. Instead
they are subordinated to an examination by the public courts before accessing
enforcement. As no other mechanism of enforcement existed, ADR procedures
still needed to resort to the state’s enforcement mechanism, which subjugated it
to ex ante state control before granting such access to its monopoly on
violence.
The changes in the state’s role after the reconciliation can be illustrated by the
following (Figure 4.1):
state safeguards and derives legitimacy 
for intervention
due process state sovereignty
enforcement
ADR must follow in order
to access enforcement 




enforcement through the state’s 
monopoly on violence
Figure 4.1 Traditional ideal model
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The structure of the argument in this interplay is interesting. The sovereign state
accepts contractual ADR by neutral thirds if and when state control is enabled before
such decisions utilise the state monopoly on violence. In order to enable enforcement
at a later stage, ADR applications must follow certain due process requirements. In
addition to the political agenda of a nation-state to expand its power, the state control
on due process is defended by references to the state’s responsibility towards its
citizens. By means of this manoeuvre, the modern nation-state has been able to avoid
the potential crisis that the emergence of the ADR movement could have signified.
Through highlighting the relation between the nation-state and protection of indivi-
duals on the one hand and the possibility of coexistence between litigation and ADR
on the other, a potential re-evaluation was averted. In other words, the emergence of
ADR in 1980s was an irritant to the legal system but the operation of the law
immunised the system and incorporated the phenomenon into its communication.
Nonetheless, the traditional model depicts how justification may be theorised
within the current doctrine of procedural law. The question is whether or not
dispute resolution is able to apply similar justificatory argument to private enforce-
ment. In private enforcement, the interplay between state sovereignty and private
providers of dispute resolution services changes.
This change takes place in the state control to which ADR decisions are
subjected before access to enforcement is granted. Private enforcement removes
this phase of seeking recognition in the public courts. In a way, this means that
the decision rendered in private dispute resolution procedure has a similar direct
access to enforcement as decisions of public courts have to public enforcement.
This can be illustrated with the following (Figure 4.2), where the dispute between
parties (P1 and P2) is resolved by a neutral third party (P3) and then enforced:
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Figure 4.2 Changes in enforcement
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Of course, some disputes that undergo a private resolution process may be
taken to the public courts later on. This option may be limited in some
situations, for example when there is an arbitral clause. In any case, the actual
possibilities of taking a dispute to public courts may be close to non-existent in
many low-intensity cases.
When decisions are put into action through private enforcement, there is no
case-by-case state control of due process before enforcement. Such recognition
procedures are needless when decisions can effectively be enforced without the
state’s enforcement mechanism. Instead, the online dispute resolution (ODR)
decision may be enforced without resorting to the state’s monopoly on
violence if the ODR provider has its own integrated mechanism for forcing
compliance. Simultaneously, the state’s monopoly on coercion comes under
threat as the question arises whether there still is a state monopoly on
violence.
It should be noted that the shortcomings of the traditional ideal model
present themselves primarily in the context of cross-border cases. This does
not mean, however, that the traditional model is unproblematic on the national
level as private enforcement also bypasses state control on enforcement in
domestic cases.
However, the picture is not so dark for the political agenda of the state as
this would lead us to believe. At least at this point, most ODR providers
that have the means to create a private enforcement mechanism are situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of some state or other. That is to say, they
are legal entities that have to follow the material norms of their place of
domicile. However, the protection provided through material norms on a
general level does not measure up with the in casu protection provided
by state control. The state control is ex post inasmuch as it evaluates the
quality of the procedure where the decision is rendered. In other words,
the control is exerted after the dispute is resolved. Simultaneously, this state
control is ex ante in that it precedes accessing the enforcement. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the argument for contractualisation of dispute resolution is
not plausible.
In addition, the ODR provider does not need to follow the minimum due
process standards simply for the purpose of accessing enforcement. This does
not mean that there are no other motivations for making the ODR process fair.
The use of a platform may depend on how well its resolution procedure is
organised. As there is competition on the market, a badly functioning redress
mechanism might drive sellers and buyers to other platforms. This connects
with independent reputational systems and soft law instruments for corporate
responsibility. However, the state’s role is different in private enforcement from
that in the traditional model regardless of these market-based reasons for
introducing due process.
The change in the state’s role may be demonstrated with the following graph
(Figure 4.3):
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The graph depicts how the role of the state changes in relation to private
enforcement. The nation-state loses the possibility of extending its influence to
the coercion used to force compliance with private decisions. In short, the
traditional model fails to apply to private enforcement. This means that the
mechanisms used for reconciling the discrepancy between territorial jurisdiction
and the ADR movement cannot be employed for reconciling private enforcement
with state control.
As the rationality behind private enforcement does not correspond to the same
logic as the traditional model, it is clear that law faces a new irritant. The method
used to immunise the challenge of ADR, i.e. expanding the traditional model
towards cooperation, cannot be employed to downplay the rupture brought on
by private enforcement. However, immunisation is needed because, without
overcoming the challenge, law’s paradox starts to unravel. In other words, private
enforcement, especially when combined with the low entrance threshold typical
of ODR, challenges the monopoly on violence of state courts. There is coercion
that needs to be justified, and this needs to be solved through other means than
the reinterpretation of the traditional ideal model. However, if the justificatory
crisis is resolved satisfactorily, ODR could create a similar improvement in law’s
immune system as ADR did.
To phrase it differently: dispute resolution and use of ICT, especially when the
implementation of ICT to dispute resolution gives rise to private enforcement, is
a mutineer in the lines of law, whereas justification is the morale of the troops. If
the morale cannot be kept up by immunisation, the disorder might spread and in
the worst case scenario the unit would no longer function. It is unlikely that law
would cease to exist if the unclear justificatory status of private enforcement is not
reconciled. Nonetheless, without immunisation the lack of justification might
affect law’s function and the coherence of its operations. In short, law faces a
discrepancy that has to be addressed.
material norms may provide protection for weaker parties
but procedural safeguards are limited
due process (state sovereignty)
DR provider may uphold elements
for improved user experience
material norms applied to the DR 






Figure 4.3 Cross-border private enforcement model
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One could contest the claim about emerging discrepancy by pointing out that
ODR has been extensively supported by state agenda and by public policy-
setting. According to this train of thought, the state support of ODR shows
that the traditional ideal model still applies and how the supremacy of the state
prevails. According to this position, the state exerts its own agenda over ODR
and claims it for its own. Thus, ODR would be simply an extension of state
power, a delegation of jurisdiction. This idea of delegation will be discussed in
further detail in Chapter 6. However, it is crucial to note here that private
enforcement does not fit this view, as the preservation of the traditional ideal
model would require the in casu control of procedural safeguards before accessing
enforcement.
4.1.2 Multifaceted implications of privatisation of coercion
We have established that the traditional ideal model, which reflects the current
doctrine of procedural law, is challenged by private enforcement. However, the
implications of privatisation of justice cannot be reduced simply to private enforce-
ment. Instead, private enforcement is only one, although perhaps the most
pronounced, implication of the gradual decline of the traditional model.
Other characteristics of privatisation also contribute to the justificatory
challenge: the lack of public precedents and the increase in the number of cases
that are left outside the public courts for various reasons. These phenomena are
not new and they have already been addressed in the wake of ADR. In this
section, these issues are discussed briefly in order to elaborate the complexity of
the justificatory crisis and to demonstrate how private enforcement is just the
latest chapter in the story of privatisation. In other words, implementation of
ICT into dispute resolution also escalates other existing discrepancies. This
multiformity of the justificatory crisis means that a simple revision of the traditional
model is not in itself sufficient to overcome the justificatory crisis.
Firstly, the lack of precedents is relevant to the justification of dispute resolu-
tion. Private dispute resolution models produce decisions which do not provide
for judicial precedents in the same way as decisions of state courts. This is a
question of law’s continuous self-renewal as well as an issue of societal values.
How do we provide for equal treatment before the law if procedures and their
outcomes are not public and do not contribute to law’s renewal? Is this lack of
precedents a reason to restrict private resolution methods or is this deficiency
remediable?
As private dispute resolution often takes place outside the courts, the highest
national court instances are seldom able to guide these processes through
precedents. However, precedents may be given when decisions reached in private
dispute resolution enter the courts for accessing enforcement. Still, non-adjudicative
processes such as mediation do not necessarily strive for enforceable decisions but
focus on settling the disputes amicably.
However, several arguments contest the claim that private dispute resolution
does not produce precedents.1 In the arbitration community, the case law of
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arbitral tribunals has been considered to be its own field of procedural law and
earlier decisions are referenced in future cases in the same way as if they were
precedents.2 The argument against private dispute resolution’s lack of precedents
would be the claim that precedents do not need to exist within the court-based
judicial system in order to be effective and to induce autopoiesis. This argument
that precedents are not the only way to achieve autopoiesis is also present in the
famous formulation of Mnookin and Kornhauser, who recognised that private
resolution takes place “in the shadow of the law”, mimicking the legal decisions
to the detail.3 The structure of this second argument differs from the first one, as
it claims that private dispute resolution is the shadow of the public system, its
alter without its own content.
The example of growing institutionalisation of arbitration suggests that judicial
precedents as such are not vital for law’s continued autopoiesis, because continuous
communication can also be achieved by other means. This means that public
precedents are not necessarily vital to law’s existence if replacing techniques are
available. However, the issue has other implications. For example, the discussion on
transparency and other values of democratic society, law’s function of upholding
expectations and the efficiency of policy setting such as consumer protection are
related to public precedents. The lack of public precedents has deconstructive
relevance, as the debate on vanishing trials depicts,4 but this issue does not connect
with law’s existence or upholding the system/environment boundary. This explains
why the emergence of ADR in the 1980s did not create the need for complete
re-evaluation but could be reconciled through the traditional ideal model.5 This
does not indicate that values attributed to public precedents have an important role
for law’s function. Also, the question still remains, whether the increase in the
number of non-public ODR decisions poses the problem anew and requires further
thought.
Secondly, technological change creates a mass of cases, which are an ill fit
for the legal system that operates primarily with the concept of nation-state-
based jurisdiction. For example, the low-intensity cases that typically arise from
e-commerce are often left outside the litigation threshold for several reasons. One
such reason is the risk of legal expenses, as the legal expenses are likely to exceed
the value of the dispute. When these disputes take place in the cross-border
context, the complexity of litigation increases. Even deciding on the court of
jurisdiction becomes challenging and time-consuming and hence taking disputes
to public courts may not be a de facto option. We could even argue that this new
category of disputes poses a challenge for the national legal systems.
However, Pollicino and Bassini have claimed that the issues of cross-border
Internet cases are only a question of localisation. Cross-border cases arising from
the Internet have been tried and decided in state courts up until now, although
sometimes several courts have announced jurisdiction over the same matter, but
the emergence of geo-localisation tools enables deciphering territorial location
of the dispute and thus removes the earlier challenges for territorial jurisdiction.6
This argument has its merits, but tools for geo-localisation are not sufficient to
solve the challenge for territorial jurisdiction. Also, Pollicino and Bassini resort to
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a case-by-case approach. Cross-border low-intensity cases create discrepancies in
the application of territorial jurisdiction, as multiple courts can claim jurisdiction
simultaneously or individual cases may be left without a court of jurisdiction. The
emergence of these case types may threaten the function of upholding expectations,
as it is unclear where the dispute should be resolved.
The challenges of privatisation through technology actualise in law’s function
of upholding expectations but, in addition, they extend further to the structures
of law, to the idea of state sovereignty as the source of dispute resolution. The
traditional ideal model does not provide a solution for deciding the court of
jurisdiction, nor does it provide an access to court for low-intensity cases arising
from the Internet. The traditional model applies only when a decision is enforced
through the state’s monopoly. The difficulty here is that the content of due
process depends on the decision on jurisdiction: two positions of the triangle,
sovereignty (which state?) and due process (whose standards?) depend on which
state, if any, claims the jurisdiction.
Thirdly, private enforcement mechanisms make enforcement of contractual
decisions a matter of technological infrastructure and contractual relationship,
bypassing the authoritative violence provided by the state. As stated, private
enforcement contests the monopoly of violence granted to the nation-state.
The disruptive element of private enforcement can be downplayed by considering
it as a contractual issue. Enforcement, regardless of its conductor, derives justifica-
tion for the use of coercion from the decision itself. Private enforcement could be
considered sanctioned by the existence of a decision, just by the mere form of the
decision, the fact that there is a decision that will be enforcement, as opposed to
mere use of violence without a form. However, this argument falls short, as it
would mean describing private enforcement as a sui generis forum agreement.
This interpretation, however, would lead to a plethora of follow-up problems.
Private enforcement has a deconstructive meaning within the legal sphere. This
significance cannot be downplayed by the traditional ideal model, as shown
before. Also Pollicino and Bassini admit that enforcement is a problem for
transnational law due to the structural limits.7 Hence, private enforcement
challenges the concept of state sovereignty in a similar way as disintegration of
territorial jurisdiction, which is to be expected as the two phenomena are closely
connected.
In the end, the issue behind all these new interpretative challenges of dispute
resolution is that of regulation. Should we provide a regulatory framework for
ODR or for private enforcement, or should we ban them? If we want to restrict
their use or bring them back into the family fold of regulation, how would we
institute such a regulatory regime?
This step takes us out of the frying pan into the fire. By asking about
regulating private enforcement we are on dangerous ground, as the question of
bringing due process to private dispute resolution suddenly becomes a question
of legitimacy of any dispute resolution. We are no longer asking what makes a
good technology-enhanced dispute resolution procedure, but instead we end up
seeking the source of due process, the foundation of dispute resolution.
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However, we cannot avoid this question, as the source and authority of due
process needs to be established before asking what are the criteria. Instead, we
face the issue of what is justification, and whether or not these implications of
privatisation can be justified within the legal system.
4.2 What is justification for the legal system?
4.2.1 Three options of interpretation
The challenges imposed by the privatisation of justice in general and accelerated
by the implementation of ICT do not comply with the doctrinal understanding
of cooperation between the courts and providers of private dispute resolution
services. It seems that the development of private enforcement has the potential
to further escalate the existing tensions between private and public governance.
In other words, private enforcement has meaning for justifying dispute resolution.
What, then, is the justification for the legal system?
As discussed, justification is produced by the operations of the legal system,
which form long-lasting structures through continuous repetition and renewal.
Hence, justification should be interpreted as internal to the legal system.8
Because justification is formed slowly and over time, we are looking at established
networked operations.
This directs the focus of our examination towards different structures within
the legal system. Should justification, the fundamental basis for coercion, be
understood as law’s programme, which guides the application of the code legal/
illegal? As law’s programme, justification would govern the allocation of the code
by defining the grounds and bases for operations. For example, Luhmann
describes legislation or the doctrine of precedents as programming. Without
programming, the application of the code could not be determined.9 In other
words, justification as a programme would demarcate the boundary between the
legal system and its environment.
Another option similar to considering justification as law’s programme would
be to interpret it as law’s autopoiesis. Is the rationality behind dispute resolution
a question of self-production? This choice would mean considering justification
as an internal continuous process of the legal system for its self-production. The
self-production may include irritations from outside the legal system to its own
operations. Nevertheless, openness through autopoiesis has connective value
solely within the legal system; it fortifies the system/environment difference as
the constitutional element of law. As autopoiesis, justification would then be left
the role of internal reference. However, there would be no external effects of
justification, which would influence other societal subsystems. Still, justification as
autopoiesis could include external information to the legal system.
Both interpretations, justification as a programme and as autopoiesis, locate
justification within the legal system. Other interpretative options, however, would
emphasise law’s interaction with its environment. If justification is produced by
law’s structural couplings with other systems, the operations that renew
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justification within the legal system also have meaning within the coupled
systems. What, then, is the relationship between structural couplings and autop-
oiesis? How does self-production relate to irritations from the system’s environ-
ment? It is clear that structural couplings are necessary for the evolution of a
system and also for autopoiesis as they help to immunise the system boundaries
and contribute new facts. As it is, both autopoiesis and structural couplings
between systems are operative couplings. Operative couplings refer simply to
connections between operations. As autopoiesis refers to couplings between
operations within a system, a structural coupling connects an operation from
one system with an operation of the other system.10
There is a fourth possible interpretation of justification’s role in the legal
system. Justification might also be understood as the result of interpenetration,
where two co-evolved systems are able to borrow one another’s computing
power. However, Luhmann exemplifies interpenetration with the connection
between social systems of communication and the psychic system of consciousness,
which are linked through the use of language.11 Interpenetration is a special type
of structural coupling but requires the dependent coexistence of the interpenetra-
ting systems.12 This means that the interpenetrating systems are formed by
convergent evolution. However, this option of considering justification as inter-
penetration is not possible, as the legal system has not co-evolved with any other
social subsystem after its functional differentiation. Therefore I discard this option
of interpretation.
It is noteworthy that ultimately all of these different forms of interaction
contribute to the autopoiesis of the legal system. These possible interpretations
vary to some extent depending on the role they play for the legal system and for
society generally. Whereas justification as law’s programme or as autopoiesis
directs our gaze inwards to the legal system, justification as interpenetration or
as structural couplings would emphasise the input to law’s operations from
outside the legal system. In short, there are only slight differences in emphasis,
depending on the chosen interpretation.
4.2.2 Justification as law’s programme?
If justification were a question of law’s programme, what would this mean? To
understand the role of programmes, we have to return to the coding of the legal
system. The legal system separates itself from its environment by the application
of the coding legal/illegal, which produces its normativity and identity. In turn,
law’s internal programmes decide how legal operations deal with situations. In
other words, the programme decides which side of the code is applied. For
example, programming decides whether a situation falls within civil law or
criminal law.13 The code is harsh in its uncompromising absoluteness: the code
does not allow the system to react to its environment. However, reaction is
imperative for autopoiesis, and thus the code produces structures for deciding
how the code is allocated, rightly or wrongly. Programmes balance the harshness
of the code.14
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The legal system does not operate in a vacuum but is connected with the
surrounding society. The code is specific for the legal system and cannot be
applied by other systems. However, law needs to correspond with the society, it
needs to be integrated. The code is insufficient for this task of integration.
Instead, the level of programming balances the code and reconnects the legal
system with the society. In this, according to Luhmann, the programming level
adopts the role earlier attributed to natural law in pre-modern societies. Before
social contract theories and the Age of Enlightenment, references to nature were
a way to bring external truisms into the legal system. For example, social
stratification was included into the rules of positive law but grounded in human
nature and natural necessity.15 Similarly, law’s programmes convey elements into
the legal system, creating an ‘enacted’ environment within, where the system may
reconnect with society without losing its self-referential closure.16
Luhmann makes a distinction between purpose-specific and conditional pro-
grammes. Law’s programmes are always conditional: they set out the conditions
on which the allocation of legal or illegal depends.17 For example, a form of
logical syllogism follows conditional programming. Legal decisions are formu-
lated through the syllogism where the application of a general rule (such as ‘the
plaintiff carries burden of proof and suffers the consequences of not fulfilling it’)
to singular past facts (‘X did not meet the burden of proof’) provide the
conclusion (‘X should suffer the consequences, i.e. the case is not decided in her
favour’). However, syllogistic argumentation often comes with fallacies, as setting
the general and singular premises is complicated. However, the form of syllogism
and the legal system’s infatuation with it depict how conditional programmes
operate. The conditional programme enables legal decisions to be dressed into
the form of syllogism; the form, in turn, provides the appearance of legitimacy.18
It should be noted that conditional programmes look mainly at past events,
facts that have actualised. This is connected with the legal system’s objective of
maintaining expectations, as the legal system aims at stabilising them. Resolution
of conflicts comes down to making a decision on which side of the code is
applied in a single case, where the expectations of parties derive from general
premises and the application is directed at past events. Luhmann makes the point
that sometimes judges adopt a different role. For example, the best interest of the
child in custody cases does not simply look at past behaviour but also makes an
assumption of future events. Also, a judge might adopt a therapeutic role in cases
concerning juvenile delinquents or in debt restructuring cases or in situations of
transformative justice. These situations go beyond past events and look rather at
future facts. Strictly speaking, such purpose-specific programmes in law are no longer
operations within the legal system but outside of it. As Luhmann states, ‘such
programmes would run into the same problem that the future gives no satisfactory
answers to the question whether something is legal or illegal right now’.19
Here, Luhmann makes an interesting remark, which has meaning for doctrinal
debate between litigation and ADR. ADR decisions often exceed the limits of
traditional litigation, which measures compensation for damages in money and
bypasses the potential importance of an apology as irrelevant. Mediation and
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conciliation instead focus on more multi-faceted and individually tailored solu-
tions. If interpreted as per Luhmann, such resolutions would not necessarily be
legal operations but would belong outside the legal system as extra-legal. In this,
Luhmann’s position seems to be coherent. Such procedures have elements that
point in the direction of the legal system and its code, but also include elements
from other systems.
Similarly, several systems meet in ODR, it is the connection point between law
(resolution of legal dispute concerning contractual obligations), economics (the
context of market place and payment for goods), politics (power to enforce), and
technology (automated dispute resolution platform and its operability). In this
context, justification of dispute resolution no longer deals simply within the law
but also has implications outside it.
It would seem that Luhmann supposes justification to be a question of law’s
programmes. Conditional programmes direct which side of the code is applied
and provide a formal legitimacy for the choice.
This leads us to following. Within the legal system, justification may have
implications that resemble the law’s programmes but justification is not limited to
this. The issue of justification of dispute resolution needs to be answered within
the legal system, as dispute resolution is pronouncedly a legal operation. Still, the
answer to the justificatory crisis within law also has implications for other social
systems that come together when ICT is implemented for dispute resolution.
Although justification is internal to the legal system, operations that provide
justification internally must also be able to abide by these other rationalities.
Simply put, justification as law’s programme does not provide a sufficient
explanation for the use of ICT in dispute resolution.
4.2.3 Justification as autopoiesis?
We have discarded the possibility of considering justification as law’s programme,
as this would simply render justification of dispute resolution an internal method
of attributing the code to operations and this would provide an insufficient image
for understanding dispute resolution technology. Next, the logical step would be
to ask, what is the significance of justification for the self-production of the legal
system? Could justification be a question of autopoiesis?
Considering justification’s role in the legal system as autopoiesis follows closely
upon the previous option of justification as law’s programme. In fact, these two
interpretative options both place justification within the legal system. In other
words, interpretation of justification as programme means that justification is
produced by the autopoiesis of the legal system. The difference between justifica-
tion as law’s programme and justification as autopoiesis is its exact location within
the legal system. The option of justification as programme grants it the role of
directing the application of the code, whereas the interpretation of justification as
autopoiesis would place it more generally within the legal system’s operational
closure. As autopoiesis, justification would be produced as a by-product of the
code’s application, through law’s internal operations.
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This being said, both interpretations provide a perspective into the implications
that justification has within the legal system. These implications cannot be
ignored; justifying use of coercion is without doubt an operation within the
legal system. However, the question is whether or not justification is limited to
these internal implications.
Legal theorist Emilios Christodoulidis touches upon this interpretation of
justification as autopoiesis in his article on sedition.20 He examines the funda-
mentalist critique of the Red Brigade members during their trial in the 1970s, in
which the revolutionaries contested the court’s power to rule. Instead of pleading
guilty or not guilty to the charges, the defendants contested the meaning of the
words and use of official language, which in turn met with frustration and
demands for a straight answer from the prosecutor and the judge. The activists
referred to the court as a form of class justice, violence of the fascist state machine
towards people. As Christodoulidis states, such a discursive act remained unin-
telligible for the legal system, as much as the language of the courtroom did not
make sense to the discourse of revolutionary action.
Christodoulidis examines how the exclusion of sedition is justified within the
legal system. He suggests that such silencing acts can be justified only through
the inclusion of the silenced in the norm-creation through democratic process.
Christodoulidis argues that sedition ‘marks the threshold beyond which law
cannot accept speech as political’. This means that after this point the legal
system is no longer able to mark the speech act as political speech and it is
excluded from the self-reference. According to Christodoulidis, external sources
of justification, such as authority, bring uncertainty in their wake.21 His argument
maintains that justification is created internally through the legal system’s self-
production. What the legal system does not include in its autopoiesis remains
outside, like the objection that cannot be heard.22
Christodoulidis’ examination of justifying silencing acts is convincing. How-
ever, the context in which he makes his claim differs significantly from the one at
hand. Private enforcement, ODR, or implementation of ICT to dispute resolu-
tion do not stand for fundamental critique of the legal system as is the case with
Christodoulidis’ sedition. However, his argument about the uncertainty that the
external references entail carries weight in this context. Whether the argument
holds true in this context needs to be discussed further in connection with
individual justificatory narratives. At this point it suffices to point out that
Christodoulidis’ inclusion in the norm-creation could be understood through
the legal system’s connection with the political system in legislation.
As interpretations of justification as law’s programme and as autopoiesis
illustrate, justification is a question of the legal system. However, implementing
the use of ICT to dispute resolution raises the question whether justification of
these new procedures is limited to the legal system.
Another option is to admit that the rationalities of other social subsystems
come together in these new forms of dispute resolution. This would explain how
the discrepancies between public and private dispute resolution have not esca-
lated into a conflict before the implementation of ICT. Private enforcement
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conforms to the rationalities of several systems simultaneously and it cannot be
reduced simply to its implications within the legal system. Law’s rationality comes
with constraints that do not explain the mandate of private enforcement, which
separates itself from the state. Simply put, the legal system does understand the
crisis yet needs to react to it. Alone, the legal system does not have sufficient data
for this task.
Either law needs to reach beyond its own limits and include external references
to its own operations (after coding them) to provide fuel for its self-production,
or it needs to answer the call for transcendence by engaging in a more long-
lasting link with other systems. Autopoiesis and structural couplings are both
operational couplings in the sense that they link operations to each other.
Whereas autopoiesis links operations within the system, structural couplings link
operations between different systems.
Dispute resolution technology certainly links operations within the legal
system, but this does not appear to explain why law cannot provide us with a
convincing understanding of private enforcement. There is something else in
addition to law taking place in this equation. As the numerous examples of
globalised world society and emergence of private regimes illustrate, the close
connection between the legal system and the political system of the nation-state
has proved to be problematic. ODR can be understood as a private sector-specific
regime, but it is also a part of the legal system.
In order to explain the complicated relationship between law, the state and
private regimes and to expand the demand for access to justice to this sphere, we
need to go further than law’s internal operations. Hence, considering justification
simply as law’s autopoiesis does not provide convincing arguments in the context
of dispute resolution technology.
4.2.4 Justification as structural couplings?
In the previous sections, it was argued that justification is created through
internal operations of the legal system but these operations also have implications
outside the legal system. Considering justification as law’s programme or as its
autopoiesis, we are unable to explain these external rationalities present in
justificatory narratives.
We have also established that the implementation of ICT to dispute resolution
has meaning within several different fields, which have their own distinct ration-
alities. We have identified these systems as those of law, politics, economics and
use of ICT. This means that implementing ICT to dispute resolution creates an
operational environment (not in the Luhmannian meaning) to which several
systems participate. For the legal system, private dispute resolution as it is enabled
by the use of ICT is a method for resolving a conflict on contractual expectations,
on legal rights based on these obligations. For the economics, the code of
payment/non-payment is allocated by the decision and following enforcement.
For the political system, it is a question of power that culminates in using force,
particularly in enforcement. In other words, the political system is interested in
100 Three quests for justification
preserving its monopoly on violence. For the system of the use of ICT, private
dispute resolution and enforcement is an issue of transmitting information.
Simply put, dispute resolution and the use of ICT observes the rationalities of
several social systems simultaneously.
This plurality of systems reflects on justification. The challenge of private
enforcement becomes particularly pronounced. The challenge it presents to the
legal system reveals that the traditional model has been that of the nation-state.
We notice that the language of law, without reference to the state, is not simply
unable to address the challenge but is also unable to comprehend it.
Instead of asking how we establish due process requirements for private dispute
resolution, we come to ask how we bring due process to private ordering without
reference to the state. This question may very well be a deadlock. As stated, ODR
has never fulfilled its potential by turning into a mainstream solution to online
disputes. There are many reasons for the unpopularity of ODR, but lack of trust is
one that has been acknowledged in the literature. To overcome this, state-issued
trust marks are suggested.23 Also, ODR applications are more and more often
linked with the public court system, as completely private applications have mostly
failed notwithstanding marketplace integrated models such as eBay. One reason for
this failure and sudden return towards the public system may be the shortcomings
of a legal order functioning without reference to the state. Because private
enforcement shatters the link between law and politics, we are suddenly looking
the structure of the legal system directly in the eye. Whether we will find a way
forward is unclear. It is a question of understanding the source of justification
within the legal system but at the same time being conscious of the connection to
the state as a traditional foundation for it.
It follows from this that the justification of dispute resolution technology
becomes an entangled matter. It should be noted that justification and demand
for due process are claims to the legal system. However, the legal system does not
seem able to answer these questions without external reference. It is suggested
here that law’s quest to find justification could be explained through structural
couplings.
Law creates justification for dispute resolution by enabling its operations to
link with operations of other systems. Through this reference the legal system is
able to hold on to its identity created through the system/environment distinction
and at the same time borrow the rationality of the other system for producing its
self-transcendence. In other words, the legal system concurrently goes beyond law
and remains within its boundaries.
This interpretation is not as far-fetched as one could assume. Structural
couplings between systems are a specific type of operational couplings that also
include the operational coupling known as autopoiesis. The difference between
autopoiesis and structural coupling is in the effect that an operation has outside
its primary system. If justification were primarily an internal operation of autopoi-
esis, then it could have an external reference, but its effects would be limited
within the legal system. Justification as structural coupling would have effects in
all systems that are linked to it, but these operations would be interpreted
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differently in all systems through the application of the system code. Thus, the
effects would be different and incommensurable between the systems.
Justification is something that the legal system understands conceptually. The
justification we talk about in relation to dispute resolution technology is most
definitely something specifically legal, although other systems might have their
own concept functionally similar to justification. With private enforcement, the
legal system faces an operation that belongs to it but also contains elements that
it cannot understand. Justification remains within law but draws strength from
other systems to comprehend dispute resolution and the use of ICT.
This means that justification is produced internally within the legal system by
operations that also belong to other subsystems. Although the other side of the
coupling partakes in the autopoiesis of these other systems, justification remains
within the legal system. In other words, the structural couplings are reciprocal by
definition. The concrete application of a structural coupling is that an operation
can be interpreted simultaneously by two different social systems in accordance
with each system’s own unique code. All social systems need a narrative of their
rationality, an origin myth or a reason for their existence, they need to state and
renew the reason why the system/environment difference was established in the
first place. These narratives are not the exclusive right of the legal system. In
the legal system this narrative takes the form of justification. In other systems the
narrative dresses up differently. However, the narrative must always abide by the
rationality of the system itself.
From the perspective of the legal system, justification is a result of the
operation of the structural coupling. For the other system at the other end of
the coupling, the narrative does not necessarily result from the coupling itself.
Still, the structural coupling is reciprocal. The operation through which the legal
system uses structural couplings as sources of justification are interpreted by the
referenced systems in accordance with their own code, as operations belonging
inside them. The operation that produces a source of justification for the legal
system is not necessarily the source of the narrative to the other. In any case the
operation has effects on both systems and as a by-product the legal system creates
justification at the same time. Law’s justification is not left solely inside the legal
system but is translated through the structural coupling to the language of the
other system. The ‘receiving’ system does not need to understand the shared
operation as justification, or even as an origin narrative, but in order for there to
be a coupling it needs to understand the operation as relevant inside itself.
By describing justification as the result of structural couplings I expand the
concept of structural couplings. As methods of creating justification within
the legal system, operations shared through structural couplings serve a central
role for the legal system. This conceptualisation is more abstract than Luhmann’s
impression of structural couplings. Luhmann, in fact, describes structural cou-
plings briefly and mostly in concrete terms and examples. Here, I am referring to
a level of structural couplings different from a simple contract, which can be read
by both the legal and economic systems. Here, the structural coupling is given
more strength. I am referring to structural couplings in the sense of shared values
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and abstract conceptualisations. This can be exemplified by sovereignty and
contract, both of which I will discuss more fully in the following chapters.
Luhmann uses a constitution created in the democratic legislative process as an
example of structural coupling between the political and legal systems. When
discussing sovereignty as a structural coupling between these same systems, I am
referring not to the legislative act or the document, but to the concept of
sovereignty, the value, the abstraction. Similarly, I refer to contract as a structural
coupling, but rather than the concrete simple legal/economic act of selling or
buying I am alluding to the principle of private autonomy, the abstraction.
This said, the reciprocity of the structural coupling takes place on this level of
values, constitutive principles and fundamental conceptualisations. When the
legal system seeks justification from the political system, the principle of
sovereignty is understood by both systems, although through their own codes.
The political system acknowledges the importance of the principle through its
language of power, and sovereignty becomes a question of maximising political
power, the state agenda. Similarly, the economic system understands the mean-
ing of private autonomy, of contractuality and consent, as a question of
establishing markets and maximising resource-allocation efficiency. For the
legal system, private autonomy and the importance of consent play different
roles in different contexts, but it is also a source of justification in the context of
dispute resolution. In other words, the principles form long-lasting connection
points between the systems but their exact meaning depends on the perspective,
the context, time and place. However, the most seminal element of reciprocity
remains.
4.3 The quest for justification
We have established that dispute resolution technology challenges the modern
concept of law connected with the nation-state and thus creates the need for new
bases of justification. This need for justification becomes visible in privatisation of
coercion simultaneously with the difficulties of going beyond the connection of
law and state for finding it. In turn, the difficulties relate to the broader
developments of globalisation and emergence of private regimes that bring the
concept of state-bound law into question. As Luhmann puts it, the difficulties in
finding justification result from excessive differentiations in situations where the
need for interdependencies is not met.24
For the purposes of examining potential ways of building legitimacy for private
enforcement, we should understand justification as a structural coupling, a
conceptualisation which turns our attention to other systems connected with
dispute resolution technology. Within the legal system, these justificatory
couplings to other systems take the form of argumentation tools that explain
the foundations of law internally. Thus, the structural couplings that function as
sources of justification within the legal system are justificatory narratives. In the
following chapters, different justificatory narratives are examined further, but
before this it is necessary to recognise which couplings have emerged within the
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legal system to justify the use of coercion and what limitations follow from their
theoretical examination.
As structural couplings are temporally long-lasting structures, their creation
requires repeated operations over the course of time. Hence, most justificatory
narratives come with history, which is the reason why the close association with
the legal system and the system of politics of the nation-state provides us with a
self-evident starting point. Binding the legal system to the state machine has its
historical roots in early conceptualisations of sovereignty and the establishment of
territorial jurisdiction in the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648 that ended the
Thirty Years’ War in Europe. Sovereignty still forms the basis of international,
Convention-orientated procedural law.25 Luhmann considers the constitution a
perfect example of the structural coupling between the systems of law and
politics, where the political system recognises the operation through its coding
of power/opposition and the legal system through its own.26 In dispute resolu-
tion the justificatory narrative corresponds with primacy of the state-governed
litigation, which also explains its shortcomings in justifying privatised coercion
that cannot be located geographically. In the following chapters, the justificatory
coupling between law and politics is referred to as sovereignty.
As the limitations of state-orientated law led to the justificatory crisis of private
enforcement in the first place, the next logical step is to evaluate whether the
alternative structures used to justify the interplay between private and private
forms of dispute resolution might provide ways forward. The emergence of ADR
in the 1980s has provided procedural law with a new structure for finding
justification in private autonomy, although the division of labour between state
litigation and out-of-court dispute resolution has relied on state control of
enforcement.27 In ADR, the source of jurisdiction is the parties’ contract, e.g.
arbitral clauses. The meeting of the minds to agree upon something, the logic of
agreement, of contract, puts emphasis on the consent of a legally competent,
rational individual who takes her best interests into calculation before entering
into a contract. This rationality follows that of commerce, the system of econom-
ics. Here, the systems of law and economics both understand the structural
coupling between them, the contract, through their own codes.
Another contestant to provide justification in the context of dispute resolution
is the discourse of human rights, that gained significant momentum during the
twentieth century. As a source of justification, this discourse, worded here as
access to justice, can be reduced to the idea that the fairness of the procedure
justifies itself. This third justificatory structure seems to be of a newer origin and
is not yet totally formed. It can be located in the aftermath of the Second World
War when the European renaissance of human rights took up the form of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the rapidly increasing
body of case law of the ECtHR. Human rights discourse seems to reflect another
type of rationality than the constitutive structures of sovereignty and contract.
This discourse is very much unlike the constitutive narratives of sovereignty and
private autonomy. Instead of naming an authoritative source, this structure seems
to be calling for a more qualitative definition, suggesting an ethical connection.
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Hence, the justificatory narratives examined in relation to private enforcement
are sovereignty, consent and access to justice, as these can be found in the
background theory of dispute resolution. As structures within the legal system,
these narratives are formed through the course of time by the continuous self-
production of law’s operations. This means that justification is produced intern-
ally in the legal system. Still, the operations that form justificatory narratives are
shared operations between several subsystems of society. This interpretation
explains the complexity of justification, as the structures reflect the rationalities
of interconnected systems. However, such justificatory structures are a freeze-
frame that depicts the mechanism of justifying the use of force within enforce-
ment. In legal practice, they seldom make appearance in such a pure form as
theoretical examination but instead are often entwined with each other or just
presupposed. As is often the case with principles that are used for justification,
they are rarely voiced. For the sake of argument, they are depicted here as distinct
and separate categories.
In the following, justification is referred to as justificatory structures that take
the form of narratives within the legal system, emphasising both the historical
sedimentation and the temporal stability of structural couplings as a source for
justification. Historical sedimentation in this sense refers to the empirical and
historical process where different foundations have become the foundational
values and fundamental principles of law’s structure. They tell us something
axiomatic about modern law. Temporal stability means that justification is
renewed and reinterpreted time and time again through the structural couplings.
Through time, operations that belong to several systems have been repeated to
the extent that they have created structures which have a more long-lasting
nature than would the individual operations. In order to provide a source of
justification for the legal system, a single unrepeated event (operation that forms
a non-recurring structural coupling between two systems) is not enough. Instead,
repeated operations that have become stabilised as structures provide the neces-
sary reflexivity and stability for the needs of the legal system.
It should be noted that justification is seldom perceivable ‘in pure form’. This
means that different justificatory structures may be engaged simultaneously and
in association with one another. For example, state litigation may be justified
both by reference to state sovereignty and by agreement of the parties. However,
distinguishing between justificatory narratives is necessary for evaluating their
capability in addressing privatised coercion. This simplification of justification
connects with Luhmann’s perception of observing communication. As commu-
nication is continuous, observation of an individual communicative element
requires its simplification. This means that we can only perceive and conceptualise
communication as asymmetrical (who communicates what to whom) if we freeze-
frame them as actions. Such asymmetry is necessary for the system’s self-descrip-
tion, as only then is it possible to steer its self-production and connect the
system’s elements with consequences. Through this process of turning symmetry
of communication into asymmetry, an individual communication becomes sim-
plified and more easily comprehensible. This freeze-frame of asymmetrical action
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is the final element of the system.28 Like all communication within the legal
system, establishing justification consists of multifaceted interlinked operations.
In order to function as a source of justification, the legal system’s operations need
to reproduce justification continuously. As we cannot access the continuous flow
of communication, we are limited to observation of actions. In other words, we
may only observe justification through such oversimplifications.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter began with an examination of how the interplay between public and
private dispute resolution has been organised through a division of labour
dependent on state control over public enforcement. This preservation of the
state’s monopoly on violence is apparent in the traditional ideal model, that does
not necessarily reflect the reality but the theoretical aspiration instead. Following
this, it was argued that this model no longer provides a feasible explanation of the
tension between private and public, as there is no state control when it comes to
private enforcement. The question about alternative ways of justifying privatised
use of coercion led to asking what is justification. Justification was located within
the legal system but as the traditional ideal model depicted, use of coercion and the
authority of law are often explained by external references, as is the case with state
control over enforcement. It was argued that justification should be interpreted as
structural couplings that take the form of narratives within the legal system. The
existing, historically sedimented narratives used in the context of dispute resolution
were recognised as sovereignty, private autonomy and human rights.
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5 Sovereignty and state agenda
In the previous chapters we established the emergence of a new social system, the
use of ICT, and examined how it disrupts the operations of the legal system by
increasing privatisation of coercion. The legal system is seen as facing the
challenge of immunising itself against the new irritant of dispute resolution
technology that takes the form of technology-driven private enforcement. The
impact of privatised coercion affects the justification of dispute resolution, which
in this study is interpreted as resulting from structural couplings with other
societal subsystems. These structural couplings reflect rationalities external to
the legal system.
Chapter 6 is first of the three chapters that apply the theoretical model
developed in earlier chapters. All of the following three chapters are structured
in the same way and the examination proceeds from the origins of the structural
coupling to locating its reflections in dispute resolution and further to evaluating
the shortcomings of the coupling in answering the justificatory challenge posed
by private enforcement. In this chapter the structural coupling between law and
politics, i.e. constitution or sovereignty, is discussed as a source of justification for
dispute resolution. After establishing the close link that has existed between law
and the state ever since the birth of sovereignty in the Westphalian Peace Treaty of
1648, it is asked whether sovereignty could be used to justify private enforcement.
This question is answered in the negative, as the possibilities of creating multilateral
Convention instruments to regulate private enforcement are scarce and any instru-
ment would face significant problems in its application. The chapter concludes with
remarks on the future role of sovereignty in dispute resolution.1
5.1 Finding sovereignty
5.1.1 Whose conflicts are they anyway?
To whom do conflicts belong? They emerge between people, both natural and
legal, grow into disputes and are then resolved, with the help of either a judge or
some other neutral third. It is evident that they do not belong to the disputing
parties themselves, as vigilantism is often criminalised.2 The parties have no
options for accessing their legal rights other than to agree between themselves
or turn to a third party. By criminalising vigilantism, the power over the conflict
is transferred from the parties to the neutral third, which can be private or public
providers of resolution services. Still, the conflict does not belong to the third
party either, as her authority depends on the initiation of the procedure, which
can be done solely by one or more of the parties. Legal decisions have effects on a
wider level than just in the parties’ lives, although these are often the prominent
effects.3 Decisions may form a body of case law or become binding precedents
that provide further grounded legal expectations to others. Private disputes
benefit the broader public. Does this mean that conflicts belong to us all? Or to
the state as the representative of the public?
It becomes evident that there are several claims to the ownership of conflicts
and, more importantly, conflicts and their resolution are important. However,
like children in Gibran’s poem, conflicts have a tendency to elude ownership.
Several positions can be argued here. The parties involved care a great deal about
the resolution of their conflict, but the state, and even the markets, also want to
have a say. We can argue in favour of increasing party autonomy so that disputing
parties have the sole right to decide how their conflicts are resolved, in private or
publicly, according to the law or according to other criteria, with the use of force
or with an amicable solution. Still, such a solution has been seen to lead to
vigilantism and blood revenge, which then threaten societal stability.
In order to preserve peace and order in social relations, we could make the
claim that conflicts disengage themselves from the parties. They become some-
thing separate from their origin, they come about through the parties but not
from the parties. Conflicts become a social practice. They are something that
needs to be solved by an outsider so that we can separate power and law from
each other. Conflicts would then become a public matter with a pronounced
social relevance. They would carry a social function and belong to society as a
whole, which would highlight their importance in creating legal precedents and
in providing continuity for future expectations and interaction. The state has a
significant role in maintaining social order and stability, so we could claim that
both the state and the entire society have a say in conflicts.
However, in lieu of the social development and functional differentiation of
society, dispute resolution has also become a market. Dispute resolution services
are more and more often provided by private entities which adopt the role of the
neutral third. As the freedom to engage in commercial activity is a fundamental
right provided for in several human rights Conventions,4 the claim that conflicts
belong simply to the state is difficult to maintain in an absolute manner. So the
addressees of conflicts include the parties, the neutral third, the operators of the
economic markets, as well as the state and the wider public.
So, who has, or should have, a say in how conflicts are resolved? And most
importantly, whose say carries the most weight? The answer to the question of
whose word we trust has implications for justification. Different perspectives
correspond with different interests and values and choosing a perspective affects
the role we grant to the parties and to the state to define what dispute resolution
should be.
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Depending on which direction we take, whether we accentuate the significance
of the parties’ perspective and their need to find a quick resolution or whether
we give more weight to the interests of the public, affects the way we perceive
justification. It is precisely this conception of the public function of disputes that
is employed to promote state action in dispute resolution. Conversely, we may
contest the state’s role by emphasising the perspectives of the markets (and the
interests of private providers of resolution). Taking the party perspective would
lead to a claim that the provider of dispute resolution does not matter as long as
the parties are content with the solution.
These positions influence which source of justification we consider decisive.
Still, the justificatory narratives often entwine and are present simultaneously. We
would miss a point if we deny that all these interests of parties, markets, the state
and the public are relevant to dispute resolution at the same and justification is
born through all these. Still, it would be an oversimplification to hold on to the
idea that one group might have a prima nocta sort of principal right to the
ownership of conflicts.
We can claim that all conflict management, through either private or public
dispute resolution models, performs a public function by preventing conflicts
from escalating, and thus protecting peace and order in society.5 As Hörnle
states, even arbitration, which is often particularly identified as being confidential
and private,6 is not entirely private; in fact, it fulfils a public function similar to
that of litigation. According to her well-argued position, it is because arbitration
serves the public interest that its legal rules are binding and arbitral awards are
given access to public enforcement.7 The same statement on the interaction
between private and public dispute resolution has been made even earlier. The
claim that private and public dispute resolution models are distinct can be
questioned by referring to Mnookin and Kornhauser’s assertion that private
dispute resolution is by no means oblivious to litigation; instead, it can be seen
as “bargaining in the shadow of the law”, where the law also creates the context
for out-of-court private settlements.8 Then again, this view can be criticised by
claiming that, in the end, such an influence of litigation on private dispute
resolution is hard to measure and may, in fact, be non-existent.
To understand how justification is created through interaction between the law
and the state, we need to bear in mind the social function of conflicts. Traditionally,
we accentuate the significance of this social function.9 In the doctrine of procedural
law, this emphasis has meant linking dispute resolution with the nation-state. This is
done by granting the state the sole right to regulate how conflicts are resolved, in
order to cater to this social function. To this end, the role of sovereign power is
referred to as the state monopoly of dispute resolution.
5.1.2 The concept of sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty is difficult to define, as the concept is loaded with
history and philosophical debate.10 As Mutanen points out, it is impossible to
give a comprehensive study of the philosophical work on sovereignty or even a
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general overview, owing to the vast attention it has received in literature.11
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, sovereignty is ‘the ultimate overseer,
or authority, in the decision-making process of the state and in the maintenance
of order . . . [and] is closely related to the difficult concepts of state and
government and of independence and democracy’.12 Since the eighteenth cen-
tury, constitutional theory has mostly considered sovereignty and state power to
be entwined, as both of them boil down to the monopoly on violence.13 In the
context of this study it is not possible or even worthwhile to describe in detail the
changes that have taken place in the concept of sovereignty or in the surrounding
society, its subsystems of law, politics or economics, since the eighteenth century.
After the French and American revolutions in the eighteenth century, sovereignty
was sometimes considered to flow from the people, in the tradition of popular
sovereignty. Whereas this perception can nowadays be interpreted in accordance
with the principle of democracy, back in the eighteenth century sovereignty was
linked with absolutism. As is often the case with such idealised principles,
sovereignty can be dressed up to serve multiple and even contrasting objectives.14
This fluidity and ambiguity of this idea may very well be the reason sovereignty
and the nation-state have proved such long-lived fundamental concepts in con-
stitutional and international law, as Mutanen suggests.15
The concept of sovereignty, as it is a link between the legal and the political,
engages in the discourses of power and violence, the concept itself being the
product of these discursive practices, as Foucault demonstrates.16 Although a
comprehensive study of sovereignty is beyond the scope of this book, a short
description of its philosophical roots is needed.
5.1.3 Deconstructing the origins of state monopoly
The concept of sovereignty was formally introduced by the French political philoso-
pher Jean Bodin in his Les Six livres de la République in 1576. To Bodin, sovereignty
was ‘an absolute and perpetual power of the republic’,17 to include all legislative
powers indivisibly. However, Bodin’s sovereignty referred to the highest unified
power, the top of the pyramid of authority, as has been pointed out by professor
Stéphane Beaulac. The concept was originally intended to describe the necessity of
the king’s central authority, i.e. in internal matters within a nation. Later on, the
perspective of externality was added to the concept, as Beaulac describes.18 Con-
currently with the addition of external effects, the concept has expanded beyond the
borders of sovereign states to the context of law of the nations.
Bodin’s sovereignty played a role in the power transfer from feudal lords to the
king, to a more centralised system of governance that signified the transformation
from feudalism to early nationalism.19 After Bodin’s preliminary theorisation,
the principle of sovereignty became attached to the concept of the state in the
aftermath of Westphalian Peace Treaty that ended the thirty years’ war. The
Westphalian concept of sovereignty was pronouncedly the origin of the territorial
state, through which secular rulers reasserted dominion over their own territory.
Hence, the birth of the territorial state took place in the shadow of the power
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struggle between secular and canonical leaders, the juxtaposition between the
territorial rulers and the authority of the Pope.20
Most importantly, the concept created borders and alongside them territorial
jurisdiction, which is still a focal concept of procedural law. The objective of the
Westphalian model was to establish a system of international law for coordina-
ting the solving of territorial conflicts between sovereign states. However,
although such a system did not emerge, the Westphalian model of sovereign
territorial states remained as the model of international cooperation for
European states.21
In the seventeenth century the concept of sovereignty was evaluated through
social contract theories. In social contract theories, the sovereign authority of the
state is created by the consent of individuals who, by surrendering their freedom
(such as it exists in the natural state), gain the protection of a sovereign. The
concepts of the state of nature, which precedes the creation of the sovereign
power, and of social contract, which is the instrument for the transfer of power,
are essential to social contract theories. Two of the most influential works on
formation of a sovereign state through a social contract are Thomas Hobbes’
Leviathan (1651), which is often described as advocating absolutism for the
sovereign ruler, and John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689), which
places limits to the sovereign’s power.
The question that divides Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories is whether or not
limitations apply to the sovereign’s power. However, both Locke and Hobbes
consider that penal authority and the monopoly on dispute resolution are
surrendered to the sovereign by the social contract.
Hobbes’ absolutist sovereign
Hobbes’s state of nature is defined as ‘war of all against all’, where an individual
has, in theory, unrestricted freedom. In practice this freedom is limited by the
continuous threat of attack from other individuals. There are no misdemeanours
or obligations to be penalised, as there is no penal authority in Hobbes’ state of
nature. He defines punishment only in relation to the Sovereign, following the
social contract that establishes such authority:
A Punishment, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath
done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a
Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the
better be disposed to obedience.22
According to Kingsbury and Straumann, ‘there is nothing, no possible violation
that could trigger a right to punish’ in Hobbes’ state of nature.23 Hobbes
considered the surrender of individual autonomy in exchange for peace as
absolute; only the right to self-preservation is left within the individual’s auton-
omy. After establishing sovereignty by acquisition or institution,24 the sovereign
has the right of judicature in all legal and factual cases.25
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According to Stanlick’s reading of Hobbes, the sovereign has a duty to
maintain its sovereignty, and undermining that sovereignty by surrendering part
of its power to another sovereign, i.e. by creating an international legal system
between sovereign states with binding legal norms, would mean the sovereign
acting against its fundamental objectives and the principle of self-preservation.26
Tarlton goes even further, by claiming that the maintenance of the sovereign
political order depends on the efficacy of the sovereign’s control mechanisms, i.e.
how effectively the sovereign can prevent individuals from attacking one
another.27 Furthermore, Kingsbury and Straumann describe the sovereign’s duty
to protect its people as a dual function, operating both within the state and
outside its territory in relation to other sovereigns: on the one hand, the
sovereign resolves internal conflicts and, on the other hand, guarantees protec-
tion against external attack.28 Thus, interpretations of Hobbes suggest that
providing efficient dispute resolution is a part of the sovereign’s responsibility,
transforming the sovereign’s rights into duties.
The Lockean safety valve of ‘objective’
While Hobbes can be viewed as advocating an absolutist monarchy, Locke’s
social contract theory is commonly seen as promoting majority democracy.29 In
Locke’s natural state, penal authority belongs to all individuals, who act as both
judges and enforcers in offences against themselves; however, their obvious bias
causes them to act from emotion and revenge rather than from fairness and
objectivity.30 For Locke, natural laws do exist in the state of nature; nevertheless,
they are poorly enforced because all individuals possess the right of enforcement.
Consequently, sovereign power is given to the communal majority by consent,31
in order to preserve the individual’s right to property and to act for the good of
the society.32
In Locke’s theory, the power surrendered to the sovereign is absolute yet
limited to the objective for which it was constituted, for the good of the public.
Owing to these restrictions on the scope of its prerogative, we may ask whether
Locke’s concept of the scope of sovereign power is different from that of
Hobbes. Still, Hobbes and Locke both define sovereignty through the objectives
of the social contract: the sovereign’s existence is based on its capability to
protect and maintain peace.
Concerning the relations between states, Locke examines the possibility of
global commonwealth that arises from the international state of nature. In this
natural state, every country’s freedom is limited by the freedom of others.
According to Cox, Locke’s global state of nature ‘leaves little room for choice
as to whether a government will or will not engage in the general competition for
power and advantage’.33 In the state of nature, a state’s foreign policy aims at
maximising military and economic power in relation to other states, resulting in a
rat race for domination. This leads to the incentive for establishing a global
commonwealth. Regardless of this incentive, creation of a global commonwealth
might fail owing to a lack of common cultural and national background.
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However, as Cox points out, Locke’s political philosophy does not actually
include a theory of international relations, although it is evident that he did not
advocate a global world-state.34
Sovereignty and globalisation
From the basis of work conducted by Locke and Rousseau, the absolutist
perception of sovereignty subsequently translated into popular sovereignty in
the eighteenth century. This idea of popular sovereignty saw the people as the
source of sovereign power. This interpretation was later incorporated into the
revolutionary constitutions of America and France in the end of that century.35
Although social contract theories have developed under completely different
social conditions, their remnants are present in our current understanding of the
relationship between society, law, governance and the consent of the governed.
These roots can be found, for example, in the focal role of the principle of
democracy, which has its roots in popular sovereignty. This consent of the
governed, which interestingly is also the basis of contractual relationships, is
central to democratic justification of rule creation, to juris-diction, where ‘we’
speak the law to us.36
Several scholars have discussed the future of sovereignty in a globalised
world, where European integration and the globalisation of markets and com-
munication have created competing authorities alongside the traditional supre-
macy of the nation-state. Castells has analysed the changes of nation-states
brought on by globalisation in general and the emergence of new technology
in particular. As crime, financial markets and technology are increasingly
detaching from the nation-state, sovereignty is increasingly shared by multiple
stakeholders in addition to the state. According to Castells, we are witnessing
‘the systemic erosion of their [nation-states’] power in exchange for their
durability’.37 Instead of the demise of the nation-state, Castells suggest the
emergence of a network state, where the states will become nodes in a network
of power. Instead of upholding Bodin’s absolutist concept of sovereignty,
Castells claims that parts of sovereignty are escaping beyond the state and the
states become more and more dependent on one another and other players of
the power network.38
Mutanen examines the role and interpretation of sovereignty in the context of
European integration and the EU and asks what has changed regarding state
sovereignty as the Member States have transferred some of their sovereign power
to the EU. Her comparative analysis of how sovereignty is interpreted and
perceived in different EU Member States illustrates how the changes brought
on by integration are acknowledged in national constitutional understandings.
The paradoxical nature of combining the theory of sovereignty with current
constitutional practice raises the question of the scope of the concept’s flexibility.
Mutanen considers that the concept of sovereignty is still relevant in constitu-
tional law and, by reinterpretation, the theory can be accommodated to modern
constitutional pluralism, which she advocates as the solution.39
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As is evident, the concept of sovereignty has faced several societal changes and a
lot of criticism. Nevertheless, both the nation-state and the theory of sovereignty
have proved persistent concepts. Despite fundamental and rigorous criticism, both
concepts still act as a starting point for theorisations on power relations in the
globalised world. Mutanen considers this endurance of the debate on sovereignty
as a sign that the concept itself has not lost its significance. According to Mutanen,
this persistence can be at least partly explained by the ambiguity and contextual
nature of the concept itself, as interpretative flexibility enables its adaptability to
changing societal environment.40
The question I am asking departs from here. Is the interpretative flexibility of
sovereignty sufficiently adaptable to fit the concept of sovereignty with the
changed environment of dispute resolution? Is there an interpretation of sover-
eignty that would uphold its position as a source of justification for dispute
resolution? If we change the context from European integration to global dispute
resolution technology, what are the roles of the state and the scope of its
sovereign power?
5.2 Sovereignty in dispute resolution
5.2.1 Sovereignty as state monopoly of dispute resolution
We have reached a point where the question of ownership of conflicts collides
with the question of justification, the latter of which is raised once again by the
consequences of implementing technology to dispute resolution. The social
element of conflicts has directed the doctrine towards state sovereignty as the
constitutive principle, from which justification is derived. After this, I demonstrated
how the concept of sovereignty emerged, was interpreted and reinterpreted during
the centuries after the Westphalian Treaty. Next, the question of sovereignty needs
to be reframed in the context of dispute resolution technology and as a source of
justification, before discussing whether the flexibility of the principle of sovereignty
enables us to reinterpret it to accommodate the needs for justification in the era of
dispute resolution technology.
This leads us to question what state sovereignty means in dispute resolution.
As state politics rarely take a stance in individual resolution processes, the close
link between law and the state is realised through legislation and state-governed
court systems. Direct references to state sovereignty are rarely made, but instead
the principle is filtered through the doctrine as the state monopoly on dispute
resolution. In order to examine state sovereignty as a source of justification, as a
structural coupling between the legal system and the political system, we need to
define this state monopoly, how it has reacted to the new irritant challenging it,
and where it draws its power.
The changes in the position of the state are linked with the emergence of
diverse phenomena such as globalisation, private enforcement, the introduction
of technology and emergence of the Internet. Still, the objective of this study is
not to adopt a stance for or against sovereignty as such, but to describe how
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sovereignty is employed as a source of justification. There is an extensive collection
of studies devoted to the analysis of sovereignty in the information era but the
approach here is that of dispute resolution. Thus, the discussion is limited to serve
this purpose, although several other theories would deserve a proper analysis based
on their merits. At this point it suffices to describe sovereignty as the supremacy of
a single authority over a specific territorial area. This supremacy, however, is under
constant attack as a result of the globalisation of markets, finance, politics and
technology. In the language of politics, sovereignty is defined in terms of power
and influence, the increasing interdependency between different states on a global
playground.41 In the legal system the principle of sovereignty is coded with the
language of legal/illegal, with a transcendental drive for justifying the use of force.
In sovereignty, the political and legal systems overlap. This means that the
operation is shared by the coding of both systems. In the political system
sovereignty follow the language of politics, i.e. the generalised medium of power
that makes the distinction between power and opposition. Sovereignty is a
structure formed by these shared operations and given the form of constitution.
The structural coupling of constitution also explains why the legal system lumps
together the concept of sovereignty, the importance of the nation-state and the
mandate of the public courts in dispute resolution. Traditionally, these three
phenomena have been closely connected, although this no longer necessarily
applies from the perspective of the political system.
Luhmann identifies the structural coupling between the political system and
the legal systems as the constitution of a state, which transforms to the
languages of both power and law.42 The legal system inadvertently simplifies
the language of power, because the nuances of the discourse of power are not
relevant to the legal side of the structural coupling. The political power to
legislate is read as a source of legislation by the legal system. Naturally, the
power of legislation is not the only source for law but it still preserves a primary
position from the system’s perspective. It could be asked whether the legal
system is able to understand the language of (political) power only if it is
combined with legislative power, as this provides fuel for the system’s application
of the code, for its autopoiesis.
The legal system is very closely connected with the territorial area of a nation-
state. This also explains why legal systems have difficulties in adapting to legal
issues raised within the globalised sub-systems of economy, politics, technology
or private regimes. The emergence of private regimes does not contest the
connection between law and the nation-state but more precisely the regimes
both reveal the existence of this connection and challenge its usefulness. The
question remains whether it is possible for law to understand sovereign power
without a connection to the state, or to understand power in terms of inter-
dependence. If yes, how is the language of power translated to the language of
law? Through new structural couplings, through redefining sovereignty, or
through casting it aside and finding something else? If no, is the legal system
doomed to the same fate as the nation-state, to an existence under the growing
restraints of globalised systems, which limit its scope of power? If the legal system
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cannot detach from its connection with the nation-state, how will it uphold
expectations (regardless of disappointment) in a globalised society?
These are the fundamental questions related to sovereignty as the source of
justification of dispute resolution. At the end of the chapter I will provide some
preliminary answers to these. Before that, it is necessary to understand the
concrete ways in which sovereignty affects the operations of the legal system and
to find the fundamental function behind adopting this principle as a constitutive
justificatory concept. These concrete examples of sovereignty in dispute resolu-
tion relate to territorial jurisdiction as the basis of international procedural law
and to the state’s monopoly on violence, from which the state’s monopoly on
dispute resolution is derived. Against these concrete courses of action, the irritant
nature of technology once again becomes apparent.
The concept of territorial jurisdiction, which is ultimately based on sovereignty,
is a fundamental concept of procedural law. Based on this principle, the state has
almost unlimited power on its own soil, but the effects of a state’s legal system
are very limited on the soil of another state. Although this conceptualisation
preserves the interests of a sovereign state, it also creates obstacles for the
functioning of law when two or more state legal systems overlap. In order to
promote commerce and interaction, effective solutions for cooperation are neces-
sary. However, it follows from sovereignty that a state can expand its effects
outside its own territory only with the consent of the state in whose territory the
effect takes place. By giving consent to procedural acts of foreign states, a
state expands its own sovereignty beyond its territory. This happens reciprocally.
The trade-off insists on allowing similar acts of another state on the territory of
the first state.43
International procedural law has followed this principle of sovereignty, as
granting effect to foreign judgments is most often created by international
multilateral Conventions.44 Such Conventions have been drafted for all stages of
litigation, from recognition of foreign documents and service of documents to
taking of evidence, legal aid for aliens and civil procedure.45
This connects with the Hobbesian state of nature and the question of the state
of nature between sovereign states. For Hobbes the state of nature between
different sovereign states translates into a vacuum of coherent power, a normative
no-mans-land, where the power of no single sovereign reaches in. The internal
aspect of sovereignty, namely the responsibility to provide effective dispute
resolution for its citizens, has up until now been sufficiently provided for by
local territorial methods and by such relatively insignificant consent-based methods
as lex mercatoria for cross-border situations.46 However, in the era of online
dispute resolution (ODR), individual citizens increasingly access this external
normative space through e-commerce and by other cross-border communication
actions, which all of a sudden change the sovereign’s responsibilities. In order to
carry out its internal responsibility and to provide for upholding its internal
sovereignty in relation to its citizens, the sovereign should be able to extend its
power to the external, but this would infringe the sovereignty of other states.
Without effective cooperation the sovereigns all fail in their internal duties, as
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individuals’ actions would not be tied to the nation-state, but dispute resolution
for disputes arising from these actions is.
As is apparent, there are several links between the Hobbesian sovereign and the
way in which state sovereignty is interpreted in cross-border procedural law. Both
perceive sovereignty as a binary concept, including the external and the internal
aspect. External sovereignty protects the sovereign from the intervention of other
sovereigns and simultaneously limits the sovereign’s actions towards other sover-
eigns. In the external relation the state’s scope of power is limited to inaction.
However, no such instruments of procedural law have been created to answer
the new types of dispute arising online. Instead, ODR schemes are promoted by
private operators and, increasingly, are also receiving public support, e.g. from
the EU and UNCITRAL. Although there has been public and legislative support
for ODR and the issue has existed for 20 years, the conventional (!) mechanism
has not been applied to battle the difficulties of online disputes.47
Internet disputes are particularly difficult, as they are typically based on an
online low-value transaction between geographically distant parties, who are
previously unknown to each other. It could be claimed that ODR has
the potential to replace state litigation as the mainstream. However, increasing
state interest in regulating online disputes could very well lead to convergence of
state litigation and ODR, which could be the solution for the justificatory crisis
caused by private enforcement.
Before asking what the state’s role in future dispute resolution technology will
be, we need to understand the connection between state-governed litigation and
justification. The legal system has historically derived justification for its function-
ing from the state machine, from the system of politics.
This justification has two forms in dispute resolution. First, the link between
law and politics forms the basis of territorial jurisdiction. This is the foundation of
internal cooperation that takes place in multilateral Conventions. Second, the
state agenda in the legal system is upheld by the concept of state monopoly on
dispute resolution. This is the other side of territorial jurisdiction as well as an
embodiment of the state’s monopoly on violence. As territorial jurisdiction is
directed externally against other states to avoid interventions from them, state
monopoly on dispute resolution reflects on its own citizens. State monopoly
means that the state governs access to enforcement and grants it solely to
decisions validated by the state courts. In this, state monopoly on dispute
resolution is simply another aspect of its monopoly on violence. In order to
maintain its power basis of exclusionary right to violence,48 the state provides and
has to provide, in its turn, effective means of dispute resolution.
Both the external and internal aspects are connected to the state’s responsi-
bility to provide protection as its ultimate raison d’être. The external state
monopoly protects citizens against the arbitrariness of foreign legislation and
self-serving jurisdictions, while the internal monopoly prevents vigilantism. In
order to maintain its monopoly on violence, the state must perform its task of
providing legal protection effectively – namely, it must provide effective dispute
resolution models for its citizens’ disputes. A failure to provide such models
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could lead to a loss of stability and coherence in dispute resolution. This is
because outlawing vigilantism would no longer be effective and it would become
unclear which disputes would be granted access to dispute resolution and
according to which standards they would be resolved.
It should be noted that the monopoly is not historical, nor does it reflect the
reality of dispute resolution. Instead, the monopoly is a conceptual and doctrinal
practice through which we preserve the connection between law and politics.
However, this relationship is experiencing some technical difficulties, so to speak.
These two forms of sovereignty in dispute resolution have led to a point where
the state is unable to resolve the issue of ODR efficiently. This follows from the
reality of online activity, which is often small-scale sale of goods, often across
borders. The cross-border, high-volume and low-value elements of e-commerce
have rendered the threshold of cross-border litigation too high for most consumers
to cross. This is the result of territorial jurisdiction and the state monopoly, which
still form the foundation of procedural law doctrine. The geographical pointers of
national borders are difficult to draw online. Because Internet disputes cannot be
localised to any state’s territorial jurisdictions, no state monopoly may exist and if
one state claims jurisdiction, it violates the other’s right of jurisdiction out of
necessity.
So, if the state monopoly is a conceptual practice but does not correspond with
historical conflict reality, why would it have stopped working at this point? Has
there always been resolution of conflicts in the shadow of the state? And if yes,
why would ODR make any difference? To answer these questions, state monopoly
has to be understood as a given explanation of organising dispute resolution
through the state.
It should be emphasised that I do not claim private dispute resolution to be the
deal-breaker of sovereignty. Historically, private ordering has existed all through
the creation of the nation-state, despite the nation-state. Although the centralised
modern state expanded its power through the introduction of a state monopoly on
conflict resolution, examples of informal community-based methods of conflict
management, settlement talks and mock courts functioning outside the public
dispute resolution system with or without acknowledgement from the central
power can be found in most modern states. Sometimes such informal conflict
management models have also been encouraged by the sovereign.49
Private dispute resolution is nothing new in itself, but two other develop-
ments have rendered the traditional state-based model of enforcement dysfunc-
tional. First, the number of cases left outside the sphere of litigation has
increased significantly as a result of Internet activity. Second, the implementa-
tion of technology has changed the content of legal operations, as the ex ante
state control before enforcement can be bypassed through private enforcement.
As a result, it is not simply a change from offline to online worlds of dispute
resolution, or the increase of case load, or the failure of regulating ODR, or the
implementation of technological innovation, but the combination of several
such factors that challenge the state monopoly as a doctrinal explanation of
dispute reality.
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5.2.2 Where can we find sovereignty in dispute resolution?
We have established that the principle of sovereignty (and its application, the state
monopoly of dispute resolution) is a fundamental concept of international coop-
eration in procedural law. However, such principles can rarely be found in the case
law of international Conventions. This means that it is not their existence, but their
nature as self-evident truths, that is under question. Still, the traces of sovereignty
can be found in preambles, convention articles on the scope and in reservations
made to such conventions as well as in some forms of case law.
In this section I try to find these traces by using the Finnish national legislation
as an example. National legislation is pronouncedly bound to the territorial
borders of the state. It could be claimed that therefore it is not a representative
example for establishing the claim of sovereignty as a source of justification. This
argument is not without merits, as the scope of this study is cross-border civil
disputes and the claim I make is about private enforcement constituting a
disintegration of sovereignty in justifying dispute resolution. However, these are
precisely the reasons why an example of national legislation is needed.
Firstly, it illustrates how the self-understanding of procedural doctrine still departs
from the nation-state, both in concrete and abstract ways. Concretely, the national acts
stipulate the conditions under which the national courts have jurisdiction, i.e. can
exercise their power as a mandate of the state’s monopoly on violence. Abstractly, this
source of authorisation also shapes the understanding of the relationship between the
courts and the state. This understanding is not necessarily a conscious one; it may well
be that it is an innate and unquestioned assumption that dispute resolution should be
organised by the state by the exact provisions of constitutional law.
Secondly, reference to national legislation still explains the framework in
which the courts function. Similar frameworks exist in most jurisdictions,
although they may have differences due to legislative tactic or legal culture.
However, there are few possibilities for variation of the main theme, as national
rules tend to accomplish the relatively simple task of granting the mandate to
national courts. This is further illustrated by the simplicity of national rules.
Although there are evident differences in both constitutional law and procedural
codes between different states, an example of a national system speaks louder
than the territorial borders that limit its application.
Thirdly, national legislation is more and more often complemented by multi-
national legal instruments. For example, when EU legislation is applicable, it
takes precedence and national legislation is applied only secondarily. Similarly, the
case law of the ECtHR is followed closely, and the Member States of the Council
of Europe mostly comply with the court’s decisions. Hence, it is likely that the
role of national legislation in procedural law is changing as a result of such
cooperation and these instruments contribute to shared European conceptualisa-
tions of fair trial and efficient methods of cross-border dispute resolution. Still, it
should be noted that procedural law is not a forerunner in the Europeanisation or
internationalisation of law. The principle of lex fori, which means that regardless
of the applicable material law a court always applies its own procedural rules, is
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widely recognised and applied. Also, the EU instruments of procedural law have
limited scope and do not extend to all sectors and cases. Hence, the search for
sovereignty in dispute resolution would be defective, if national instruments were
ignored. Two examples of UNCITRAL’s work are discussed. The first is the
1958 New York Convention negotiated through UNCITRAL, which has 159
parties, established case law, and is widely recognised and respected.50 The
second example tells a different story. Since 2010, UNCITRAL’s Working
Group III has focused on drafting uniform procedural rules for ODR, with very
little progress.
National legislation
In Finland, the separation of powers between the legislative body and the
judiciary is provided for in the Constitution of Finland (731/1999). The section
is located just after the section on democracy and rule of law, which accentuates
that the powers of the state are vested in the people represented by the Parlia-
ment, and establishes that the exercise of public powers must be based on law.
The section is followed by a section on the territory of Finland. According to
section 3:
(1) The legislative powers are exercised by the Parliament, which shall also
decide on State finances. (2) The governmental powers are exercised by the
President of the Republic and the Government, the members of which shall
have the confidence of the Parliament. (3) The judicial powers are exercised
by independent courts of law, with the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court as the highest instances.51
Section 3 of the Constitution of Finland is the highest order provision in the
national legislation regarding the delegation of power between different branches
of government. In addition to this provision on principles of organisation, the
basic right to a fair trial is provided for in section 21, titled ‘Protection under
the law’:
(1) Everyone has the right to have his or her case dealt with appropriately
and without undue delay by a legally competent court of law or other
authority, as well as to have a decision pertaining to his or her rights or
obligations reviewed by a court of law or other independent organ for the
administration of justice. (2) Provisions concerning the publicity of proceed-
ings, the right to be heard, the right to receive a reasoned decision and the
right of appeal, as well as the other guarantees of a fair trial and good
governance shall be laid down by an Act.
This division between the organisation of the judiciary and the right to a fair trial
is not out of the ordinary. Neither one of the quoted provisions are surprising,
nor do they reveal some hidden meanings on closer inspection. What makes their
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examination worthwhile is in plain sight: judicial powers are a part of the function
of government. Section 3 gives the mandate to judicial powers to courts that
are established by law. In addition, the highest instances are named, one for the
general courts and one for the administrative courts. The power to resolve
conflicts is granted to the judiciary by the power of the constitution. The
constitution itself derives legitimacy from the democratic legislative order, which
has enacted its reform based on the mandate given by the previous constitutional
instrument.52 Hence, it is the democratic legislative procedure that grants the
jurisdiction to the courts and creates the instance order between lower and higher
courts. The function of the judiciary, the power to resolve disputes, is derived
from the link between the legal system and the political system, from the
constitution that can be understood by the languages of both systems.
In addition to the mandate of section 3, the constitution guarantees a certain
quality of dispute resolution. According to section 21, everyone has the right to
access to court. This access can be provided by some ‘other authority’ than the
courts, and a review can be conducted by an ‘independent organ for administra-
tion of justice’. The right to appeal is a part of a fair trial. The dispute should be
resolved ‘appropriately and without undue delay’. Other aspects of access to
justice, such as the publicity of proceedings, the right to be heard, the right to
appeal and the principles of fair trial are further elaborated elsewhere in legisla-
tion. In Finland, these detailed provisions are incorporated in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Read together, these two sections of the constitution give a clear image what
dispute resolution should be on the territory of Finland. It is a societal function,
part of the government alongside the executive and legislative branches. It is
administered by courts of law that are established by national law and follow
national law while they execute their duties. Such duties can be delegated to
other authorities but the constitutional basic rights still apply. Similar structure
can be found for administrative matters. Private entities of dispute resolution
exist, but they often derive their mandate from sector-specific legislation, as is the
case with the Consumer Disputes Board.53 No dispute resolution market as such
exists in Finland at the time of writing, and ADR has been established and
advocated by different projects of public actors.54 This partly explains why the
image of dispute resolution is focused on courts and the public mandate given by
the constitution.
The New York Convention
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards, best
known as the New York Convention, was concluded on 10 June 1958. With 159
Parties, the Convention is a well-functioning and often applied multilateral
instrument for facilitating the movement of arbitral awards across borders. Its
significance is widely acknowledged and taken into consideration when creating
other cross-border instruments.55 The Convention forms its own global frame-
work for arbitration, but its application is closely entwined with national courts.
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This connection between the cross-border instrument and its application through
state courts is interesting, as it depicts an example of regulating private dispute
resolution by entwining it with the state’s monopoly on violence.
For example, Article 1 of The New York Convention on enforcement of
arbitral awards states that:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.
As Article 1 demonstrates, the Convention instrument makes a distinction
between domestic and foreign arbitral awards. Domestic awards are enforced in
accordance with the national legislation, but enforcement of foreign awards
requires the multilateral instrument between the state where the award is given
and the state where it will be enforced. A point of interest is that the reference to
nation-states is already incorporated to the definitions of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’.
Accordingly, states are the actors behind the creation of Convention instruments
and carry the responsibilities that follow from these instruments. This status is
based on their sovereign power to agree on limitations to their territorial
jurisdiction by granting legal effects to foreign awards and to simultaneously
expand the effects of their domestic awards across their borders.
According to Article 3 of the New York Convention:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following
articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions
or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral
awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recogni-
tion or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
Articles 1 and 3 illustrate that the enforcement of arbitral awards within the
framework of NY Convention requires cooperation between the Convention and
national systems. The authority that recognises the award as enforceable is the
national court of jurisdiction in the state where enforcement is sought. The
uniform interpretation of both the Convention and its interface with various
national legal systems is facilitated by collecting relevant case law of its
application.
The NY Convention was intended to be a relatively simple and straightforward
document for improving cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards. The reason
behind this was to facilitate its implementation to different jurisdictions and
application of its provisions within Contracting States. The simplest method of
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improving enforcement was to use the existing infrastructure of courts within the
Contracting States.56
Thus, the parties to the Convention are the nation-states that have exercised
their sovereign power by opting in to the multilateral enforcement mechanism of
arbitral awards. The instrument is put into practice through the court system in
each of the Contracting States. The individual court of the country of enforce-
ment makes the decision between recognising the award and refusing to recog-
nise it on the exclusive grounds provided for in Article 5 of the Convention.
Violation of public policy of the country of enforcement constitutes grounds for a
refusal, entwining these grounds with the fundamental principles of national
legislation.
By these two examples, the infrastructure of both national and multilateral
procedural law becomes clear. The national courts derive their exclusive jurisdic-
tion from the constitution, from the link between law and politics. The multi-
lateral instruments, which are needed to cross over the barriers of territorial
jurisdiction, are similarly grounded in Conventions between sovereign nation-
states and applied through their court systems. This interaction is seen as one of
the reasons behind the success of the NY Convention.
This close link between jurisdiction and sovereignty – that can be found both
in national constitutions as well as in the framework of the NY Convention –
describes the traditional self-understanding of procedural law. Such a conceptua-
lisation of justification as interaction between law and politics has its advantages,
as access to enforcement is granted only after judicial review in the court, and
thus provides safeguards for due process. Based on this simple solution of
employing state courts for enforcing private dispute resolution, the NY Convention
is easily implemented, thus enabling its widespread acceptance.
Apparently using the link between law and the state as a source of justification
has created long-lasting, viable instruments for cross-border transactions. In the
words of Fali S Nariman, who examines the 50th anniversary of NY Convention, the
‘genetic heritage’ of state sovereignty still holds fast and the success of the Conven-
tion is the result of taking this into consideration.57 But is the link to the state still a
feasible option for finding justification for dispute resolution technology? Could the
logic of the NY Convention also be applied to ODR?
Uniform procedural rules for ODR
An effort has been made in this direction, to create a cross-border instrument for
ODR. In addition to facilitating international arbitration, since 2010 UNCITRAL
has focused on drafting uniform procedural rules for ODR. The focus of Working
Group III is on cross-border electronic commerce transactions, where there is no
existing cross-border regulation and no consistent self-regulation of auction sites
or merchants. As UNCITRAL’s objective is to further the unification of interna-
tional trade law and serve the needs of international commerce under the mandate
of the UN’s General Assembly, there arises an urgent need to provide unified rules
of due process for the low-value, high-volume disputes of e-commerce. ODR was
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embraced as a solution to these disputes, which could not be dealt with using
traditional resolution mechanisms. In contrast to the success of the NY Conven-
tion, UNCITRAL’s work on ODR has left much to be desired, as little progress
was made and, finally, the work was terminated in 2016 with the result of
producing technical notes on ODR, the meaning and nature of which are some-
what unclear. However, UNCITRAL’s work sheds light on the difficulties
of drafting cross-border Convention instruments for ODR and thus demon-
strates the shortcomings of state-based models in governing dispute resolution
technology.
From the beginning, in 2010, the working group’s efforts encompassed both
business to business (B2B) and business to consumer (B2C) disputes. By the
time the ambitious unification project had begun, it had already become clear
that one of the key issues at hand consisted of the policy differences between
countries which accept pre-dispute consumer arbitration and countries which do
not.58 However, it was agreed that arbitration is a necessary part of ODR,
although cases should primarily be settled without an arbitration phase. The
acceptance or rejection of pre-dispute binding arbitration in B2C cases reflects
the reality of the online market. In the USA, in which market leaders of
e-commerce such as eBay and Amazon.com are located, consumer arbitration is
accepted and chargebacks are often used as enforcement alternative. In contrast,
national legislations in EU Member States do not generally allow pre-dispute
consumer arbitration, and, as EU established its own regulatory framework for
ODR based on this rejection, the contrast between jurisdictions was further
emphasised.
Later, an attempt was made to reconcile these differences of opinion by
establishing a two-track system, whereby two different sets of rules would be
developed to address the different needs regarding enforceability. The two-track
system was introduced in November 2012. This system resolved the tension
between pro- and contra-arbitration positions by separating non-binding and
binding ODR rules into two different tracks.59 The binding arbitration track
would be applicable to B2B disputes, and to B2C disputes in jurisdictions where
binding pre-dispute arbitration was accepted. Thus, in track 1 the parties would
have agreed at the time of purchase that any dispute would be resolved in an
ODR procedure which would end in a binding arbitration award. The award, in
turn, could perhaps be enforced through the NY Convention, although this is
still somewhat unclear. Only one click would be needed, the click which
simultaneously completes the purchase and agrees to the binding arbitration
clause. In track 2, binding arbitration would still be possible, but only if the
consumer accepts it after the dispute has arisen. So, both tracks would start off
with facilitated negotiation, but the difference would be that there is a second
click for parties in contra-arbitration jurisdictions: a click to opt-in for binding
arbitration after they have failed to reach an amicable solution earlier.
However, the two-track system had its own flaws, such as the difficulty of
determining which track a dispute belongs to and what would be the point of
reference for determining whether a certain B2C dispute is within a non-arbitration
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jurisdiction. As is often the case in private international law, the question of
allocating jurisdiction has many solutions: jurisdiction can be determined based
on nationality, by place of residence, by place of purchase or by other criteria, all of
which options have further not-so-simple definitions. Determining jurisdiction
becomes even more difficult in relation to e-commerce, as foreign e-commerce
platforms are easily accessed from several countries, purchases can be done while
visiting a different country, and network traffic can be rerouted. Also, the basic
issue with holding on to the two-track system is ‘the annex question’: who would
create and maintain the list of countries by track so that ODR providers could
determine which set of rules would be applicable?
Owing to these inherent problems of maintaining a two-track system, the model
was set aside in October 2014. The decision was made after several delegations had
pointed out that arbitration would not provide sufficient consumer protection and
that simplified arbitration rules would undermine traditional arbitration procedure.
Several delegations stated that non-binding rules would be able to accommodate
all jurisdictions and the practical influence of ODR arbitration would be low, and
awards’ enforceability would remain without effect because enforcing arbitral
awards would be too expensive and time-consuming for low-value disputes.60 It
follows from this that the work seemed to have come to a standstill. In February
2015, the discussion turned to the question whether the work should be discon-
tinued due to the lack of progress. This discussion stems directly from the
problems of the basic model, i.e. whether pre-dispute arbitration clause is binding
on the consumer or whether arbitration is only allowed after the consumer gives her
consent during the dispute. On the one hand, there were many who considered the
fundamental chasm too wide to overcome, but on the other hand, others thought
the need for a compromise, even a weak one, more urgent than the alternative of
laissez-être. In July 2015, UNCITRAL’s Commission further specified the Working
Group’s mandate to focus on the ‘elements of an ODR process, on which elements
the Working Group had previously found consensus’. At the same time the commis-
sion decided that the working group will be continued for one year until summer
2016, after which it would be terminated regardless of the outcome.61
In March 2016, the Working Group drafted the final document, which took the
form of non-binding technical notes on ODR. According to the final document,
the purpose of the descriptive Technical Notes ‘is to foster the development of
ODR and to assist ODR administrators, ODR platforms, neutrals, and the parties
to ODR proceedings’.62 The notes reflect due process values such as impartiality,
fairness and transparency, but as a non-binding instrument the document’s impact
is somewhat unclear. Regardless of this lack of clarity, the document is bound to
reflect UNCITRAL’s encouragement for the increasing use of ODR.
As UNCITRAL’s work on ODR ended with the adoption of the technical
notes, UNCITRAL Member States were left to their own devices to address the
problematic procedural issues of cross-border e-commerce and regulation of
ODR. The lack of a more ambitious instrument was probably more difficult for
developing economies, while it will have less impact on the EU’s established
ODR regime and the US, where chargeback models are commonly used. The
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outcome of the working group falls short of the high expectations placed on its
work. Understandably, the consensus-based technical notes do not take a stand
on the question of one-or-two clicks, which issue substantiated the differences of
opinion regarding the finality of ODR decisions. The lack of consensus on finality
has not been resolved at the cross-border level and if another attempt for
regulating ODR through international Conventions is sought later, the issue
remains to be solved at that time.
Thus, UNCITRAL’s work on ODR tells us something. As the continuous
efforts of the working group over six years has provided only technical notes of
uncertain usability, the probability of developing a global ODR regime seems
highly unlikely. However, the work still gives valuable insight into the issues that
stand between the aspiration and the realisation of such a regime.
As the example of UNCITRAL’s work on ODR illustrates, it is unlikely that a
sovereignty-based framework can be established for ODR, at least for the time
being. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, the dispute resolution market has
changed significantly since the adoption of UNCITRAL’s most successful instru-
ment, the New York Convention. The typical ODR case is not a high-value
business dispute, for which international commercial arbitration and enforcement
through state courts are the preferred resolution models. E-commerce disputes can
involve consumers and consumer protection needs to be taken into consideration.
At the same time, typical e-commerce cases are low-intensity disputes that seldom
exceed the litigation threshold in the first place. Enforcing the outcomes of such
disputes through state courts would not remove the reason why these cases were
not litigated in potentially time-consuming and expensive cross-border civil proce-
dures. Instead of decreasing or removing the litigation threshold, enforcement of
ODR through state courts would just shift the threshold from the access to court
perspective into the enforcement phase. In order to function similarly to foreign
arbitral awards, access to enforcement through state courts requires that the
thresholds of time and expense be lowered. However, making the court system
more efficient without lowering due process standards is no small feat.
Secondly, the typical e-commerce cases delve deeper into the sphere of domestic
legislation than does commercial arbitration, as consumer protection regulation
varies significantly between different jurisdictions. The national character of con-
sumer protection and the need for upholding sufficient redress as a means to this
end mean that we cannot leave private ODR simply as it is without regulating due
process and enforcement, as ODR may easily be the only available redress
mechanism. Thirdly, the role and consequences of private enforcement mechan-
isms have not been discussed at all in this context. It is unclear whether and how
private cross-border enforcement could be regulated, but it is becoming increas-
ingly obvious that the existing way of understanding enforcement and traditional
instruments does not provide the answer.
Hence, we arrive at another dead end. Attempts to create multilateral regulatory
instruments have been fruitless, as sovereign states have not found a compromise.
It is unclear how such instruments would come about, and to what extent they
would be implemented even if an acceptable compromise could be found. National
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or regional regulation is a plausible option but too limited in scope to solve the
difficulties arising from cross-border transactions, as it is limited to the state’s
territory. Leaving ODR unregulated would mean that only national material norms
of e-commerce sites would provide safeguards to individuals in ODR procedures
and this would overlook the procedural element of their dispute resolution func-
tion. We would have to admit that regulating this new and significant field of
dispute resolution is too difficult. This dead end reveals something vital. The
traditional way of understanding dispute resolution through sovereignty is unable
to answer the challenge imposed by ODR and private enforcement mechanisms.
5.2.3 What’s wrong with sovereignty?
The concept of sovereignty is a risky business. The concept has proved to be
especially long-lived, inclusive to the point of losing its descriptive force and
subject to continuing reinterpretations. The principle has received its share of
criticism but still forms the basis of our understanding on law and society.
The question that needs to be asked is, to what extent can we understand
different types of enforcement, of use of force, through the concept of sovereignty.
Sovereignty functions as the coupling between law and politics of a nation-state,
meaning that it is the basis of understanding litigation. Hence, it justifies the way
in which enforcement is conducted through the state’s monopoly on violence.
Also, voluntary compliance with a decision, i.e. when the losing party makes a
voluntary payment, bypasses the use of force entirely. Voluntary compliance does
not engage the monopoly on violence, and therefore it is partly left outside the
logic of enforcement. This also means that compliance with a decision is not
coercion and therefore it does not challenge the state’s enforcement monopoly.
Instead, voluntary compliance is seen as belonging to the individual’s freedom of
contract, the sphere belonging beyond the state’s interests as long as there is no
foul play involved. Therefore, sovereignty as a source of justifying dispute resolu-
tion does not explain the coercive element in forcing voluntary compliance and
neither is there a need for such an explanation. Voluntary compliance is qualified
under freedom of contract and hence it poses no challenge or threat.
However, other models of enforcement do not necessarily fall as easily to the
logic of sovereignty. Still, can the problem be solved inside the logic of sovereignty
by similar means, as is the case with voluntary compliance? Chargebacks provided
by credit card companies, direct enforcement through ICANN, internal private
enforcement of e-commerce sites such as eBay and other enforcement mechanisms
may also be qualified as belonging to the sphere of private autonomy as they are
basically contractual relations or networks of such relations. However, they differ
significantly from voluntary compliance, as the use of force is engaged. Ignoring
these alternative ways of enforcement by contractual qualification is not a credible
solution, because they tap into use of force and use of force needs to be justified
from the perspective of the legal system.
At present, the nation-states have been unable to reach a consensus on
controlling ODR. This inability to establish a new multilateral Convention does
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not yet constitute the failure of sovereignty as a source of justification. Instead,
the question is, what would sovereignty as a source of justification mean if the
nation-states are unable to extent their control to cross-border private dispute
resolution? Without actual possibilities of providing sufficient redress, sovereignty
starts losing its impact – and this in turn would diminish its justificatory power.
This opens up another set of questions, namely, whether private autonomy is a
more credible source of justification than sovereignty, which is discussed in the
next chapter. However, the feasibility of sovereignty as a source of justification
for dispute resolution depends on the concept’s possibilities to perceive and
categorise use of force other than that wielded by state courts. Thus, the question
is, can sovereignty as a source of justification provide us with other means of
understanding the challenge these models entail instead of just qualifying them as
a part of private autonomy? How flexible is the concept of sovereignty?
As stated above, the origins of sovereignty can be located in the writings of
Bodin in the sixteenth century, later discovered in the concept of Westphalian
sovereignty, further elaborated by social contract theories, distinctions between
internal and external, de facto and de jure etc. were made to contextualise the
concept’s content. Originally, sovereignty referred to the person of the sovereign
ruler – a context very different from its current-day use. The concept of sovereignty
was later transferred from the sovereign king to the people, to the consent of the
governed, but did not receive international consequences in a similar way to the
earlier absolutist sovereignty. Thus, Henkin argues, sovereignty as a fundamental
normative axiom of international law should no longer be perceived as such.63
Others have voiced similar opinions on various different grounds from empiria to
philosophy. Koskenniemi divides such criticism into three categories. Sociological
critique accentuates that no state can actually exist as autonomously as the theory of
sovereignty would suggest. According to moral criticism, the concept of sovereignty
caters for the state’s egoism, which is the reason for several political cataclysms in the
previous century. According to the logic-systemic criticism, sovereignty can have no
independent meaning without referring back to the fundamental question of the
relationship between constitutional and international law.64
Two Finnish legal scholars, Tuori and Syrjänen, suggest that the disintegration
of state sovereignty could present a way forward. They both argue that sover-
eignty as the interpretative framework of law is old-fashioned and has outlived its
usefulness. Syrjänen claims that considering societal peace as the product of state
sovereignty leads us astray, for in late modern society there is no sovereign power
that is not restricted by international or national limitations, such as human
rights. Syrjänen suggests that, instead of perceiving law and justice in a state
context, we should review it in accordance with Niklas Luhmann’s system theory,
as a part of social systems and their interaction, as society’s law.65
From a systems theory perspective, the inability of procedural law to effectively
resolve cross-border civil disputes is a result of the close connection between the
law and the nation-state. While the subsystems of commerce and technology are
global in nature and give rise to disputes, discrepancies between systems follow.66
In other words, legal rules are established by national legislative processes and
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governed by national courts giving in casu content to these norms, the conflict
environment that the national law tries to reduce to a normative code is global,
and thus cannot be simplified to such a code. However, in an information-based
society, there is a need to develop cross-border legal instruments for addressing
such disputes, and this can be reached only by overcoming the restrictions
embedded in the concept of state sovereignty. Regardless, state sovereignty
might hinder access to dispute resolution, but it also retains the task of providing
due process by safeguarding access to enforcement.67
The discussion on private enforcement shows that the sovereign nation-state is
losing some of its power due to the disruptive power of technology. Still, these
changes in the role of the state are by no means straightforward, as Castells points
out.68 The implications of this change for dispute resolution are evident in the
justificatory crisis brought on by dispute resolution technology. The state monopoly
seems to be poorly compatible with e-commerce disputes and private enforcement
seems to pass over the state’s monopoly on violence as well. However, the territorial
nation-state has proved to be a long-lasting phenomenon historically and it is still
very much the primary provider of power and administration.69 No other norm
project has been able to establish itself as strongly as the nation-state, although the
potential for this is increasing. In other words, owing to the globalisation of
economy, the nation-state has lost some of its power, but not its influence.
It seems we cannot rid ourselves of sovereignty, although its role as a source of
justification for dispute resolution technology can be challenged on solid
grounds. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, conflicts involve the diverse
interests of the parties, the public, the market operators and the state. If we
dismiss the sovereign state as the primary source of justification, what will its role
be? Could we still emphasise the role of the state, but simply try to reinterpret its
content? Would such an exercise provide a way of understanding alternative
means of enforcement, and enable maintaining the concept of sovereignty as the
source of justification?
The possibility of reinterpreting sovereignty is desirable, as it would save us the
trouble of finding other sources of justification. For example, we could test
whether understanding sovereignty as delegation would function, or whether
sovereignty as interdependence of States would provide a solution. There are
several options for reinterpretation of sovereignty.
The first option of reinterpretation is to consider private enforcement as a
delegation of power. Seeing private enforcement as a delegation of power from
the sovereign to the e-commerce sites would be a theoretically solid description
and would comply with Hobbesian sovereignty. This model has been applied to
understand the relationship between state litigation and ADR while simulta-
neously holding on to the constitutive starting point of sovereignty. Then again,
such a description is not entirely accurate, as private enforcement owes more to
the inaction of sovereign states than to pro-active and conscious transfer of
powers. Also, Hobbes’ theory is an ill fit with the reality of globalised world, as
it makes a close connection between the person of the sovereign and the territory
of the state without focusing extensively on the relationship between different
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states on a global scale. It is unclear to what extent the emergence of alternative
enforcement mechanisms could be read as a delegation of state power and how
much they owe their existence to creativity in bypassing the litigation threshold.
The second option for reinterpretation is to perceive sovereignty as interde-
pendence between states. Rijgersberg suggests a model for interpreting sover-
eignty in the context of a globalised legal environment, in which sovereignty and
constitutional obligations are considered as interdependence of interconnected
states and private operators would provide the organisational architecture for this
by participating via Internet. For Rijgersberg, the state maintains the responsi-
bility for providing public security, ensuring welfare and protecting property
rights. Rijgersberg’s claim that, from the perspective of globalisation, constitu-
tional responsibilities can be interpreted as interdependency provides us with a
useful insight. Still, it is unclear how such a reinterpretation would provide us
with added value for explaining the role of the state in justifying dispute
resolution technology. Sovereignty as interdependence could help us to include
alternative enforcement mechanisms, but what this solution essentially would
entail is somewhat elusive. Interdependent sovereignty could assist in expanding
the stakeholders in enforcement, but several questions are left open. For example,
what is the relationship between private enforcement and the interdependent
nation-states and how the organisational infrastructure relates to the principle of
democracy?
A third option for reinterpretation is to perceive sovereignty as interaction of
different justificatory constructs. Thus, sovereignty would re-enter this discussion
through its nature as the consent of the governed or as the safeguard of access to
justice. For example, the jurisdiction of state courts would be derived from the
consent of the people represented by their system of government, from the
principle of democracy. Hence, it would be the consent of the people instead of
the interests of state sovereignty that would provide justification for dispute
resolution.70 Another example is to derive justification from the fundamental
right of access to justice, which would be primarily provided and identified in
connection with the state.
However, the difficulty with this solution is that it would preserve the term but
transfer its meaning to other constructs. In the end, such a strategic move would
not provide a new role for sovereignty, but instead would change the source of
justification from the structural coupling between law and politics to somewhere
else. This strategy would remove the dysfunctionality of sovereignty on the surface
level, yet it would only hide the problem. We need to consider the applicability of
consent and access to justice as their own sources of justification rather than as the
other side of sovereignty.
The demise of nation-states caused by technology has also been acknowledged
in relation to cyber threats.71 The argument is similar within that debate to what
has been related here concerning dispute resolution: the emergence of techno-
logy has created the possibility of cyber threats that have consequences different
from crime, terrorism and war outside cyberspace and these threats cannot be
addressed within the current framework of nation-states. According to Brenner,
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these cyber threats cannot be classified as internal (such as crime or terrorism
caused by individuals) or external threats (war between sovereign nation-states)
to the societal order, as cyberspace introduces a new element to defining and
evaluating these disruptive actions.72
Enforcement takes a decisive role also in relation to cybercrime. Brenner
describes the nation-state’s agenda for overcoming internal and external threats
as two-fold, where both the containment of external threats by a standing army
and containment of internal threats by law enforcement and the judiciary are
based on the monopoly on violence. However, the distinction between warfare
and individual crime becomes more and more difficult to hold on to, as recogni-
tion is no longer as simple, and the two categories may also converge.73 Also, the
relatively low risk of getting caught, prosecuted and sanctioned for transnational
criminal action online contributes to the increase of cyber threats.74
It follows from Brenner’s analysis that the difficulties of addressing cyber
threats result from the same aspects of the nation-state as those of addressing
private enforcement, namely territorial jurisdiction, the monopoly on violence,
the lack of reliable cross-border instruments, and inefficient enforcement.
5.3 The future of sovereignty in dispute resolution?
One functional model is bringing ODR technology to the courts, as has been
suggested by the report of the ODR Advisory Group of the Civil Justice Council
in the UK.75 This shift towards convergence of ODR and courtroom technology
has also been suggested by Benyekhlef and Vermeys.76 Implementing technology
in dispute resolution through the courts would still enable the use of sovereignty
as the decisive source of justification. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
sovereignty provides a stable source of justification for domestic disputes that
are resolved through state litigation despite its shortcomings in the cross-border
context. Connecting ODR with the courts would function similarly in the
national context and relieve the challenges of access to justice for its part.
However, the problem of sovereignty-based justification would still exist in the
cross-border context.
Regardless of this, private enforcement, both in domestic and cross-border
contexts, still bypasses state control. This means that the justificatory crisis is not
limited to the cross-border context but intrudes in the national context instead.
At the beginning of this chapter I described the conventional and modern
approaches to sovereignty and demonstrated how the concept has proved to be
easily adapted to changing societal conditions. In the context of dispute resolu-
tion, sovereignty adopts the mask of state monopoly on dispute resolution, which
has become a battleground for negotiation and reinterpretation, as the concept of
state monopoly de jure and the actual governance of disputes de facto have
moved farther away from each other. The discussion of different possibilities to
reconcile the principle of sovereignty with the change in the dispute resolution
environment proved to be fruitless, which suggests that we need to abandon state
sovereignty as the constitutive source of justification for dispute resolution (and
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technology). The question remains, what is the role of state agenda in dispute
resolution, if sovereignty loses its primary role as a source of justification?
Discarding sovereignty as a source of justification for dispute resolution does
not mean that we have to abandon the principle itself. As Mutanen states, other
suggested terms of constitutional theory, such as autonomy or independence,
come with different difficulties and reinterpretation of sovereignty, as constitu-
tional pluralism is a more apt choice for constitutional law.77 However, the point
I make here is not about the theory, history, application or dominance of the
principle as a description of either de jure or de facto state from internal or
external perspective. Instead, the demand for abandoning sovereignty is significantly
more limited here, contextually.
Finding the justification of dispute resolution in state sovereignty has been very
much a silent practice and the connection is difficult to find in constitutional texts
or even codes of civil procedure. This silence of legislative work does not mean
that it does not exist, as I established earlier. It is this particular practice of
justifying dispute resolution through a reference to the political system that is
problematic. However, this does not mean that sovereign states should have no
interest or no business in dispute resolution. Simply put, the source of justifica-
tion needs to be re-evaluated in the context of both states and other stakeholders,
the limitations of the cross-border context, and the objective of providing
efficient redress mechanisms.
As Castells and Mutanen point out, nation-states or the concept of sovereignty
are not disappearing or losing their influence. Neither is the public function of
dispute resolution in providing predictability of legal decisions, transparency,
equality and societal stability. The importance of this public function needs to
be emphasised: the role of the state as one of the basic building blocks of
democratic societies and global community is first and foremost linked to these
objectives.
Private enforcement, which bypasses state control, is challenging the traditional
doctrine of cross-border procedural law. Still, private enforcement is currently a
relatively small phenomenon, although it is gaining ground. However, private
enforcement challenges and undermines the state’s monopoly on violence. The
question is how to reconcile the state’s interests in upholding the public function
of dispute resolution while simultaneously providing efficient mechanisms for
enforcement, both public and private.
Sovereignty alone does not provide sufficient theoretical justification for dispute
resolution, nor does the practical framework derived from it provide sufficient
means of reacting to the phenomenon of private enforcement. In other words,
sovereignty alone is not enough, but the sovereign states have impact on the
matter of both justification and practice. It remains to be seen whether this impact
is actually tapped into and transformed into a regulatory standard for private
enforcement. Considering the failure of UNCITRAL’s Working Group, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that the network of states alone cannot provide
sufficient tools, but creating standards for private enforcement needs to include the
whole variety of stakeholders.
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5.4 Conclusions
This chapter discussed sovereignty, which in dispute resolution is presented as a
fictional state monopoly on dispute resolution, as a source of justification for private
enforcement. Deriving its current conceptualisation from the social contract theories
of Hobbes and Locke, sovereignty is understood as a mandate to provide protection
for the people, an idea also present in the role of public courts as gatekeepers of
enforcement. The shortcomings of sovereignty in justifying private enforcement
become apparent in the insurmountable-looking difficulties faced in trying to preserve
the statemonopoly by creating state-oriented transnational mechanisms for regulating
ODR. In short, sovereignty only provides a model for justifying the state’s monopoly
on violence. Thus, the quest for finding justification for private enforcement cannot
be solved with reinterpretation of the connection between law and the state but
instead we need to assess the possibility of finding justification from other narratives.
These narratives, private autonomy and access to justice, both compensate for the
deficiencies of the sovereignty narrative and provide flexibility in dispute resolution.
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6 Consent and private autonomy
Chapter 5 addressed the shortcomings of sovereignty, the structural coupling
between systems of law and politics, as a justificatory narrative for private
enforcement. This chapter examines the structural coupling between law and
economics, contract and the private autonomy it reflects, as a possible source of
justification for private enforcement. As the emphasis is on evaluating how the
consent narrative is, and could be, used to overcome the shortcomings of
sovereignty, this treatment is more cursory than in the previous chapter.
The origins of private autonomy as a source of justification for dispute resolu-
tion can be traced back to Roman law and to the rekindled interest in contract in
the eighteenth century. However, the importance of consent in justifying dispute
resolution started to increase in the 1960s, as the ADR movement advocated the
use of the parties’ agreement as a basis of jurisdiction in order to enable out-of-
court dispute resolution models. As with sovereignty, the possibilities of private
autonomy in justifying private enforcement are evaluated and its shortcomings
are found in its lack of awareness of power imbalances and in the challenges of
creating sufficient redress mechanisms. However, the potential of private auton-
omy is discussed only in relation to the shortcomings of the sovereignty narrative;
the attention is directed to asking whether the consent narrative can compensate
for the limitations that follow from the connection between law and state and fill
the justificatory void of private enforcement.
6.1 Finding consent
6.1.1 The perspective of the parties
Whereas sovereignty is focused on the connection between law and state, consent
calls attention to the relationship between individuals. Although dispute resolu-
tion is about interpersonal communication, the need to sustain the fiction of state
monopoly on dispute resolution has downplayed the importance of consent. This
does not mean that consensual models are of recent origin even if the current
formulation of consent as an alternative jurisdiction is. Often consent has not
been considered as a sole source of legitimacy, but instead coupled with state
control. As technology offers alternative ways of enforcement without state
control, the acceptability of consent as a justificatory narrative transforms into a
question about the limits of consent. Can we give consent to renouncing the
state’s role as the gatekeeper of enforcement? Can we renounce Montesquieu’s
separation of powers? Can we consent to the democratisation of violence, to
private enforcement? What criteria do we place on consent to ascertain that it is
acceptable and ‘true’, from which perspective are these limits imposed, or is this
truthfulness of consent a fiction to begin with?
Private autonomy, i.e. the significance of consent, or freedom of contract is the
structural coupling between the systems of law and economy. Contracts employ
the binary codes of both systems simultaneously, the legal/illegal of law and
paying/not paying of economy. However, the definition, boundaries and appli-
cation of consent are not clear-cut. As stated in Chapter 5, voluntary compliance
with a decision is understood as a contract, the consent of the parties, and there is
no use of force. Whereas sovereignty as justification draws attention to the
interests of the state in dispute resolution, the perspective embedded in private
autonomy turns the focus to the disputing parties. From the perspective of
sovereignty, the use of force, the binary code of power/opposition, is a deciding
factor in allocating voluntary compliance to the sphere of freedom of contract.
But from the perspective of private autonomy, can we expand its sphere to
include the use of coercion? Is this not contradictory?
As discussed in relation to sovereignty, the ownership of conflicts is an elusive
concept. Legal conflicts have a public function in providing stability and predict-
ability, but the direct consequences of conflicts impact the disputing parties first
and foremost. The demarcation between the public function and the interests of
the parties is further supplemented with the perspective of the markets. Both the
e-commerce market and the dispute resolution market affect the success of
different conflict management methods. However, the conflict starts and ends
with the parties, their disagreement is the basic element of all dispute resolution,
the fuel for reinterpretation and development of law, the discrepancy of business
transactions, a valuable asset for the dispute resolution market.
The ownership of conflicts is a question that cannot be answered as such;
however, different perspectives reveal different facets of dispute resolution. The
examination of sovereignty as a source justification gives insight into the interests
of nation-states in conflict management. Through the structural coupling of law
and politics we perceive dispute resolution in terms of power in addition to the
internal framework of the legal system. Looking at dispute resolution through
the lens of private autonomy sheds light on the interests of the parties and the
markets. The structural coupling between the legal system and the economy
brings attention to resource allocation in dispute resolution. By emphasising the
importance of private autonomy, sometimes at the expense of sovereignty, the
focus shifts to the needs, motives, resources and rights of the parties themselves.1
Freedom of contract is often connected with laissez-faire liberalism, highlight-
ing the importance of minimum state control in contractual relations between
two competent and consenting parties. However, freedom of contract has roots
in Roman private law,2 and was well established as one of the basic principles of
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medieval trade law, lex mercatoria. Lex mercatoria was a sui generis legal and
socio-economical system, based on the self-regulation of merchants themselves,
drawing its credibility from best practice and customary law, which were applied
in merchant and trade courts along important trade routes. Still, it can be
contested whether lex mercatoria in fact existed to the extent attributed to it in
modern literature.3
Although freedom of contract is a well-established principle of contractual law,
its significance in dispute resolution is a relatively new development. The impor-
tance of consent in dispute resolution owes much to the ADR movement of
1980s. In their efforts to provide alternatives to court proceedings, which were
considered expensive, slow and inadequate due to their win–lose mentality, advo-
cates of ADR favoured more flexible and efficient conflict management. These new
methods would take into consideration the needs of the parties in a specific case.
Instead of enforceable decisions on rights and obligations, the ADR ideology
would produce solutions that would transcend the limits of legal dispute resolu-
tion, by introducing new mediation and negotiation techniques for coming to a
genuine agreement between the disputing parties. The basis of jurisdiction for such
alternative resolution methods would lie in the consent of the parties. The
individual needs of the parties would be decisive in formulating the procedure in
casu, as this would also change the focus from courts to the parties and encourage
parties to take responsibility and a more active role in settling the dispute.
6.1.2 The concept of consent
Similar to the concept of sovereignty, the concept of consent has carried a
multitude of meanings that have been subject to continuous reinterpretations.
Consent is closely linked with contracts, although neither can be truncated to the
other: the history of contracts dates back to Ancient Greek and Roman legal
traditions but the emphasis on consent is more recent. Although consent, in the
meaning of popular participation in communities, has also been applied in early
Christian and Medieval communities,4 in the following I focus on consent in the
framework of contractual law, as individual expression of intent, which is considered
to be legally relevant.
Consent, according to the Oxford Dictionary, refers to ‘permission for some-
thing to happen or agreement to do something’.5 What makes consent legally
relevant is the subtext of subjectivity, of individual action, of the importance of
self-determination, which all flow from the subjectivity of the individual. Thus,
the increasing importance attributed to consent in the late-eighteenth century
and in the nineteenth century is linked with individualism, which consecutively
was a reaction to the social change brought on by the Industrial Revolution and
urbanisation.6 As such, consent has a reciprocal dimension, as the legal conse-
quence, the contractual relationship with obligations, follows from congruent
expressions of consent from parties. This element of incorporating an obligatory
meeting of the minds, the binding contract, has proved to be a particularly useful
legal instrument.
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Before examining the origins of consent and private autonomy, another point
regarding the relationship between consent and legitimacy of government: the
application of consent outside contractual law is related to the consent of
the governed, the notion that the mandate of the sovereign ruler stems from
the consent of the public. As discussed in Chapter 5, social contract theories have
often included this premise within their frameworks. The question arises, to what
extent are sovereignty and consent congruent, or two sides of the same coin? It is
noteworthy that justificatory constructs are not completely unattached from each
other but there can be – and often is – overlap. As discussed in Chapter 5, this
results from the simultaneous application of several justificatory narratives, as they
seldom appear individually. In addition, sovereignty can be interpreted through
private autonomy, as is the case with the fictional consensual element of social
contract theories. We might even claim that establishing the principle of sover-
eignty requires a contract of private law between the sovereign and the governed,
leading to the point where both consent and sovereignty are different aspects of
the principle of democracy.
However, the shortcomings of social contract theories are numerous. First, it is
unclear whether the foundation of a social contract establishing sovereign power
is, in fact, embedded in free choice and consent of all concerned parties. As social
contract theories imply, the contract on sovereignty is a metaphoric fiction that
aims at explaining the conceptual jump from the state of nature to organised
society. There has been no constitutive social contract in history and there is no
effective opt-out alternative. As such, the social contract does not meet the
requirements of free choice and consent placed by classical contract theory, as
there is no actual meeting of the minds.7 Second, consent and sovereignty,
although sharing connection points, conform to different rationalities – sovereignty
to that of the political system and consent to that of the economic system – and
thus joint examination would mean an unavoidable oversimplification of these
connections. Third, social contracts tend to subscribe to geographical borders and
presence within them as an outward sign of consent. This logic disintegrates in the
context of technology, where geographical markers lose most of their decisive
meaning and contractual instruments gain ground. Identifying consent with pre-
sence has the potential to obscure the complexity of online actions, leading to
unnecessary oversimplifications.
6.1.3 Deconstructing the 0rigins of private autonomy
As this examination focuses on the possibility of compensating the shortcomings of
sovereignty in justifying private enforcement, it is not possible to provide a compre-
hensive analysis of the formation and evolution of consent and private autonomy.
However, a short introduction to the theoretical context should suffice for the needs
of this study to demonstrate how the constitutive principle of private autonomy has
entered into the debate on dispute resolution in the form of consent.
One of the most influential examinations of the origins of contract law is that
of Henry James Sumner Maine’s in Ancient Law, which was published in 1861.
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The objective of Maine’s analysis was to portray the early ideas as they were
reflected in ancient legal texts and to point out the common nominators between
them and the thinking of his time. According to Maine, ancient Roman law saw
contracts as a combination of a pact between the parties, resulting from consensus,
and of an obligation, which was added to the pact. Obligation was considered to
be ‘the “bond” or “chain”, with which the law joins together persons or groups of
persons, in consequence of certain voluntary acts’.8 Four types of contract were
recognised and could be enforced by law: the verbal contract, the literal contract,
the real contract and the consensual contract, which all emerged at different phases
of the Roman era.
The first and most common type of enforceable contract Maine distinguishes is
the verbal contract, which consisted of a question and an answer, which together
created the agency for annexing the obligation to the contractual instrument
itself. The verbal contract followed a specific technical form. The literal contract
is different from the verbal in that the obligation was formed by an entry of the
debt sum to the debit side of a ledger. The literal contract was related to the
domestic habits of household bookkeeping. It is unclear whether consent was a
required element for the obligation, as the meaning and context of the literal
contract changed during the later stages of the Roman Empire.9
Unlike earlier contractual forms, the real contract signified the emergence of
ethical conceptions, Maine claims. In real contracts, the obligation followed directly
from the performance of a party, which imposed a legal duty on the other based on
ethics. However, the last form of contract, the consensual contract, transformed
Roman contract law by incorporating the obligation directly to the consensus of the
parties without the need for any additional acts. However, the scope of application of
consensual contracts was limited to commission and agency (mandatum), partner-
ships (societas), sale (emptio venditio) and letting and hiring (locatio conductio).
Maine suggests that these types of transaction are the most common legal acts of
any trade-oriented community, which is also the reason for forgoing technical
formalities as obstacles to trade. The historical significance assigned to consensual
contracts is partly due to the possibilities of further doctrinal classifications it
enabled, such as natural and civil obligations and quasi-contracts. Also, the use of
the Latin language played a central part in disseminating the innovations of Roman
contract law to the Western parts of the Empire and making them accessible to
medieval scholars.10
The work of Maine located the birth of contract law, and the role of consent,
in Roman law. Although consent has played a part in contracts under Roman
law, the emphasis granted to the concept is the product of latter social changes.
This conceptualisation of legal evolution is often considered to be a transition
from status-bound rights and duties to social relations regulated by contracts.11
Since Roman law, the doctrine of contractual law has undergone significant
and diverse changes. However, the increasing importance of commercial
exchange formed the societal background for this development of contractual
law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This increase of commerce and
the need to develop a contractual theory for its needs also explain why Maine’s
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examination in the middle of the nineteenth century focused on finding the
origins of contract law. Maine’s interest in the Roman law of contracts reflects
the need for finding functional origins for the needs of the new contractual
theory. In Luhmann’s terms we can describe this growing interest in contract law
as the result of increasing functional differentiation of both the economic system
and the legal system. Simply put, this increase in commerce could be seen to have
led to the development of classical contract theory in the nineteenth century.
English legal academic Patrick S Atiyah examines the emergence and demise of
freedom of contract in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.12 Atiyah claims
that the consent-based concept of contracts, the binding contract as a meeting of
minds, is a relative newcomer in private law. Consent-based contracts did not
exist until 1800, before which the legal evaluation of contractual relationships
was focused more on particular types of transaction and on the overall fairness of
transactions. Classical contract theory culminates in general principles and trust
placed in clear-cut ‘objective’ concepts such as an offer and its acceptance, as the
result of growing emphasis of freedom of property and the move from a
property-based to a contract-based society.13
However, Atiyah continues by claiming that classical contract theory has come
to the end of the road, to a position where the role of contract had started to
decline in the twentieth century. Growing regulation in consumer protection,
labour laws and tenant protection have lessened the significance of classical
concepts, and this development has confined contract law to a much narrower
scope than during its prime in the 1870s. Atiyah attributes this demise to three
individual, but connected, developments. First, the role of contracts in overall
society has diminished. This follows from the growing importance of public
administrative law in protecting the weaker parties of contractual relations,
which is closely linked with the emergence of the welfare state after World War
II. The expansion of public activities has changed the concept of society, which
was centred on networking individuals freely entering bilateral contracts. According
to Atiyah, there has been a broader shift from private to public law.14
Second, Atiyah claims, the significance of free choice as a source of legal rights
has decreased, as emphasis has moved on from promise-based rights and obliga-
tions to non-voluntary rights. This translates into the lessening importance of free
choice, consent and promises. In practice, lawyers are increasingly acknowledging
that there are other overriding values and not all contractual consequences flow
from the intention of the parties. New forms of contractual relations, e.g. standard
contracts, which are not individually negotiated, implied contracts such as riding a
bus, and compulsory contracts such as compulsory acquisition of land, all contra-
dict the definition of contracts as consensual and voluntary meeting of the minds.
Thus, the concept of contracts expands to situations where the consensual element
is surpassed by other values and objectives.15 However, Atiyah points out that in
the area of sexual morality the importance of (adult) consent has, in turn,
increased, showing an opposing trend to the general current.16
Third, contractual law has shifted away from the classical executory model of
contracts that refers to remaining contractual obligations of the parties in
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fulfilling the contract, Atiyah claims. In turn, the executory contract, which
focused on intended future performances, marked the shift to classical contract
theory, as the earlier doctrine had operated mostly on the concept of completed
(executed) contract, i.e. what the parties had done. However, modern doctrine
makes a distinction between present and future consent and limits the binding
nature of the latter. For example, the possibility of cancelling a binding contract
is nowadays considered an integral part of life insurances, several continuous
consumer contracts and the sale of goods. Also, contracts on entering marriage
are no longer considered binding in the future, a development linked with easier
divorce.17 In addition to and following this, contracts have lost their role as
instruments of risk allocation, as protection of future expectations is no longer
focal to contractual relationships.18
Atiyah’s analysis of the emergence and downfall of consent reveals that private
autonomy is a relatively new concept in comparison with sovereignty, as the latter
dates back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although consent has
suffered from the loss of importance, it is still a central concept of law. It could
be claimed that, instead of its demise, or in addition to it, consensuality has
expanded outside its origins in contractual law, to other fields of law, e.g. public
administrative law, family law and procedural law. Similarly to what Mutanen and
Castells have pointed out about the longevity of sovereignty and the nation-state,
consent has proved to travel well across disciplinary boundaries and to be
exceptionally durable.
In the following section, the role of consent in dispute resolution is evaluated.
Before this, one last general remark on the evolution of consent needs to be
addressed, namely the emerging private regime of a new lex mercatoria, as
proponents of this tradition consider it a solution for private regimes, a model
of contractual networks for an a-national but global, autonomous legal order
with its own institutions and without connecting points to the legal systems of
the nation-states. Allegedly, this uniform regime can be found in international
commercial arbitration and global governance of international commerce.19
According to Calliess, the new lex mercatoria draws credibility for its neo-liberal
agenda from an interpretation of the medieval lex mercatoria as an autonomous
legal system co-existing with the domestic public courts. Opponents of the new lex
mercatoria have claimed the opposite: that the ancient merchant law was not an
autonomous legal system but a hybrid of public and private elements. As Calliess
points out, it is impossible to cover the exact content of this medieval merchant
law, as historical sources are scarce and open to various interpretations. The ancient
lex mercatoria had its origins in the medieval commercial revolution, which
resulted in the self-governance of market towns, specialised market courts often
headed by town officials, general enforcement of informal contracts, and the
creation of some customary rules on debt collection. Later on, the growing state
agenda of the nation-state led to the seizure of jurisdiction in commercial cases and
to the codification of customary law.20
Based on this assessment, Calliess evaluates the extent to which the new lex
mercatoria in fact redeems the promise of being a uniform, a-national legal
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system. The new lex mercatoria is advocated as a response to the fragmentation
of national legal systems and their inability to provide protection for interna-
tional commercial disputes. As such, its autonomy comprises general principles
of law and customary business practices, international commercial arbitration
and enforcement through social sanctions (e.g. reputation) and codification to
principles, standards and business practices. Based on an empiric analysis of
these functions, Calliess states that to some extent the regime does its own
norm-making, but its enforcement relies on cooperation with states, as arbitral
awards are most often enforced based on the New York Convention. Still,
voluntary compliance plays a role in enforcement and in certain industries
social sanctions may be sufficient.
However, Calliess concludes that the new lex mercatoria is a hybrid model of
both public and private governance, and as such cannot be described as an a-
national, uniform or comprehensive legal system.21 This hybrid nature is also
acknowledged by is proponents: for example, Alec Stone Sweet considers the new
lex mercatoria ‘parasitic on state authority’, resorting to state mechanisms of
enforcement when necessary.22 Thus, it seems that the discussion of the new lex
mercatoria touches upon the same tension between private and public as private
enforcement. As such, the debate helps in contextualising these new applications
of dispute resolution technology within the interface of law and economics.
However, it does not seem to provide a uniform foundation for an examination
of these phenomena that would furnish us with additional tools.
6.2 Consent in dispute resolution
6.2.1 Where can we find consent in dispute resolution?
We have established that the concept of consent has roots in ancient Roman
contract law but otherwise is extensively the product of the nineteenth century.
Next, the issue of consent needs to be reframed in the context of dispute
resolution technology, and as a source of justification. This means that instead
of adopting a position against or for private autonomy, how the concept is
employed to justify dispute resolution in general is evaluated, and how the
concept reacts to the new irritant of technology-driven private enforcement.
The question is the same as with sovereignty: is principle of consent flexible
enough to accommodate the needs for justification presented by private
enforcement?
Whereas finding vocalisations about the self-evident presence of sovereignty in
dispute resolution was difficult, this is not the case with consent. The importance
of consent becomes apparent especially in alternative dispute resolution, which in
itself describes the justificatory narrative’s complementary nature in justifying
dispute resolution. In ADR, stressing consent has more practical meaning than
just the acknowledgment of ideological roots: consent can create the basis for
jurisdiction.23 From ADR, the scope of consent has expanded to other forms of
dispute resolution. The importance of consent is also increasing in litigation.
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In Chapter 5, the coexistence of ADR and litigation was described through the
traditional ideal model, which explained how the fiction of state monopoly on
violence can be sustained while simultaneously allowing private dispute resolu-
tion. This interplay was based on the state’s control over enforcement, where
private outcomes needed to resort to the public enforcement mechanism and the
ensuing due process control. It was claimed that this model disintegrates as
private enforcement bypasses the state control and thus incidentally ends up
challenging it. However, it is possible that this challenge can be downplayed by
stressing the role of consent, by restoring its value to alleviate the shortcomings
that follow from the connection of law and state. Before the era of the nation-state,
contractual dispute resolution was commonplace, although the concept of consent
as we know it was still waiting to be formulated. As Norwegian sociologist
Vilhelm Aubert has noted, in tribal communities consent-based dispute resolution
is sometimes institutionalised by using powerful members of the community as
go-betweens. The outcome is seldom contested, as the contesting party would
then face with both the opposing party and the go-between and their families in
the following process.24 In addition to depicting social pressure for voluntary
compliance as an alternative of enforcement, Aubert’s example of tribal practices
accentuates the community-oriented, informal origins of conflict management,
which run parallel to the criticism of the ADR movement.
The role consent plays in modern dispute resolution can be divided into three
different instances: arbitration, non-adjudicative ADR mechanisms and consensual
emphasis in litigation.
Arbitration is often depicted as the textbook example of private ordering, in
which the meaning of private autonomy becomes particularly pronounced, as the
arbitral agreement itself is de facto the basis of the dispute resolution procedure.
Arbitration is an adjudicative procedure and thus resembles traditional state-
governed litigation. As stated above, arbitral awards rely on the state system in
the enforcement phase, although voluntary compliance is highlighted especially
within the new lex mercatoria doctrine. Alec Sweet Stone considers that the
increase in arbitration adds to the dominance of the a-national regime of
international commerce, a development detaching from the state altogether.25
In international commercial arbitration Kurkela and Turunen have considered
the role of the arbitration clause crucial for the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The
agreement of the parties forms the jurisdiction based on freedom of contract.
However, they make the distinction between this concrete mandate of the
arbitrator (mandate in concreto) and the abstract mandate of the government
that allows the freedom of contract and the delegation of judicial authority
(mandate in abstracto).26 Nader and Shugart see arbitration as an escape from
litigation, which unfortunately may lead back to the official judicial system at the
enforcement phase.27 While discussing the history of arbitration, Born notes that
it is questionable whether medieval arbitration has, in fact, based its jurisdiction
on consent to the same degree as we understand the limits of consent today.
Through contrasting the present understanding of consent’s meaning for
jurisdiction, Born brings forward the premise that consent is an important factor
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for justifying private dispute resolution.28 Julia Hörnle, who examines the
resolution of Internet disputes, considers consent as the necessary foundation of
all ADR processes.29
In short, the doctrine of arbitration seems to place emphasis on the consent of
the parties, both in the form of the actual arbitral clause and as an opt-out from
the official judicial system of the nation-state. There are two reasons for this
rhetoric of dissociating private dispute resolution from the public by references to
consent. First, it promotes the significance of consent in dispute resolution and
connects the legal system with the economic system, justifying private ordering
both on the level of jurisdiction and on a more abstract level of justification.
Second, the distinction is based on doctrinal development that has highlighted
private dispute resolution particularly as an alternative to courts.30 It is against
this background that Lon Fuller sees the rise of mediation as a change of attitude
from litigation to ADR.31
This juxtaposition of litigation and ADR is still present in literature, where
ADR is promoted as the ‘authentic’ will of the parties and litigation represents
hard and unaccommodating black letter law. Emphasising harmony and the
significance of a genuine real agreement repeats the ideal of contract law with
the contract as the meeting of the minds. In ADR literature the quality of the
end result, a genuine understanding between the parties, is portrayed as the ideal
outcome. According to the doctrine, the authenticity of the newly found agree-
ment binds the parties to the resolution’s outcome and prevents future conflicts
from rising, thus making enforcement inconsequential. As the eminent ADR
scholar Frank Sander states, the neutral mediators aim to find an agreement
‘which seeks to alleviate the long-run tensions as well as resolve the immediate
controversy’. The authenticity requirement is met when non-legal elements such
as feelings are brought to the discussion table for ‘therapeutic effect on the long-
term relationship’.32 According to Sander, such a genuine authentic agreement
between the parties can be reached only outside the courtroom where there is no
compulsion to affect the parties’ opinions.33 Interestingly, this argument depicts
the conditions of eligibility placed on the consent. In order to qualify, the
consent needs to be genuine, unforced, freely given. Continuing in the same
train of thought, such consent cannot be formed within litigation, as it would
lose its authenticity.
Contrastingly, Mnookin and Kornhauser claim in their seminal article from
1979 that ADR solutions take place in the shadow of the law, reflecting
the predicted outcomes of taking the case to court.34 Thus, contractual dispute
resolution follows the same outlines as litigation and, in fact, these outlines are
created, reinterpreted and upheld by the public dispute resolution system.
Although this difference of opinion between Sander and Mnookin and Kornhauser
looks like a discrepancy of ADR doctrine, it is not. While Sander speaks about
informality of ADR procedures creating an atmosphere void of compulsion,
Mnookin and Kornhauser point out that agreements in general are rarely reached
without a context, without weighing the pros and cons of ADR in comparison to
litigation. Thus, the two notions approach the subject from different angles.
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However, they do share a common denominator, which is the emphasis on the
parties’ own opinions, attitudes and the need to address these in dispute resolution.
Private autonomy and consent are raised above state control and such resolutions
of conflicts are considered better than litigation results.
The juxtaposition of ADR and litigation is somewhat artificial in the current
context, although historically it is understandable. However, this categorisation
hides the role of consent in litigation. Unlike the majority of ADR literature
seems to imply, litigation increasingly acknowledges the importance of consent-
based settlement. For example, Harris Crowne points out that litigation and
ADR both work under the auspices of self-determination, and ADR does not
grant disputants more leeway than litigation. Instead, both forms of dispute
resolution share the same operational sphere, which is based on self-
determination.35 Also, different forms of dispute resolution are more and more
often converging, states Resnik.36
These bridge-building stances depict the triumph of conciliation, and the
expanding scope of consent, also within the sphere of public litigation. The
desirability of an amicable solution has been adopted into litigation both by
introduction of mediation and by codification of settlement objectives into
legislation.37 This trend towards ‘softer’ and more diverse methods of dispute
resolution appears to be connected to ADR. It is conceivable that the shadow of
the law argument functions reciprocally: contractual solutions reflect legal ones
but also affect the content of future methods of adjudication. Or, the popularity
of ADR methods imposes a pressure for change in litigation. Regardless of causes
and consequences, the settlement trend itself cannot be contested.
To sum up, the role of private autonomy is particularly pronounced in ADR,
but not limited to these forms of dispute resolution. Instead, public dispute
resolution processes increasingly place value on settlements and encourage disput-
ing parties to find an amicable solution. On a different note, institutionalisation has
brought several ADR schemes closer to public dispute resolution. Also, compulsory
forms of mediation are bringing into question the authenticity of forced compli-
ance in consent-based dispute resolution. It is evident that different methods of
private and public dispute resolution are converging. Although the current scope
of consent is to some extent in a state of flux, it is impossible to deny that private
autonomy can be found in dispute resolution, and that its role is acknowledged
and sometimes used to justify different methods of dispute resolution.38
6.2.2 What’s wrong with consent?
The concept of consent appears to be flexible and open for continuous reinter-
pretation. At first glance it appears that the structural coupling between the
systems of law and economics has more leeway than sovereignty to overcome
the justificatory challenge of technology. Justifying dispute resolution through
private autonomy does not make a distinction between dispute resolution offered
by state authorities and that offered by private providers, and thus the principle
brushes off the challenge of understanding private use of coercion, which is so
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insurmountable to the code of politics. Here lies the strength, as well as the
weakness, of private autonomy as a source of justification.
The limits of consent are dictated by the binary codes it operates with. Private
autonomy conforms to the legal/illegal code of the legal system and to the
paying/not-paying code of the economic system. Naturally, the consent narrative
is oblivious to the power/opposition coding of the political system, which means
that power relations remain outside the narrative’s perception. The rhetoric of
consent tends to bypass issues of unequal power dynamics between disputing
parties, as discussed by the American historian John Auerbach, who analyses the
rise of arbitration in low-value consumer cases. Auerbach notes that, historically,
arbitration proved to be detrimental for the consumer, because of unequal
economic power, unilaterally drafted standard contracts with arbitral clauses,
and binding arbitral awards. Consumers might also waive their rights through
uninformed consent to arbitration, with no redress mechanisms available, as the
public courts have rejected such claims outright.39 The issue of unequal power
distribution has received extensive attention in both ADR and ODR literature.
The repeat player effect, i.e. inherent bias in favour of economically stronger
parties who repeatedly use the same mechanism, has been widely discussed and
the debate mostly culminates in demands for the professional competence of
dispute resolution providers. The code of economics becomes visible particularly
in the ADR context, where discussion has focused on portraying ADR methods
as more cost-effective than litigation.
Through private autonomy and the emphasis placed on consent we can describe
the use of dispute resolution technology, also including the stumbling block of
private enforcement. All enforcement mechanisms can be understood contrac-
tually: from the perspective of private autonomy, enforcement is simply an
extension of the contract. From the perspective of the economic system, private
enforcement can easily be portrayed through contract, as it conforms to the code
of the economic system.
Nevertheless, this description is not entirely convincing. As with explaining the
state through social construct theories, describing enforcement through the
consent narrative appears somewhat artificial. As consent derives its justificatory
power from the meeting of the minds, from voluntariness of performance,
coercion and consent are more or less incompatible. The legal system, however,
finds itself wanting: from its perspective, mere description is too open-ended. The
focus on private autonomy loses sight of law as coercion; it hides the inherent
violence visible particularly in enforcement, and although it explains private
regimes, it fails to provide a nuanced account of privatised coercion. This, in
turn, demonstrates the mostly complementary nature of the consent narrative,
which in dispute resolution has often been used alongside the sovereignty
narrative to counterpoint the latter’s shortcomings. In other words, consent
provides a model for examining conflict management outside the courts while
simultaneously presupposing their role as the ultimate gatekeepers of enforce-
ment. Currently, the consent narrative is not comprehensive enough to function
without its close connection with the sovereign nation-state.
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Consent as a source of justification is flexible and resilient enough as long as
there is an available recourse to dispute resolution. As Avinash Dixit describes,
this recourse does not need to be that of the nation-state as long as some model
of governance and enforcement exists. Traditionally this need for a redress
mechanism has been provided for by the nation-state.40 In situations in which
the need for such governance is not provided by the nation-state, alternatives are
required. It should be noted that the formal right to access to a court is not
sufficient, but instead there needs to also be an actual possibility of access, which
is often not the case with low-intensity cases. If we assess the examples of existing
private enforcement mechanisms, we notice that they have evolved to substitute
public redress mechanisms when these are unable to provide sufficient legal
protection. However, if there is no actual alternative to these private mechanisms,
if there is no true choice to be made for or against their use, there can be no
informed consent. If there is no alternative, the consent becomes a fiction and
thus challenges the assumption of voluntariness that forms the basis of the
narrative’s justificatory power. The consent narrative is built on the conception
that the consent is ‘real’, although we can ask whether this assumption is a similar
fiction to that of state monopoly on dispute resolution, used to maintain the
narrative’s theoretical prowess. If the justificatory power of the consent narrative
is not in voluntariness, our attention is directed towards the form of consent, the
rituals and structures used to give the proper utterances of consent.
The shortcomings of private autonomy as a source of justification come down
to the same reasons that are behind the demise of contractual freedom, as
described by Atiyah.41 The scope of application of consent is narrowed by the
demands of protection for the weaker party. This protection derives from the
demands for fairness and is accommodated in contract law by special clauses on
validity and setting the contract aside. In order to provide such protection while
justifying dispute resolution at the same time, we should be able to apply the
internal safeguards of contract law, i.e. the defences against formation and grounds
for setting the contract aside. These safeguards, in turn, presuppose the existence
of a proper forum to challenge the contract, which traditionally has been the public
courts. The limits of consent stem from the context in which the concept originally
emerged; the entwined cooperation between sovereign power and private autonomy
does not seem to provide sufficient solutions for new interpretative situations.42
Attempts at providing such safeguards internally via industry self-regulation over-
come these problems, but face a different set of challenges, such as conflict of
interest, lack of incentives and ostensible best practices.
As the means for contesting the validity of consent require efficient means of
dispute resolution on a micro level, justifying dispute resolution through consent
on the macro level has no similar safety valve. Simply put, uninformed consent in
a single case could sometimes be contested in public courts, according to the
norms of contract law but on an abstract level such internal safeguards cannot be
employed. To put it more concretely, there are no concrete ways of contesting
the validity of consent given to private enforcement (e.g. due to the litigation
threshold), and, as such, the concept of consent can only be applied without the
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element of protection, one-sidedly. The consent narrative is flexible and inclusive
enough, to the point of losing its descriptive force, becoming inapplicable as a
source of justification.
6.3 The future of consent in dispute resolution
As demonstrated above, the difficulty with consent-based models of justification is
that they hide the justificatory crisis at hand. The concept of consent does not
provide us with a mechanism for conceptualising private enforcement: from
the perspective of consent, private enforcement does not constitute a crisis. Both
the traditional coexistence of litigation and ADR, and the new interpretative
challenge of private enforcement can be understood through the concept of consent
as the focal starting point for legitimacy. In other words, the markets are not picky:
there is no distinction between different models of enforcement, because the
economic system does not require the system of state enforcement, it simply needs
a system of enforcement.43 However, this distorts the overall image, downplaying
the importance of the irritant for the evolution of both the legal system and society.
As stated, consent alone does not provide us with sufficient means of tackling private
enforcement and bypassing the state monopoly on violence. Hence, grounding
justification on the principle of private autonomy is not a feasible option.
Consent has not lost its significance in connection to the use of information and
communications technology (ICT), despite all of this. Contractual instruments are
gaining ground and function as the legal foundation for private enforcement. The
validity of these contractual models is difficult to contradict in terms of contract
law, although they have consequences for our comprehension of procedural law.
On a broader scale, it is difficult to imagine that the role of consent would
significantly decrease. It is also probable that contractual instruments will gain
more ground in the online context and that they will be applied to understand the
legal nature of future technological applications.44 Still, this debate detaches from
the question of justifying dispute resolution technology. Sovereignty fails at
justifying private enforcement, because privatised use of force cannot be explained
in the political system, which emphasises the political claim on use of power. Thus,
private enforcement is incomprehensible from the perspective of sovereignty.
From the perspective of consent the situation is different. Through the
structural coupling of consent both the legal system and the economic system
can understand private enforcement but this line of thought meets a different
type of resistance, the external requirement for fairness. Although there are
methods in contract law for providing fairness and protection for the weaker
party on a micro level, these cannot fulfil their function accordingly on a macro
level, in justifying private enforcement.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the structural coupling between the legal system and the
system of economics as the source of justification for private enforcement.
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Whereas sovereignty emphasises the public interest in private disputes, consent
calls attention to the perspective of the parties, to their private interests. It was
asked whether the consent narrative can compensate for the shortcomings of the
sovereignty narrative in justifying private enforcement by providing interpretative
flexibility. The consent narrative has earlier been successfully used to complement
sovereignty-based dispute resolution, as was the case with the ADR movement’s
criticism that resulted in the reconciliation of ADR and litigation through
cooperation demonstrated in the traditional ideal model. However, the consent
narrative does not provide sufficient justification for technology-driven private
enforcement. The problem with the justificatory narrative of consent is
embedded in its over-inclusiveness, which provides too much interpretative
flexibility to the point of ambiguity and not enough means for safeguarding and
monitoring due process. Also, consent becomes fictional when there are no
alternative redress mechanisms, providing only a form without content. This
brings into question how the structures that create the form, the mechanism for
giving this fictional consent, create justificatory structures. It follows from this
that, as the structural coupling between law and economics does not solve the
justificatory crisis, it is necessary to evaluate whether private enforcement could
be justified through the narrative of access to justice.
Notes
1 It should be noted that private autonomy has a connection to the concept of
sovereignty and finding justification may employ such interconnections. For example,
to Bodin the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the binding nature of contracts, was the
most important rule and the sovereign was responsible for safeguarding its use. See,
ibid 29.
2 Andreas Wacke, ‘Freedom of Contract and Restraint of Trade Clauses in Roman and
Modern Law’ (1993) 11 Law and History Review 1.
3 Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘“Lex Mercatoria” ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational
Studies No. 52/2015’ available at ssrn.com/abstract=2597583 (accessed 25 June
2018).
4 See e.g., Arthur P Monahan, Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of
Parliamentary Democracy (McGill-Queen’s University Press 1987) 46–48.
5 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Consent’ http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definitioncon
sent (accessed 25 June 2018).
6 On individualism and its effect on freedom of contract see, PS Atiyah, The Rise and
Fall of Contract (Oxford University Press 1979) 256–.
7 Atiyah considers the authenticity of consent a major difference between social contract
theories of Hobbes and Locke. Locke contests that consent derived by force or out of
fear is not ‘true’, whereas such consent is the basis of Hobbes’ theory. See ibid 49.
8 Henry J Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society,
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (10th edn, John Murray 1908) 287.
9 ibid 290–294.
10 ibid 294–305.
11 Originally, the wording ‘from status to contract’ is Maine’s. Maine used this terminol-
ogy to describe the changes of family law, particularly that in the position of married
women. See ibid 151. Maine’s analysis has received its share of criticism. For example,
Graveson considers it necessary to add limitations to the thesis, as it is an
Consent and private autonomy 155
oversimplification of both social relations of feudalism and of modern law. See RH
Graveson, ‘The Movement from Status to Contract’ (1941) 4 The Modern Law
Review 261. Atiyah agrees with Maine’s analysis but claims that the transition away
from contracts had already started in Maine’s time. See Atiyah (n 6) 261.
12 As stated by JH Baker in his book review, Atiyah’s study continues the debate on birth
and death of classical contract theory that was begun by American scholars Lawrence
M Friedman, G Gilmore and MJ Horwitz. Atiyah’s analysis partakes in this debate
from the English perspective. Baker also criticises Atiyah’s analysis on its historical
merits. See JH Baker, ‘Book Review, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. By PS
Atiyah [Clarendon Press: Oxford. 1979. Xii and 792 Pp. (Incl. Index). £30.00.]’
[1980] The Modern Law Review 4.






19 For an overview on the foundation of the new lex mercatoria, and its codification see
e.g. Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer
Law International 2010).
20 Calliess, ‘Lex Mercatoria’ (n 3) 4–7.
21 ibid 8–15.
22 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ (2006)
13 Journal of European Public Policy 627, 627.
23 In a similar vein, some scholars have consequently claimed that ODR has its own
jurisdiction in parties’ agreement. See e.g. Victoria C Crawford, ‘Proposal to Use
Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Foundation to Build an Independent Global
Cyberlaw Jurisdiction Using Business to Consumer Transactions as a Model, A Note’
(2002) 25 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 383, 383. Building
jurisdiction on consent instead of territorial jurisdiction makes it clear that both
sovereignty and consent are used for same ends.
24 V Aubert, ‘Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolu-
tion’ (1963) 7 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 35.
25 A Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13
Journal of European Public Policy 627.
26 M Kurkela and S Turunen Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration (2nd
edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 43.
27 ‘Even though the arbitration itself is extrajudicial, the law will stand behind and
enforce the award. The first potential difficulty with arbitration appears at this point.
The consumer may need to use the judicial system to enforce the award, and hence all
the problems with that system that the consumer has been hoping to avoid crop up
again.’ Laura Nader and Christopher Shugart, ‘2 Old Solutions for Old Problems’, No
Access to Law. Alternatives to the American Judicial System (1st edn, Academic Press
1980) 79.
28 ‘It is unclear just how “consensual” arbitrations in the context of medieval guilds and
fair really were, since the relevant tribunals appear to have had a degree of mandatory
jurisdiction, as well as enormous commercial sway.’ Gary B Born, International
Commercial Arbitration. Volume I (Wolters Kluwer 2009) 28.
29 J Hörnle, Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution (Cambridge University Press
2009) 49.
30 See above, Chapter 4, section 4.3, The quest for justification.
31 ‘. . . the central quality of mediation, namely, its capacity to reorient the parties toward
each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and
156 Three quests for justification
shared perception of their relationship, perception that will redirect their attitutudes
and dispositions toward one another.’ Lon Fuller, ‘Mediation – Its Forms and
Functions’ (1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 305, 325.
32 See Frank E Sander, ‘Varities of Dispute Processings’ in Leo A Levin and Russell
Wheeler (eds), The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future. Proceedings
of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (West Publishing 1979) 74–75.
33 ‘Of course, it might be suggested that a court could also induce such a settlement. But
quite aside from the unlikelihood of a busy court being able to create a climate that
encourages the disputants to ventilate their underlying grievances, there is a world of
difference between coerced or semi-coerced settlement of the kind that so often results
in court and a voluntary agreement arrived at by the parties.’ See ibid 75.
34 RH Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce Dispute Resolution’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950.
35 ‘ADR functions within the sphere of disputant self-determination that already exists in
the court system. It gives litigants no measure of control that they do not have under
adjudication. Therefore, ADR programs do not undermine the justice system’s current
commitment to serving public interests.’ See Caroline Harris Crowne, ‘The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice’ (2001) 76
New York University Law Review 1768, 1784.
36 J Resnik, ‘Many Doors – Closing Doors – Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication’ (1995) 10 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 211, 211. Similar
opinions have been voiced also elsewhere. In Finnish jurisprudence Risto Koulu has
spoken of this phenomenon together with the traditional distinction between litigation
and ADR paradigms. According to Koulu, the great paradox of dispute resolution is
the unanimous starting point that litigation has to change radically. This paradox then
divides into two different fronts, where ADR protagonists want to see litigation
adopting ADR strategies, and litigation protagonists consider that development of
litigation is enough. This, in its turn, has resulted in litigation procedures moving
closer to ADR methods and ADR procedures starting to more closely resemble court
proceedings. See Risto Koulu, Kaupallisten riitojen sovittelu (University of Helsinki
Conflict Management Institute 2006) 436.
37 In the Finnish context, ADR methods, e.g. mediation, have mainly been introduced
through the public courts. See Kaijus Ervasti, Sovittelu tuomioistuimessa (WSOY 2005).
The possibility of an amicable solution is also highlighted in the Finnish Code of Civil
Procedure. The judges in civil cases are required to exhaust all possible means of finding
a settlement before proceeding into adjudicative process (e.g. chapter 5, section 26). On
the settlement trend in family law, see, Frederik Swennen (ed), Contractualisation of
Family Law – Global Perspectives (Springer International Publishing 2015).
38 It should be noted that consent serves a slightly different function in different ADR
methods. For example, it is possible to distinguish jurisdiction-creating consent to
solve a dispute through ADR from the consent that is needed for ending the conflict
through mediation. Both of these are not necessarily required at the same time. In
arbitration, jurisdiction-creating consent takes the form of the arbitral clause and no
additional consent is required or even possible for rendering the arbitral award.
39 John Auerbach, Justice without Law? Resolving Disputes without Lawyers (Oxford
University Press 1983) 126–127. Of course, compulsory material norms limit the
scope of consent, as compulsory rules cannot be set aside by agreement. However, the
de facto protection that these norms provide depends also on the availability of
effective dispute resolution.
40 AK Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton
University Press 2004) 1–4.
41 See below, Chapter 7, section 7.1.3.
Consent and private autonomy 157
42 McMurtry formulates the same notion in the context of e-commerce: ‘The law of
contract was originally developed in an age of face-to-face negotiations and paper
contracts, when a time lag between agreement and its fulfilment were expected. The
law that developed in a simpler time cannot necessarily accommodate the new reality.
Although common-law will continue to evolve, the existing law may simply have
become irrelevant in the face of new realities. In these circumstances, we should not
torture or twist existing jurisprudence to make it applicable to situations for which it is
not equipped.’ R Roy McMurtry, ‘Information Technologies and Globalization’ in
Lisa Austin, Arthur J Cockfield and Patric A Molinaryi (eds), Technology, Privacy and
Justice/ Technologies, vie privée et justice 2005 (Canadian Institute for the Administration
of Justice/ Institut canadien d’administration de la justice 2006) 23.
43 Avinash Dixit examines alternative ways of legal governance. According to his analysis,
economists have considered law as a prerequisite for successful markets. Most often
this need for governance has been directed at the nation-state. However, only some
evolved nation-states have been able to fulfil this idealized image, which leads Dixit to
evaluate alternative models of governance. See, Dixit (n 40) 2–3.
44 Teresa Rodríguez De Las Heras Ballell, a Spanish professor of commercial law, discusses
the changes of contractual law similarly: ‘Most radical perception of the Web describes as
an anarchic world, where the law, born to manage and settle disputes in a national-border
scene, is unable to moor territory-based connecting factors in the new digital borderless
space. Business strategic response to such gap has been two-fold. On the one hand, relying
on contract as a powerful device to manage risks and align interests beyond the law that is
undergoing serious and complex difficulties to face challenges issued by the new space.
That has boosted an increasing phenomenon of “contractualization” of activity on the
Web. On the other hand, entrusting technological architecture with regulatory tasks
further than a mere supporting role. Far from operating as a simple technical infrastruc-
ture, technological architecture disciplines user conduct, imposes obligations, limits and
determines the exercise of rights.’ Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, ‘Terms of Use,
Browse-Wrap Agreements and Technological Architecture: Spotting Possible Sources of
Unconscionability in the Digital Era’ (2009) 2009 Contratto e Impresa/Europa 841,
860. See also Immaculada Barral-Viñals, ‘Electronic Mass Procurement by Means of
“Web Technology”: Basic Options in Its Regulation’ (2014) 20 ILSA Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law 373.
158 Three quests for justification
7 Access to justice
In the previous chapters, structural couplings between the legal system and the
systems of politics and economics were evaluated as possible sources of justification
for private enforcement. Inability of sovereignty narrative to explain privatisation
and the shift of focus to the structures that follow from the fictional consent call
attention to the rituals of dispute resolution, to the idea that how the process is
organised caters to its acceptance, produces justification.
The justificatory force of structures, the link between law and ethics, points to
ethical discourse on dispute resolution and the growing importance of funda-
mental right to fair trial since the end of World War II. Here, this justificatory
narrative is called access to justice. Although aspects of access to justice have been
positivised into due process criteria, access to justice as a justificatory narrative
refers to the moral dimension of such procedural rights. Because of this elusive
character of access to justice, conceptualising the justificatory narrative connects
with the transcendent element of law, namely justice itself. As with private
autonomy, the narrative is discussed only in relation to the shortcomings of the
other narratives to evaluate how it is used to compensate their limitations.
7.1 Finding access to justice
7.1.1 From constitutive couplings to fundamental rights
The access to justice narrative is different from the more constitutive sovereignty
and consent narratives that are produced through structural couplings between
the legal system and systems of politics and economics. Unlike these narratives,
access to justice is not produced through a coupling to another system, as since
the differentiation of ethics and religion, ethical discourse does not belong to any
given system. Instead, ethical discourse can be located in all subsystems in secular
Western societies. There is no constitutive principle that provides authority for
the narrative, but its foundation lies in the intrinsic value of fairness that has been
gaining momentum as a part of the human rights discourse. It is argued here that
these special characteristics explain the limits of access to justice as a source of
justification. Ethical communication about dispute resolution does not provide
generalised standards that could be applied as such to provide justification for
private enforcement mechanisms. The access to justice narrative requires a case-
by-case analysis or the support of other justificatory narratives if it is to provide an
explanation for private enforcement.
Unlike sovereignty or private autonomy, access to justice – in the meaning of the
human rights discourse it reflects – is mainly a product of the twentieth century,
although the roots of inalienable universal rights can be traced back to the Age of
Enlightenment. However, the human rights rhetoric has gained unparalleled
recognition and significance in the aftermath of World War II, when the need for
human rights was acknowledged within the global community and this consensus
translated into the first expressions of universal human rights. This increasing
significance of human rights has been made possible by sovereignty-based interna-
tional Conventions and the positivisation of ethical discourse into national legisla-
tion, which in relation to dispute resolution demonstrates the importance of the
connection between law and state in providing criteria for fairness.
The first of these expressions, the primus motor for legally binding treaties in
the future, is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1948. The General Assembly later adopted two significant,
binding Conventions on human rights: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights were both adopted in 1966 and came into force in 1976. The
ICCPR is monitored by the Human Rights Committee, which also examines
individual petitions in infringement situations and provides an authoritative,
although non-binding, interpretation of the treaty.1 The most important treaty in
the European context is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and in
force since 1953. The treaty established the European Court of Human Rights,
which examines petitions from both state and individual parties and in infringe-
ment situations may order the state to pay damages to the injured party. The
ECHR is a living document, meaning that its interpretation is further dynamically
developed in the court’s case law and is thus susceptible to societal change.
This turn to human rights has taken place pronouncedly in political sciences
and within law. Within the legal system human rights have run through most
fields of law and the perspective has become focal for legal research, to the point
of giving rise to criticism of ‘human rights fundamentalism’.2 Within procedural
law, the human rights perspective has adopted the role of a sui generis legal
principle: access to justice. However, the concept of access to justice is not
unambiguous and is open to interpretation.
It is noteworthy that the human rights rhetoric is usually applied in connection
with the constitutive sovereignty and consent narratives, where references to
fairness are used to explain the supremacy of given dispute resolution models.
For example, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement has particularly
emphasised the access to justice perspective; informal mediation is better for
providing such access to justice, the ideology suggests. On the other side, state
litigation can be defended based on the same argument – that it provides better
safeguards for respecting due process and thus it, in fact, is better. The fact that
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the argument of access to justice can be employed by proponents of both
litigation and ADR tells us something about the concept. Firstly, as a recently
emerged discourse its role, application and consequences of human rights within
the legal system are still taking shape and arguments on access to justice are used to
advance various ends. Secondly, human rights are seen as universal and thus their
scope of application is not limited to certain geographical areas, certain fields,
contexts, procedures, practices or institutions.
Thirdly and most importantly, this ambiguity demonstrates that it is impossible
to establish criteria for what is better without a reference to the objective used to
evaluate this superiority. Simply put, the claim about something being better calls
for answering the follow-up question of ‘in what respect?’. This means that the
language can also be used to mislead, to offer arguments for a multitude of
contradictory ends. It is, therefore, important to closely inspect human rights
argumentation within the present context of dispute resolution, as such arguments
can be just arguments for ‘better’ instead of claims for concrete human rights
requirements. Also, it demonstrates that justificatory concepts are not distinct from
each other but instead justificatory narratives are often applied simultaneously.
The rhetoric of human rights departs from the moral dimension of law. Thus,
human rights are considered to transcend the limits of national legal systems,
enabling their universal application. It follows from this moral aspect that the
fundamental rights and access to justice reflect a different discourse than is customary
for the legal system. As ethical stipulations, these requirements of access to justice
open up to the fundamental questions of what is law, what is justice, and whether
these two are interchangeable. Access to justice brings us back to the law’s inherent
paradox, the never-ending search for the elusive and unattainable ideal of justice.
7.1.2 The concept of access to justice
The concept of access to justice seems to be somewhat imprecise and unfocused,
making the demands of fairness difficult to decipher within the legal system. This
ambiguity results from the multitude of meanings attributed to the concept; the
interpretative ambiguity also reveals something crucial about the role of ethics,
about law’s quest for justice.
For Luhmann, justice is law’s programme of programmes, its contingency
formula that operates like the conception of god in the religious system, or the
principle of scarcity in the economic system. A system’s contingency formula is its
eigenvalue, the reference point that decides which communication is meaningful
in the system, against which all communication is reflected and possible selections
limited. Justice is the centrepiece around which all communication is organised,
the ‘foundation on which the legal system build up its complexity’.3 This means
that Luhmann provides no values or criteria for deciding what is justice, no
maxims or ethical codes, as all legal communication is about justice. Justice is an
internal process of the legal system, the system’s self-observation that aims to
provide ‘adequate complexity of consistent decision-making’.4 This ‘adequate
complexity’ goes beyond the formal consistency of the legal system and responds
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reflexively to external demands from its environment.5 However, justice is closed
within the legal system by operative closure, rendering justice as law’s necessary
but impossible self-transcendence. Justice as law’s contingency formula provides
the necessary uncertainty for law’s operations, provides fuel for the application of
the code, which makes distinctions between legal/illegal while leaving their
attribution open.6 Simply put, justice is the unreachable objective of legal
communication that ensures the continual of law’s operations by regulating
uncertainty within the legal system.
How does this law’s contingency formula relate to the principle of access to
justice? The unattainability of justice demonstrates the contradictory nature
inherent in calls for improved access to justice. As justice in unreachable, we
need to focus on what can be perceived: the temporalised ethical communication
that has formed structures within the legal system, the due process criteria. This
being said, it is important to keep in mind the overarching ideal of access to
justice beyond treaty stipulations and the comprehensiveness and scope of it that
affects courts and private dispute resolution alike. On the concrete level of due
process, demands for access to justice entail individuals’ procedural rights starting
from the equality of arms, i.e. that both parties in a dispute should have the same
informational and procedural resources at their disposal, to legal aid schemes and
the impartiality of the tribunal. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
has a central role in substantiating the exact content of these criteria.
As the demand for access to justice is often too abstract and complex to analyse
on a generalised level, due process criteria form the essential core of the whole
rhetoric. This means that treaty stipulations, the argumentative structure incorpo-
rated in them and the dynamic interpretation in case law become decisive for
evaluating the content of access to justice. It should be noted that access to justice
is a broader concept than due process, as the latter refers to how a proceeding
should be organised. Access to justice, however, enables us to ask more far-
reaching questions on how access to proceedings is provided for, what about the
cases left outside the litigation threshold, and what the bigger picture is. In other
words, access to justice cannot be reduced to positivised due process criteria but
instead its value is in its ability to express the ethical dimension of law in relation to
law’s contingency formula of justice. Access to justice opens law towards ethics.
However, ethics do not interact with the legal system as do the systems of
politics and economics: references to access to justice are often ambiguous and
may be employed in pursuit of contrasting ends. Part of this ambiguity can be
explained by the role of justice as law’s contingency formula, another part by the
unusual nature of ethics. Unlike sovereignty or private autonomy, access to
justice does not provide us with an external reference point outside law, which
raises the question of the narrative’s potential in providing justification for private
enforcement without the support from the other narratives. Like the other
narratives, the access to justice narrative needs to conform to two sets of
coding, the legal/illegal of law and the code of ethics, which Luhmann pinpoints
as allocation of regard/disregard.7 According to Luhmann, the code of morality
does not refer to good or bad performances of individuals (e.g. as scientists or
162 Three quests for justification
soccer players) but to the whole person and her participation in the specific
communication.8 Luhmann’s approach to morality has been described as sceptical,
stating that ‘the observation of this specific “problem” of the “catchword” morality
leads Luhmann to a critical examination of morality as a somewhat pathological
phenomenon of communication and to establishing a new kind of ethics able to
respond to what may be called the specific conditions of morality in the current
society’.9 Luhmann’s approach to morality starts off from the functional differen-
tiation of modern society, when morality transformed from the habits of a stratified
society towards functionally distinct subsystems, and could no longer be based on
social customs or religion. Thus, the need for universal morality and ethics needs to
be rethought in modern society instead of referring the question to these earlier
authorities of morality. However, the search for ethics in modern, functionally
differentiated society has proved fruitless, according to Luhmann, as ethics cannot
provide reasons for morality. No universal justification for moral judgments can be
reached, and ethics is left the role of theoretical reflection on the existence of
morality.10 This means that ethics becomes a question of the diversity of moral
choices, a paradox of the moral communication, where no final answer can be found.
This universal application of morals includes the danger of polarisation, com-
municational fundamentalism.11 Thus moral communication is closely linked
with conflict and power, and the escalation of argumentation from which de-
escalation is difficult if not impossible. This results from the specific form of
moral communication, i.e. moral communication is always symmetric, meaning
that the person who communicates morally commits herself. Hence, moral
communication includes both sides of the code; the person who communicates
identifies with the positive side of the code, with the ‘good’ or ‘regard’ or
‘esteem’, and simultaneously attributes a polarising position to the other side.
This leads Luhmann to consider moral communication as risky, very much like
the bacteria living in human bodies that cause sickness but at the same time have
certain beneficial functions. It follows from this that ethics as a reflective theory
about moral communication is able to reveal why moral positions become over-
heated, but it does not provide solutions for moral dilemmas.12
Thus, the demand for better access to justice, or the emphasis on human rights
in general, is a mode of ethical reflection about law. By making claims on the
importance of access to justice we maintain that it is morally right to apply the
‘legal’ side of law’s code instead of the ‘illegal’ in specific situations that concern
the symmetric acknowledgement of a person, i.e. her inclusion in the society.
Human rights discourse is moral (and thus risky) communication about law.
7.1.3 Deconstructing the origins of access to lustice
The question about the nature of morality brings us back to the functional
differentiation of society. Moral communication has previously been attributed
to a specific subsystem of society, namely religion. Structural couplings between
law and religion have existed, as the power struggles between the secular and
divine authorities in medieval Europe demonstrate. The two systems have had
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shared language, canon law being an example of this. At this point, the system of
religion might have provided law with an external reference that could have
adopted the role of justification, as was the case with canon law. However,
functional differentiation led to the decreasing importance of religion and to the
detachment of moral communication from this subsystem. The doctrine of natural
law was later utilised to provide similar constitutive argument, and the external
reference, for the purposes of justification.13 This would mean that the source of
morality could be found embedded in reason, in the human mind itself, or in the
emerging system of ethics that transcends connection to religion. So, moral
communication about law has come to mean something other than moral com-
munication about law based on religion. This also means that both subsystems of
law and religion have evolved beyond the historic point of shared language and
thus religion can no longer provide a similar source of justification (through
external reference to another system) as once was possible.
However, in access to justice we see a concept that is employed to take the
place of the justification of dispute resolution. How is this possible, if moral
communication has no home other than in the environment of subsystems? The
answer is simple. There is no longer a structural coupling between law and
another subsystem, but the legal system still presupposes the existence of a
structural coupling that once was there. Law operates as if the structural coupling
still provides information from outside the legal system’s boundaries, when in fact
the reference attained by the coupling is only a reflection of law’s own operations:
there is no information transfer between two systems. Still, law operates as if the
information transfer takes place, as if the operations shared by itself and the ghost
system conform to two types of coding, that of morality and that of law. This
interpretation also explains why moral communication about law lacks a consti-
tutive principle like sovereignty or private autonomy. Simply put, there is none
except the reflection of the legal system itself. Although ethics does not relate to
any specific subsystem but is located in the environment of these systems, access
to justice functions in a similar way to sovereignty and consent narratives. Moral
communication about law attributes the code of morality to the application of
the legal system’s code. Thus, moral communication about law in the context of
dispute resolution technology functions in more or less the same way as the more
constitutive narratives. This said, access to justice materialises as an unsolvable
paradox of ethics, as a one-sided structural coupling that provides no clear-cut
answers to moral dilemmas.
Despite this transcendence of ethics, the access to justice narrative gains
justificatory force through its positivisation into due process criteria. Commu-
nication about fairness of dispute resolution carries an ethical undertone while its
legal plausibility stems from the constitutive power it lends from the connection
between law and the state. Thus, access to justice narrative is able to complement
the sovereignty narrative, and vice versa, by providing material standards for
evaluating how dispute resolution should be organised. By continuous reinter-
pretation, the access to justice narrative has become a programme within the legal
system that directs the application of the code. Its use as a justificatory narrative
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argues that the material standards can provide justificatory power directed to the
structures of dispute resolution. In other words, the ethical communication
about dispute resolution takes the form of due process criteria that reflect the
transcendence of justice, the values behind the concrete stipulations, but simulta-
neously constrain this transcendence by subsuming it into concrete stipulations.
By examining the values reflected in due process criteria, we are able to perceive
the ethical dimension and tap into its justificatory use.14
It should be noted that these treaty stipulations, in addition to the national
legislation on fundamental rights, the case law and the doctrine that substantiate
them, are the most authoritative legal sources for concrete due process criteria.
However, they are not the sources of morality but simply applications of moral
communication to dispute resolution that have been positivised through state-
bound law. In other words, they are operations of the legal system, which include
the application of the code of morality alongside the code of legal/illegal. This
symmetry of moral communication is what distances these stipulations from other
operations and structures of the legal system. Still, continuous application of
these morally encoded legal operations in case law seems to lose some of the
moral emphasis, as they become rule-like routine application in simple cases.
These rule-like criteria of what makes dispute resolution fair, i.e. due process,
become the access point to observing the moral communication on dispute
resolution in the first place.
The criteria for due process is defined in the focal instruments, which reveal in
what concrete instances moral communication about dispute resolution is under-
taken. First, the European Convention of Human Rights Article 6(1) on fair trial
stipulates concrete rules for both civil and criminal procedure.15 Article 6(1)
states that:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
Second, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 14(1)
stipulates similarly:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determina-
tion of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a
suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press
and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of
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morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic
society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires,
or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but
any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made
public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
When we compare these two formulations of due process criteria we discover
several common denominators. Both of the most influential Conventions define
due process as fair or equal public hearing in an independent and impartial
tribunal, which is established by law, although this publicity may be reduced
under certain acceptable conditions. It seems that the decisive core of due process
is equality; the wording functions as a description of elements that are relevant
for providing for equality. Equality is mentioned both as itself and as linked with
the other stipulations, the constitution of the court, which has to be independent
and impartial – to ascertain equality and fairness – and established by legislative
order from the political system. Thus, one instance of moral communication
about dispute resolution is question of the constitution of the court, which the
provisions solve through reference to the democratic system that establishes
courts by law. This criterion reduces equality back to the democratic principle,
which then links with the political system and sovereignty. Such reduction would
make it futile to discuss due process in global regimes without reference to the
state, or would otherwise deem due process solely as belonging to state control,
thus nullifying the question of how we impose due process on ODR without
referencing to sovereignty-based transnational law. It seems that equality forms
the core of the justificatory force of access to justice narrative. Within the legal
system equality is often rephrased as the demand for treating similar cases alike
and different cases differently, although this formulation hides the inherent
arbitrary violence present in decisions on which cases are alike and which are not.
7.2 Access to justice in dispute resolution
7.2.1 Where can we find access to justice in dispute resolution?
Moral communication about dispute resolution takes its form in the rule-like
criteria for due process and in the general principle of equality. This due process
criteria and the underlying principle may be employed to take the place of
justification. Using due process criteria as a source of justification means that a
decision loses its formal validity if the procedure in which it was reached had
incorporated some procedural shortcomings.
It should be noted that ECtHR’s case law on Article 6 is an extensive body of
moral communication about dispute resolution. As such, these interpretations
of the Convention Articles are applications of both codes of law and that of
morality. They are individual operations that become guidelines for future cases.
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In other words, decisions that there has been a violation of Article 6 (or that
there has not been one) form structures within the legal system. This means that
they become dominant positions of moral communication. These safeguards of
due process are formed by a network of specific communications stipulating that
certain applications of legal/illegal intersect with regard/disregard, i.e. precedent
cases. In order to avoid further escalation in applying the legal system’s code,
these structures of earlier communications need to be accommodated in future
cases. It follows from this that the concrete due process criteria (e.g. principle of
audiatur altera pars, or let the other side also be heard) become an internal
programme of the legal system.16 These programmes are significant elements for
networking future operations within the legal system but they have no external
reference point outside it. Thus, the authority of case law on access to justice
draws its strength from the morality of these communications, which is then
historicised internally within the legal system.
It follows from this that we are only able to analyse these individual moral
communications on dispute resolution and the programmes they form within the
legal system. Hence it is possible to evaluate how they guide the application of
legal/illegal. However, it is not possible to contest, whether the ‘right’ conclusions
were drawn in these formative cases on Article 6, as such a position would only be
another instance of moral communication. There is no external reference in moral
communication, which would justify the authority of ECtHR’s moral communica-
tion, outside the constitution of the court in specific and the delegation of
sovereign power from the Contracting States to the Convention instrument itself
or to Council of Europe in general. We may only reach the individual commu-
nications of decisions and deduce from those what has been communicated about
dispute resolution with the simple authority of moral communication.
One example of moral communication on due process is the ECtHR’s case law
on equality of arms and on adversarial nature of the proceedings, which empha-
sises the parties’ equal means of making their case in adversarial proceedings.
According to the Court, adversarial proceedings form the cornerstone of the
right to fair trial.17 The content of adversarial proceedings comes down to the
right to have knowledge of all evidence presented in the case and the possibility
to comment on said evidence.18 The case law highlights that the parties alone
have the right to decide whether or not to comment on specific documents.19
In the case K.S. v Finland the ECtHR established that there had been a
violation of Article 6, because no possibility to comment on documents obtained
by the court was granted to the plaintiff in an unemployment benefit case. In the
case the applicant had been dismissed from his post as a tax inspector with six
months’ notice in 1991, because he had been found to continuously neglect his
duties. After his dismissal the applicant had applied for unemployment benefit
from the Unemployment Fund for Lawyers and Legal Associates, which the
Fund refused on the ground that the applicant had caused the dismissal
himself. The decision was based on the binding opinion of the Employment
Commission, which the Fund was by law obliged to follow. The plaintiff then
appealed first to the Board of Unemployment Benefits, which dismissed the
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appeal, and later to the Insurance Court. During the proceedings the Insur-
ance Court requested an opinion from the Fund, which was delivered but not
communicated to the applicant. Also, the Insurance Court obtained docu-
ments from the Supreme Administrative Court, which had solved the case of
the applicant’s dismissal. The Insurance Court upheld the Board’s decision in
its judgment in 1995.
In his application to the ECtHR, the applicant claimed that there had been a
violation of his right to a fair hearing, as the documents obtained ex officio by the
Insurance Court had not been communicated to him. According to the Finnish
Government, the non-communication did not constitute violation of Article 6,
because the obtained documents had primarily referred to the appeal and
subsequent observations and to the facts of the case but had not contained any
new evidence or revealed new facts that would have affected the Court’s conclu-
sion. The non-communication was undisputed. The ECtHR stated that the
obtained opinion had constituted reasoned opinions on the merits of the appli-
cant’s appeals and the objective of these opinions was to influence the decision of
the Insurance Court. Hence, the ECtHR concluded that it should have been for
the applicant to decide whether or not to comment on these opinions. As no such
possibility had been reserved to him by the Insurance Court, the applicant was not
able to participate properly in the proceedings.20 Thus, there had been a violation
of Article 6 and the respondent state was obliged to pay damages to the applicant.
In the aftermath of the ECtHR’s decision, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe invited Finland to inform it on the measures taken in
consequence with the decision. In its communication, the Government of Finland
informed the Committee that the damages had been paid to the applicant in
accordance with the decision. In addition to this, the Government accentuated
the possibility of seeking the annulment of the domestic decisions on the grounds
of violation of Article 6.21 Although decisions of ECtHR do not cause annulment
of the domestic decisions as such, the Government’s communication shows that
they are closely followed. The ECtHR’s decision on the violation of Article 6
provides grounds for annulment within the domestic legal system. Thus, the
violation of due process can cause the decision to be set aside, and to lose its
validity because the process during which it was reached did not accommodate the
moral position adopted in the due process programme of the legal system.
Article 6 ECHR on the right to fair trial has several different elements. The
Article addresses equality of arms, the independent constitution of the court, and
publicity of the proceedings. In addition to these, the Article addresses access to
the court as well as access to enforcement. Access to enforcement is not
specifically provided for in the Convention but has been established in the case
law. The case law concerning access to enforcement depicts another different
aspect of the right to fair trial than equality of arms and adversarial proceedings,
although it does not provide any additional insight into justification beyond the
analysis of due process as law’s internal programme. Still, access to enforcement
as a part of due process benefits the objective of this study in another way,
namely for understanding private enforcement. The case law on access to
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enforcement is moral communication about the core of the legal system, as it
draws the boundaries of legally recognised use of coercion. Thus, we may observe
these boundaries as the self-understanding of procedural law concerning coercion,
while bearing in mind the unresolvability of moral positions.
In Horsby v Greece, the ECtHR established that the right to execution of
judgment is included within the right to a fair trial. The argument behind this
position accentuates that access to court would be ineffective without the execu-
tion of the final and binding judgment.22 Furthermore, the scope of access to
justice has been elaborated in Burdov v Russia, where the ECtHR established
that some delay in enforcement is acceptable as long as it does not impair the
litigant’s right.23 It has also been established that the enforcement provided
should be exhaustive and full, and no partial enforcement suffices to accommo-
date the demands set by the case law.24 However, certain procedural steps may
be expected of the litigant to access enforcement.25 Still, the states must provide
the necessary means for enforcing compliance from private individuals but cannot
be held responsible for the non-compliance of these third parties.26
Thus, law’s internal programme of due process criteria, which is grounded in the
moral discourse of human rights, dissects all aspects and phases of the dispute
resolution process. These criteria addressed both the threshold of litigation costs,27
actual conduct of proceedings as discussed above, and even the enforcement phase
after the final decision has been rendered. Unlike sovereignty or private autonomy,
elements of these moral communications about dispute resolution can be located
overall.28 Sovereignty, in turn, is to be found in territorial jurisdiction and structure
of cross-border legal instruments. Private autonomy is located in consent of the
parties as an alternative jurisdiction and in respect of the parties’ freedom of
contract. These effects take place on an abstract level, whereas due process criteria
depicted here functions on a more concrete level. Self-evidently, corresponding
examples of private autonomy can be located on the same concrete level in sections
of procedural legislation providing for parties’ freedom of contract within the court
proceedings or in acceptance of arbitral clauses. Concrete workings of sovereignty
can be found in treaty stipulations on margins of appreciation and in ordre public
clauses, which aim at procuring the unity of national legal systems.
This leads us to the following. Human rights in general and access to justice in the
particular context of dispute resolution are moral communications about law that
form lasting structures within the legal system. The non-compliance with these
structures, namely with the due process criteria, may lead to disappointment of
expectations and to setting aside the judgment rendered at the end of a dispute
resolution procedure. Thus, we find the elusive justificatory narrative of access to
justice in the structuralised moral communication embedded in the due process
criteria.
7.2.2 What’s wrong with access to justice?
The due process criteria represent the positivisation of moral communication
about dispute resolution. This is to say that due process is a reflection of the
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structural coupling the legal system presumes it has with a system of ethics. As a
justificatory narrative access to justice derives its force from fairness as a prerequi-
site for a decision’s validity. Its shortcomings follow from this high level of
abstraction, as the law’s difficult relationship with justice starts to unravel one of
law’s paradoxes. As a contingency formula, justice provides contingency for the
legal system, and hides the indeterminacy of the possibility of arbitrary decisions
while simultaneously upholding it to enable law’s renewal.29
However, the point remains that law is unable to hide from the paradoxical
nature of adopting justice as its necessary formula of formulas, as the super-
programme, which surpasses all other programmes within the legal system. The
paradox remains. And the question of justice reveals it. This is the inherent
tension always present in law. Re-entry of transcendence is mandatory for law
but at the same time its rationality goes beyond law. As Teubner describes it:
The cause for the internal revolt, for the subversion from within the law in
the very name of justice, lies in the glaring failure of law to live up to its
own promise – to supply convincing reasons for its decisions, to produce a
legitimate basis of rational argumentation that people accept as just. Legal
reasoning does not and cannot justify legal decisions – anyone who has had
to decide a legal case has been exposed to this disturbing experience. In
other words: law cannot stop in principle the intrusion of irrationality into
its rational world of norm-oriented decision making and reason-based
argument.30
According to Teubner, law’s desire for justice cannot be fulfilled within the
framework of modern law. As such, ‘juridical justice as societal justice continues
to offer the false promise of salvation’.31 As moral communication tends to
polarise moral positions owing to its symmetry, it does not provide a solution to
the question of the source of morality or to specific moral dilemmas. This means
that we can access only the individual operations of moral communication on law
but we have no external constitutive reference to another subsystem. This is the
dilemma of moral dilemmas: we cannot solve them but only observe them.
However, this does not mean that moral communication about law is without
effect. Instead, moral communication may form long-lasting structures such as
programmes within the legal system, which is the case with due process.
The case law on Article 6 is a prominent example moral communication about
dispute resolution. It gives us a well-defined rule-like system of instances, in
which moral communication about dispute resolution needs to be taken into
consideration. In line with Luhmann’s view on moral communication, the due
process criteria that arise from the case law serve a purpose within the legal
system and are necessary for its identity. Still, these individual decisions on due
process do not solve the deadlock at the abstract macro level of justification, it
simply transmits the issue of justification to the micro level, where the fairness of
individual dispute resolution procedure justifies the authority bestowed to it.
Access to justice works well on the micro level of individual processes but on the
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macro level of abstract justification its justificatory power falls short of that
provided by sovereignty or private autonomy.
Access to justice as a source of justification brings us to the core of law’s own
paradox of its inherent violence, and in moral communication it cannot be
hidden. This is problematic, as the legal system needs to understand its entirety,
its identity as a system and continuation of the system/environment difference as
coherent. It leads us to the following conclusion. Moral communication about
law does not provide an answer to the justificatory crisis brought on by dispute
resolution technology. It provides us with an internal programme of the legal
system, i.e. the due process criteria that can be employed as a source of justifica-
tion and is starting to claim ground as such.32 However, the criteria have no
constitutive foundation other than the morality of communication. It is internal
to law and brings the issue of justification back within the law. But, here we face
the limits of law, as the legal system strives for justice that remains unreachable.
Although institutional formulations provide concrete criteria, these derive their
authority from other sources, from the state or from private autonomy, and
without their support the access to justice narrative loses most of its justificatory
force, its meaning within the legal system. The justificatory narrative of access to
justice acknowledges the need for a more comprehensive in casu analysis and an
analysis of the reality of the current conflict management environment, where the
protection of due process is provided by a miscellaneous and fragmented combi-
nation of material legislation, soft law, institutional practices and multilateral
Conventions. However, the shortcomings of the access to justice narrative
follow from its unique nature: there is no ‘other’ side of the structural coupling,
but only ethical communication about law. Still, when the legal system uses
access to justice for justification, it presumes that another subsystem exists on the
other side of the structural coupling, which explains why access to justice can
adopt the role of justification in the first place.
The fact that ethical communication is located in the overall society also explains
why there is no constitutive rationality, such as those of the state or private
autonomy, behind access to justice. This special characteristic also explains why
the possibilities of access to justice in justifying private enforcement without
reference to other justificatory narratives is difficult. In theory, access to justice
could provide justification for private enforcement if there is a method for verifying
that what is provided is of sufficient quality. The problem is that there are few
concrete applications that can be derived from this outcome. Similar questions arise
as with relation to consent: who decides the sufficient level of access, by which
authority should such a decision be made, how is monitoring provided, and so on.
It seems that access to justice as a justificatory narrative would require a body that
produces precedents for the protection of predictability and the stability of the
system – in other words, a mechanism for upholding expectations regardless of
disappointment. As a source of justification, access to justice provides few answers
but instead leads to a deadlock of contrasting argumentation.
This means that the possibilities of access to justice in justifying private
enforcement without the support from other justificatory narratives are limited.
Access to justice 171
Ethical communication about dispute resolution reveals law’s embedded vio-
lence, the use of coercion, but is unable to hide it from sight or, in Luhmann’s
terms, deparadoxify it, as it provides no criteria for solving polarised arguments.
It follows from this that the justificatory narrative of access to justice alone is
unable to reconcile on the needed generalised level the justificatory crisis that has
emerged as a result of technology-driven private enforcement. Thus, the due
process criteria as a source of justification lead us to the paradox of law, where
violence and the pursuit of justice collide. However, the quest for justification
does not end here, as moral communication does not state that justification
would be irrelevant to the legal system. Instead, moral communication has a
place within society and the legal system. The legal system cannot complete its
need for justification. but neither can it repudiate it. In other words, we have
reached the end of the line, a non liquet.
7.3 The future of access to justice in dispute resolution
Although moral communication does not provide solutions to moral dilemmas, it
is by no means irrelevant to the legal system or to the overall society. As the
example of access to enforcement shows, due process criteria provide the legal
system with a long-lasting programme. This programme is based on moral
communication but applies the code of legal/illegal and plays an important role
as the blueprint for ‘acceptable’ dispute resolution. As such, this moral commu-
nication provides us with an established position to evaluate the quality of dispute
resolution and the level of procedural justice. As becomes apparent, justification
cannot be derived from rules, although such rules provide a reflection. These
rules are fundamentally guidelines for providing fairness, not a definition of
fairness. In the Marxist philosopher Walter Benjamin’s terms, they are Richtsch-
nur, a word translating both as a legal principle and as a mason’s plumb line,
used for vertical measurements in construction.33
However, due process criteria leave us with some comfort, although they do
not provide us with a solution for the never-ending quest of justification. It gives
us a way forward. Concretely, this particular moral communication about dispute
resolution, the case law of ECtHR, relays the message that enforcement matters.
It gives guidelines on how enforcement should be provided for. This particular
moral communication appears also to convey that the cases remaining under the
litigation threshold need to be granted access to dispute resolution, and, as a part
of this, access to enforcement.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the possibility of finding justification for private enforce-
ment from the moral communication on dispute resolution, as the sovereignty
narrative was unable to address the privatisation and the consent narrative failed in
justifying coercion. Unlike these constitutive couplings, the access to justice
narrative does not connect the legal system with an external reference but instead
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calls attention to the content of the dispute resolution process as a condition of its
validity. Although the narrative’s focus on the organisation of dispute resolution
seems to avoid the shortcomings of the other narratives, it fails in providing
justification for private enforcement. Due to its nature, ethical communication
does not provide solutions for moral dilemmas on a general level but only enables
their observation. Despite the narrative’s concretisation in due process criteria, the
narrative derives its justificatory force from the other narratives, from sovereignty-
based stipulations or consensual models, without being able to address the
justificatory crisis without this support.
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8 New bases for justification
As the analysis in the previous chapters has shown, private enforcement cannot be
justified by reference to delegation of sovereign (state) power, private autonomy
of the parties or the moral communication of access to justice. If private
enforcement cannot be justified by reference to axiomatic principles, does this
mean that we should simply discard the quest and announce this model of
enforcement unacceptable without further inquiry, and, if so, what would be
the implications of such a ban that is next to impossible to enforce?
This chapter offers a summary of the results by discussing the interrelationship
between the existing justificatory narratives. It is then asked whether a new
justificatory narrative could be found from the structural coupling between the
legal system and the system of use of information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT). This possibility is demonstrated by an excursion to blockchain-based
smart contracts that are claimed to be self-enforcing. As a decentralised system,
blockchain infrastructure is often considered regulation-averse, encouraging its
proponents to declare the code itself as law and disregarding the need for other
governance models. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the possibi-
lities and challenges of regulating private enforcement.
8.1 Justification as interrelationship
Through the analysis undertaken in this study, we have identified three justifica-
tory narratives – sovereignty, consent and access to justice narratives – which have
been applied to provide justification for dispute resolution. The sovereignty
narrative results from the close connection between law and state and forms
the self-evident starting point for assessing the justification of coercion but is not
able to explain the privatised use of force, whereas consent and access to justice
narratives have developed as complementary mechanisms that aim to remedy
these shortcomings. Although none of these narratives can single-handedly justify
technology-enabled private enforcement, this does not mean that their impor-
tance can be overlooked. The narratives reflect different ideologies and interests
present in dispute resolution and thus explain the complexity of the justificatory
crisis that emerges as a result of the disruptive qualities of dispute resolution
technology.
Sovereignty may provide justification based on the authority of the democratic
principle, private autonomy based on the fundamental importance of self-determina-
tion. Hence, we can justify the public courts by saying that in the end they are the
institutions of the nation-state, safeguarding the interests of the state and our
interests, which overlap. We can justify consent-based dispute resolution by referring
to self-determination. Access to justice provides justification for dispute resolution
by saying that the fairness of the procedure justifies the use of force within that
procedure. It leaves the question open on a theoretical level, to be solved – or more
suitably, to be justified – in casu, thus making justification dependent on the decision
whether the case at hand is the same as or different from the previous cases. This
open-endedness is descriptive of human rights discourse.1
Justificatory narratives often become entwined, as is the case with the interplay
of all narratives portrayed in the traditional ideal model outlined in Chapter 5,
and with the access to justice narrative that consists of positivised due process
criteria. This interaction results from the temporal sedimentation of these justifi-
catory constructs that demonstrates the reactionary nature of law. Through new
structural couplings the legal system has strengthened its immune system against
irritants emerging in the broader society, thus enabling increasing complexity.
The sedimentation process, where fundamental principles of law become a
definitive part of law’s self-understanding,2 happens gradually over time and
each narrative acknowledged here is at a different stage. Also, the emergence of
new sources of justification does not undo the importance of previous sources or
shatter the existing structural couplings. Nor is it clear-cut which methods of
justification are used in a given context. Outside the theoretical pursuit of this
study, justificatory concepts interact, become entwined, overlap and are applied
together, separately, and incongruently, if at all, deliberately. The examination of
justificatory narratives has the objective of dissecting the self-understanding of the
doctrine of dispute resolution, and this deconstructive analysis has shown that no
unambiguous starting points for reconstruction can be found. This being said, a
part of this quest has been to depict the interrelationship between these incom-
mensurate sources of justification.
The problems in finding justification for private enforcement emphasise the
increasing tension between private and public that result from the close connec-
tion between law and state. Although this division between private and public has
existed before, dispute resolution technology is further intensifying the tension
that seems to be deeply embedded in the doctrine of procedural law. One
possible interpretation that follows from this unresolvedness of the justificatory
crisis is that the tension itself is necessary for dispute resolution. This interpreta-
tion would suggest that the different justificatory narratives have been able to
balance each other out, and, by doing so, have managed to leave law’s paradox
unravelled up until the justificatory challenge of private enforcement.
As none of the existing justificatory narratives provides an answer to the justifica-
tory crisis caused by technology-enabled private enforcement, what does this mean
for the acceptance of private enforcement and for the underlying problem that
private enforcement aims to solve, namely the need for fair and low-threshold redress
180 New ways forward?
mechanisms online that also incorporate the possibility of coercion? The question of
acceptability of private enforcement connects with the necessity of finding dispute
resolution mechanisms that can also provide efficient legal protection online. The
existence of actual redress mechanisms is vital for e-commerce, as without them
consumers’ willingness to trade online and cross-border suffers. As public courts
have been unable to provide redress for low-intensity disputes, private online dispute
resolution (ODR) has emerged to take its place. Although private mechanisms are
able improve trust and encourage online trade, without a method of enforcement
private ordering is often left without an actual effect. Different alternatives for
steering online behaviour have developed, e.g. ‘soft’ instruments such as user
reviews, reputation systems, chargebacks and trustmarks,3 and also industry-specific
codes of conduct, best practices and self-regulation could provide some methods for
steering online behaviour. These methods, however, mostly impact future behaviour
and do not provide sufficient redress, as they cannot force compliance in individual
cases. Thus, mechanisms such as technology-enabled private enforcement are
needed, that are able to provide some form of redress without reference to the
state, but at the same time their existence is problematic, to say the least.
Private enforcement comes with a multitude of other issues that are not easily
solved, as private use of coercion bypasses the state’s monopoly on violence and
circumvents state control on due process as the prerequisite of enforcement.
Although private providers are bound by the national legislation of their place of
business, such norms often fall short of regulating the due process of private
enforcement. The issue becomes even more complicated when the elements of
dispute resolution and use of force are disguised as insurance models or contrac-
tual issues. This said, private enforcement seems to fulfil a need for redress that is
otherwise hard to address but the solution opens up a complement new set of
problems. Also, it is noteworthy that we cannot derive what ought to be from
what is, i.e. we cannot maintain that private enforcement should be acknowl-
edged legally because it exists in practice.
Still, the difficulties in finding a basis for privatised coercion does not change
the fact that the legal irritant needs to be addressed in order to overcome the
justificatory challenge brought on by implementing technology to dispute resolu-
tion. One way to circumvent the justificatory crisis of private enforcement is to
continue to rely on the connection of law and state by developing sufficient
public mechanisms through the digitalisation of national courts and the intro-
duction of sovereignty-based standards. However, such mechanisms would
require significant court reforms across all jurisdictions in addition to reaching
consensus on the content of a multilateral Convention, both options seeming
unlikely owing to the required public spending and the failure of UNCITRAL’s
working group on ODR.
Nevertheless, one more option for finding justification can be proposed. As
discussed above in Chapter 4, the social dimension of modern technology and
the societal changes that result from its increasing use can be construed as an
emergent social system of the use of ICT. As justification for privatised coercion
cannot be found from the connection of law and state or from the consent and
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access to justice narratives used in its place, it becomes necessary to ask whether a
structural coupling between law and technology could provide a way forward.
Early sketches of such coupling can be found in the discussions on self-enforcing
smart contracts built on decentralised technological infrastructure, where the
claim ‘code is law’, coined by Professor Lawrence Lessig, is used to contest the
need for any conflict management mechanisms.
8.2 Justification through technology: the promise of blockchain
for conflict prevention?
This section addresses the emergence, potential and pitfalls of another candidate
for a justificatory narrative: the idea that the technological infrastructure itself
could provide justification for private enforcement. Thus, the use of coercion
would be justified by the narrative consisting of a structural coupling between
systems of law and use of ICT. The discourse around blockchains, the technolo-
gical infrastructure behind cryptocurrencies, is contributing to the justificatory
narrative of ‘code is law’, where the code is the primary form of governance. This
means that the number of possible actions is limited on the level of code and
there is no way of going against these premediated models, to behave
differently.4 This narrative supposes a technological network formed with the
help of the markets, where the state becomes redundant and national legal
systems are replaced by the code infrastructure, a decentralised system which
does not rely on centralised authorities such as states or central banks.
The blockchain infrastructure provides an interesting insight into the justificatory
crisis of private enforcement, for two reasons. From the theoretical perspective,
where the focus is on justifying the use of coercion through law’s structural
couplings, conversations around blockchains depict yet another justificatory narra-
tive. This narrative, however, is not built around the same tension between law and
state, private and public, as sovereignty; it does not presuppose the existence of any
central authority besides the network itself. The potential of this for justification is
yet to be evaluated, but the possibility of a new justificatory model is intriguing.
From the practical perspective, this potential is reworded as a possibility of
improved redress for low-intensity disputes without reference to the state. The
promise of this ‘code is law’ narrative is to produce a concrete redress mechanism
that would not require multilateral Conventions or trust placed in any central
authority but would still provide public, transparent and fair governance for
individual conflicts. Instead of trusting in a central authority and its control, in
blockchain networks assumptions on the validity of a certain action are based on
the network’s decentralisation, the state of the network continuously reconciled
between networked actors.
In order to evaluate what the ‘code is law’ narrative entails for the privatisation
of coercion, we need to understand the complex blockchain infrastructure and
how it enables self-enforcing arrangements, called ‘smart contracts’. Despite the
hype around the allegedly regulation-averse nature of blockchain, the vulnerabil-
ities in the code, which have led to vast amounts of digital assets being stolen or
182 New ways forward?
destroyed, call attention to how conflict management is, can and should be
organised within the infrastructure. Some users demand conflict management
mechanisms and redress, while the supporters of the ‘code is law’ narrative argue
against any subsequent actions that would change previous events and thus pull
down the irreversibility of the code.
The blockchain-based networks are decentralised public ledgers, where trust is
allocated by the infrastructure to the infrastructure. Individual transactions are linked
to one another, forming a chain of blocks, each block containing a transaction or
some other change of status. The blockchain infrastructure was developed for the
purposes of digital money, cryptocurrencies, the most famous example being
Bitcoin, developed by the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 and later on
released as open source software.5 Originally, the structure was developed to over-
come the shortcomings of traditional trust-based currencies, which out of necessity
always rely on the authority of central banks and on the possibility of reversing earlier
transactions in the case of fraud or court decision. Modern cryptocurrencies are
based on a cryptographically secure ledger, a blockchain of earlier transactions, which
provides information security and transparency. The ledger is maintained by all
participants of the decentralised and anonymous peer-to-peer network. The ledger
of past transactions is public,6 and no transaction can be removed from the ledger.
The rules on how a transaction can be added to the blockchain safeguard the
system from external interference such as fraud or hacking. In order to be added
to the blockchain, a transaction needs to include a solution to a specific
mathematical problem, a so-called hash function, that is designed to be compu-
tationally difficult and time-consuming to solve but the validity of the solution
can easily be verified. This computation that validates the new block consumes
resources, which is the reason why users who lend their computational resources
to it are rewarded by new units of cryptocurrency in a process called ‘mining’.
Mining simultaneously enables the decentralised verification of transactions and
provides the means for creating new units of the currency.7 The regulation-averse
quality of blockchains is seen as deriving from this decentralisation and compla-
cency of the network in creating new value true mining.
Although much legal communication has evolved around qualifying cryptocur-
rencies as property and thus as regulatory and fiscal objects,8 the potentially more
interesting blockchain applications relate to automation of transactions – and of
enforcement. The American law professor Frank Pasquale and systems engineer
Glyn Cashwell evaluate different automation scenarios depending on the high or
low level of regulation and high or low susceptibility to automation. In their
analysis, blockchain applications exemplify the scenario of high regulation and
high automation, where public functions are outsourced to computation. As
Pasquale and Cashwell point out, the infrastructure could be employed to take
over legally complicated functions, which is evident in the unconventional propo-
sals on blockchain-based enforcement regimes that would replace the traditional
legal authorities.9 Following a similar line of thought, Fairfield states, ‘it is time to
start looking past routine financial applications of such [trustless public] ledgers as
currencies’.10
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In addition to simple transactions between digital assets, the technology
enables programmable contractual arrangements called ‘smart contracts’. These
contracts are in fact generalised computation taking place in the blockchain,11
and they provide a form of enforcement that does not presuppose any centralised
authorities such as nation-states, e-commerce market leaders or credit card
companies. Thus, smart contracts are contracts embedded in software code that
include the contractual arrangement, the preconditions that define the contrac-
tual responsibilities and the actual execution of the contract.12
To say that smart contracts are self-enforceable means that the software
executes the contract, e.g. allocates digital assets, autonomously and regardless
of trust between the parties. Payment of the funds is not dependent on
voluntary compliance, nor is it affected by later changes in the position of the
parties (e.g. bankruptcy). Simply put, digital assets are transferred to the smart
contract and later on allocated by the software according to the contractual
obligations. No external monitoring or enforcement is needed and self-execution
functions as conflict prevention. It is even possible to include external data points
to a smart contract, which could be employed for the purposes of obtaining
evidence.13 For example, we could imagine escrow services, and even dispute
resolution, drafted in the form of a smart contract, where both parties transfer
assets to the programme and after the dispute is resolved a neutral third party
concludes the transactions based on her authority. The lines of code of
the contract could be only changed based on the third party’s decision but the
parties could not revise the code. The legal issue between the parties (e.g. ‘the
sold item never arrived and the buyer requests her money back’) is a factual
circumstance that, if proved true, gives the buyer the right to obtain the money.
We could imagine an interface with the transport company that could provide the
information verifying whether the item was indeed received by the buyer. This
information would then be accessed by the smart contract, which would then
allocate the money depending on the facts. The variations for conflict manage-
ment purposes, and thus the possibilities for automation, are numerous.
Regardless of the promise of blockchains for self-enforcement, mistakes and
failures at the code level have called attention to governance of the distributed
networks. In June 2016, a decentralised autonomous venture capitalist fund built
on the Ethereum blockchain was hacked, leading to around US$130 million
being stolen.14 The hack took advantage of a mistake in a single smart contract’s
code but challenged the whole network’s ability to provide governance in conflict
situations. The DAO (decentralised autonomous organisation) hack made visible
the potential of fraud within distributed ledger technologies that were supposed
to be beyond vulnerability. In addition to a multitude of practical questions,
ranging from what happens to the individual investments to finding and punish-
ing the perpetrators, the hack has given rise to more in-depth debates about
governance on the blockchain. Are there legal rights and obligations within the
network and, if so, how would such norms for behaviour be set in a system that
transcends all national borders and escapes state-bound regulation? If, ideally, the
code defines the borders of acceptable behaviour and, by definition, unacceptable
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behaviour is not possible within its framework, how will the negative implications
be mitigated when this assumption does not hold true, when suddenly unaccep-
table behaviour is proved possible? In short, how is redress organised?
In the wake of the DAO hack, the developers of the whole Ethereum network
deliberated between two reactions to the event: either freezing the stolen money and
thus preventing the hacker from benefiting from the theft, or reversing all transactions
in the blockchain and thus removing the negative effects of the hack. The first option,
called ‘soft fork’, would have meant some people losing their investments for good,
whereas the second option, called ‘hard fork’ would restore the transactions made to
the smart contract. In July 2016, the hard fork solution was implemented, thus
constituting a human intervention against the irreversibility of the code, breaking the
neoliberal ideal of smart contracts as beyond external influence, beyond subsequent
redress. Ultimately, the hard fork solution underlined the inadequacy of the ‘code is
law’ approach in providing redress in unexpected conflict situations. Nevertheless, the
DAO hack, alongside the recent blunder concerning Ethereum-based Parity multi-
signature wallets that led to the supposedly accidental destruction of US$300 million
worth of digital funds and speculations of yet another hard fork,15 indicate that the
blockchain architecture itself is not conflict-averse, and not as independent as claimed.
Despite the potential of smart contracts in conflict prevention and private enforce-
ment, distributed ledger technologies have not been able to remove the need for
conflict management, but on the contrary have given rise to new types of conflicts that
cannot rely on existing state-bound redress mechanisms.
In addition to not seeming to hold true in reality, the ‘code as law’ approach
disguises a troubling neoliberal ideology, described by the blockchain scholar
Primavera de Filippi as the libertarian dream advocated by blockchain enthusiasts16
and by lecturer Alan Cunningham as the combination of decentralisation and
distrust. In his analysis, the blockchain technology is seen to emphasise a political
ideology that aims at the elimination of the state for increased agency of indivi-
duals, an ideology built on a computationalist belief, ‘a complete faith in the ability
of mathematics and technology to eradicate problems emerging from human
behaviour’.17 The danger of such ideology lies in its mechanic understanding of
societal interaction: any gained agency and independence in the decentralised
network is individual only and, as human interaction loses its collective dimension,
the concept of public interest is eradicated. Despite their neoliberal promise,
blockchain organisations and smart contracts cannot operate independently of all
external control but instead require governance, ex post redress mechanisms, the
safety valve of human intervention.18 For Cunningham, this means that attention
should be on developing new ways of building up trust in public society instead of
outsourcing it to code.
If it is not sufficient to use code as a regulatory concept to steer behaviour, this
raises the question to what extent code architecture can assume the place of the
normative provided by law, to what extent code can be law. As the continuously
increasing interest in distributed ledger technologies shows, in the majority of
transactions the code can provide a sufficient framework for interactions. Code
continues to do so until a vulnerability, an unexpected error, takes place, at which
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point interference is required, as was the case with the DAO attack. But it is also
possible to argue that such systemic steering is not normative in the meaning of
the legal system, that it is solely predetermined compliance, behaviour modifica-
tion through code. Thus, code cannot be law, as law ceases to be anything but
control when one cannot go against it, when adherence to the rules is forced.19
If ultimately code cannot be law, can law be extended to the code – can
blockchains be regulated despite their inherently regulation-averse decentralisation
that escapes state-bound law and makes it impossible to define the receiver of any
regulation attempt? In addition to limiting the negative impact of such new
technologies by governance and legal protection, governments face the frequent
need to encourage technological innovation and new markets. These conflicting
objectives often lead to inconsistent regional regulation of global phenomena, such
as the attempts to regulate initial coin offerings (ICOs), that have become a widely
popular crowd funding method making use of the monetary side of blockchains. For
example, China and South Korea have outlawed ICOs, as offshore financial centres
such as Cayman Islands root for the new financial tool, and states with strong
regulatory frameworks for financial technology such as the UK, the EU and the US
have adopted a careful stance, emphasising the extra-territorial scope of their
national legislations.20 In addition to these practical limitations, there is a theoretical
side to regulating such complex phenomena as distributed ledgers. Law has limited
means of addressing the novel environment of blockchains where economic, social
and technological implications become intertwined and regulation is always political.
As Professor Michael King puts it, ‘all that law can do is regulate what can be
regulated through law, and, while this is no mean achievement, it leaves vast areas of
activity . . . quite invisible to law’.21
Code cannot be law and code should not be law, which admittedly limits the
potential of the ‘code is law’ narrative, the structural coupling between law and the use
of ICT. The problematic example of blockchain-based smart contracts and the
inadequacy of code as redress suggest that the technological narrative does not provide
a sufficient source of justification, at least in this form. Instead, as the decentralised
quality of distributed ledgers make regulation by state-bound law mostly ineffective
and there is no internal conflict management available, the use of code as a regulatory
concept seems only to deepen the justificatory crisis of private enforcement. Lessons
learned from blockchains demonstrate the ideologies behind technology, warn against
computationalism, the idea that law could be reduced to computation. As with other
technologies, such as algorithmic decision-making that makes use of machine learning
and artificial intelligence, the blockchain vulnerabilities demonstrate that code is never
infallible, and and it is dangerous to believe that it is infallible.
8.3 What about the future of private enforcement?
As the example of blockchains illustrates, regulating individual technologies may
be extremely complex or even impossible. But even more so, technology-specific
regulation of blockchains, artificial intelligence or machine learning does not take
into consideration the broader social implications of technological development.
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Without a holistic overview of dispute resolution technology, the important issue
of privatisation of coercion remains invisible, and with it the signs of a justifica-
tory crisis resulting from the connection of state and law. Privatisation of
coercion needs to be addressed as a diverse phenomenon within the legal
system, in which different applications of dispute resolution technology and the
social dimension, e.g. the ideologies reflected in these applications, all contribute
to the overall development. If we are to address the resulting justificatory crisis, it
is necessary to respect the boundaries of law, to remember what can be achieved
by means of law.
Bearing this in mind, UNCITRAL’s work was unable to produce anything more
than technical notes, which do not provide a sufficient framework for binding
ODR. In addition, the EU’s ODR platform has not been as impactful as hoped in
providing efficient redress for consumers, as the finality of the outcomes varies
inconsistently between different jurisdictions and individual national ADR provi-
ders. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), on
the other hand, applies a different approach, as the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) procedure for resolving domain name disputes
relies on the direct enforcement of the organisation. However, ICANN’s practice
has led to criticism of the lack of acceptable due process criteria.22 Although
resolution of domain name disputes leaves much to be desired, the criticism of
ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model might offer beneficial observations for other
governance projects. If regulation of binding ODR or other forms of private
enforcement is based on a multi-stakeholder model, critical attention must be
paid to include civil society actors and to improve transparency, participation and
democracy of such policy setting. However, the difficulties remain when regulation
is sought through truly global instruments. In addition to jurisdictional differences,
e.g. the acceptability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in business-to-consumer
(B2C) disputes, there is the challenge of respecting such differences while simulta-
neously establishing a coherent system that works in practice. If another attempt is
made for regulating private enforcement, the policy should include all forms of
private use of coercion.
Despite the contentious quality of private enforcement and the relative lack
of success in developing binding ODR, privatisation of coercion needs to be
addressed in itself. There is a danger in considering enforcement only as a part
of state-orientated judicial redress mechanisms. Technological possibilities of
private enforcement already exist and it would be deceitful to assume that
these private enforcement mechanisms would not employed for the purposes
of forcing compliance in the name of contractual arrangements. In fact, it is
understandable that private enforcement mechanisms are reworded as insur-
ance models, internal complaint-handling systems, or as non-binding ODR
especially by the providers of such services, as otherwise it would be necessary
to address the issue of bypassing the state control of due process before
engaging in use of force. As the quest for justification conducted in this
study hopefully demonstrates, there is a certain value in considering these
models from a procedural perspective as alternatives to state-governed
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enforcement. Although this perspective is not the only one of importance, it
sheds light on the function of enforcement that otherwise would go unno-
ticed. The significance of privatisation of coercion is further emphasised by the
importance of enforcement as a part of access to justice. As the case law of
ECtHR illustrates, the execution of final and binding judicial decisions should
be understood as belonging to the fundamental right of fair trial.23
However, enforcement is not the only, or even the most central, of due process
principles. If this were the case, then the choice would simply be for binding
models of dispute resolution, which would lead to accepting private enforcement
as it is. However, there are valid reasons for arguing that enforcement of ODR as
online arbitration would be detrimental to consumer protection. The unequal
power balances between business and consumers, the danger of repeat player
bias, and finality of arbitral awards are all factors that contribute to the lack of
sufficient consumer protection.
As both private and public schemes of enforcing decisions are available, there is no
longer the need to consider enforceability only in relation to courts. However, both
private and public approaches to enforcement come with baggage. The challenge of
private enforcement, both in the form of private enforcement of e-commerce plat-
forms and as self-executing smart contracts, relates to the ideological choices behind
the technological solutions, what we have called here the neo-liberal dilemma.24
Although private enforcement would most likely provide efficient enforcement
within reasonable time, it is unclear how well private actors would take into
consideration power imbalances and would uphold due process where there is no
mandatory regulation and monitoring to force them to do so. Also, human rights
obligations are mostly directed towards state actors, as is pointed out regarding
ICANN, and it is unclear to what extent they would obligate private actors when
they provide services of dispute resolution and enforcement.
If the decision is made for public redress mechanisms, other challenges need to
be taken into consideration. First and foremost, solutions are needed to tackle
the threshold issue so that future models do not end up repeating the short-
comings of public courts regarding the resolution of low-intensity online dis-
putes. In addition to this, there is the danger that public mechanisms created
through black letter law might forestall future innovation and possible self-
regulation.25 If public redress mechanisms are the chosen way forward, it is
necessary to consider the position of private enforcement and its regulation
separately. Otherwise the private use of coercion, which is enabled by technology
and bypasses state control, is left in the margins, disguised simply as a contractual
issue. This in turn could prove to be a problem for the coherence of the legal
system, as the legal irritant would then remain unaddressed.
One option worth looking into could be the formulation of an intermedi-
ary model where both public and private schemes would be connected, and
some attempts to this end have been made. For example, trustmarks have
been discussed in literature and some applications of them exist,26 but this
solution has not yet gained sufficient momentum to form the basis of policy
recommendations.
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Based on this, it is likely that ODR using non-binding ADR methods does not
provide the desired solution for low-intensity online disputes. Public courts are
latecomers to the field of dispute resolution technology, but court-based applica-
tions are pressing forward equipped with the keys to the doors of public
enforcement. If the digitalisation of public courts indeed reaches the level where
the threshold issues no longer form obstacles to access to courts in low-intensity
disputes, it is possible that the problem of low-intensity disputes and their
enforcement will solve itself organically. In order to do so, however, technology
needs to be brought to court proceedings knowing that one of the key issues to
address is the resolution of cross-border low-intensity disputes, which otherwise
might or might not be resolved with sufficient due process – if resolved at all.
The choices made when regulating private enforcement, as well as when reform-
ing court practices, have the power to decide whether the justificatory crisis is
conquered or not.
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9 Conclusions
This study has sought to demonstrate how the development of dispute resolution
technology has given rise to new forms of private enforcement. Modern technol-
ogy applied to conflict management enables new forms of coercion, such as direct
enforcement on e-commerce sites, ICANN’s domain name dispute resolution,
and self-enforcing smart contracts. This increasing privatisation of coercion has
mostly gone unnoticed, as most of these private enforcement mechanisms deal
with low-value civil disputes in which party autonomy has traditionally been
extensive. Unlike in cases dealing with criminal liability, the public interest
in such civil disputes is less pronounced. In this context, the contractual dimen-
sion can easily pass over the need for effective access to justice, although in some
instances it cannot be ignored, as is the case with effective consumer protection in
e-commerce disputes. However, the emergence of such private mechanisms
demonstrates a general trend towards privatising coercion. This shift explains
something about the disruptive qualities of dispute resolution despite the fact
that it mostly affects cases often disregarded from the fundamental rights per-
spective. The main finding of this study is that the technologically-enabled
privatised coercion cannot be justified by the existing legal concepts.
In order to understand the overall trend of privatised coercion it is necessary to
approach dispute resolution technology from a broader, holistic perspective. Dispute
resolution technology represents one of the intersections between law, technology
and society, its disruptiveness being the result of complex social, economic, political
and legal reactions related to the overall digitalisation of society. This study has
attempted to provide one perspective on the ways in which the society is changing
as a result of the increasing use of ICT. Here, this change within the legal system is
portrayed through interpretation influenced by systems theory, and the social
dimension of technology is seen as an emergent social system called the use of ICT.
Technological development does not take place in a social vacuum. We need to
acknowledge the societal implications of increasing legal digitalisation. This being
said, we should be aware of how this development at times strengthens and renews
existing social ideologies and power imbalances. However, we also need to be
cautious not to reduce the impact of dispute resolution technology to reflect existing
tensions but instead assess the scope of technological disruption while simulta-
neously keeping in mind the complex interplay of law, technology and society.
This means that the overview of dispute resolution technology consists of two
complementary perspectives. Firstly, a holistic approach helps us to perceive the
long-term trends and the overall impact of technological change on the society.
Secondly, a nuanced and contextual approach to individual applications comple-
ments this overarching perspective and allows us to evaluate the normative
consequences of individual use cases of dispute resolution technology. The
combination of societal overview and contextual approach to applications
makes it possible to find common denominators between different applications
of dispute resolution technology such as direct enforcement on e-commerce
sites and smart contracts despite differences in their scope, motivation and
functionalities. Thus, we can perceive a more general trend towards increasing
privatisation of coercion.
Because of their generalised scope and the lack of actual alternatives, the
private enforcement mechanisms discussed here differ from other forms of private
governance but, ultimately, they present yet another example of the demise of
our modern conceptualisation of law in connection with state. These new forms
of technology-enabled private enforcement challenge the fiction of the state’s
monopoly on dispute resolution, in which enforcement is the epitome of its
monopoly on violence.
Owing to the particular role attributed to enforcement, its increasing privatisa-
tion reveals something about law. From the theoretical perspective, private
enforcement renders visible law’s inherent nature as coercion; compliance with
law can be coerced by use of force. As long as the criteria established by law are
followed, such coercion is acceptable, justified, its legitimacy preserved. Simply
put, law is a mechanism for justifying coercion. Traditionally, we have disguised
law’s inherent violence by restricting its use discursively to established legal
structures, to public courts and legal professionals, who contribute to making
the decision on who has the right to access the state’s enforcement mechanism.
Thus, the use of coercion has become institutionalised in order to provide
coherence, predictability and authority to the operations of the legal system.
However, the privatisation of coercion exposes law as a legitimised form of
violence and forces us to reinterpret who is entitled to use this force, against
whom, and on what grounds. Privatisation of coercion embodies the disruptive
properties of technology for demarcating the boundary between acceptable
coercion and arbitrary violence. In other words, implementing technology to
core areas of law, to dispute resolution and enforcement, brings the need to
justify coercion to the fore.
The need for justifying private enforcement is one of the challenges caused by
the fast-paced technological development, to which increasing automation con-
tributes significantly. Interestingly, the tensions behind increasing privatisation of
coercion are not simply technological but also societal. Private enforcement
mechanisms have emerged to provide binding conflict management in situations
where the existing state-governed mechanisms fail to do so, most prominently
online. The changes in enforcement and the need to justify coercion become
questions of law’s ability to address the justificatory challenge posed by private
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enforcement mechanisms. Can the challenge be addressed by our existing legal
frameworks? Can we find justification for private enforcement by tweaking law,
by making use of its established justification mechanisms, by reinterpreting
existing legal concepts in new ways through interpretative flexibility?
The need to justify increasingly privatised coercion – together with the
uncertainty of how this can be done – leads to a justificatory crisis. In this
study, remedies for the lack of justification are sought from existing legal
concepts used to provide legitimacy for coercion. These concepts are called
justificatory narratives. The analysis identified three different narratives: 1) sover-
eignty, the structural coupling between law and politics; 2) consent, the coupling
between law and economics; and 3) access to justice, moral communication
about dispute resolution. Recognition of these narratives requires two theoretical
moves. Firstly, it is necessary to perceive how the legal system produces justifica-
tion through external references, by relaying the rationalities of other subsystems
to law through shared structural couplings. Secondly, we need to evaluate which
sources were used to provide justification by exploring how the doctrine has
previously reconciled similar justificatory crises.
It should be noted that the state’s monopoly on dispute resolution has
previously been challenged by the critique of the access to justice movement
which, among other things, advocated for out-of-court dispute resolution. Inter-
estingly, the justificatory challenge was then reconciled through a collaborative
model, which rendered private dispute resolution acceptable as long as the
courts’ ultimate power over enforcement was maintained. However, the chal-
lenge we are currently facing appears to be of more fundamental nature. Instead
of advocating for plurality of dispute resolution, the demand is for plurality of
enforcement, as in certain online contexts public enforcement has become
redundant. This means that it is not possible to reconcile the justificatory crisis
of private enforcement through a solution similar to the one achieved through
the collaborative model and, due to the limitations of state-bound law, similar
balance is difficult to achieve.
Private enforcement poses a justificatory challenge that cannot be resolved
with the existing justificatory narratives. The sovereignty narrative mainly pro-
vides justification for state monopoly on violence, which private enforcement
contradicts, and the narrative cannot explain coercion without connection to
state. Private autonomy, in turn, presupposes voluntariness and is thus unable
to address the coercive element. In addition, lack of actual alternatives to
private enforcement make consent given to their use fictional, refuting its
validity and thus its justificatory force. Ethical discourse, or the access to justice
narrative, points towards the structures and rituals present in dispute resolution,
but does not provide any overarching guidelines or standards on which justifi-
cation could be based.
As the earlier narratives falter, some seek answers elsewhere and advocate for
the regulatory dimension of code, the connection between law and the emerging
social system, the use of ICT. The ‘code is law’ narrative suggests that technolo-
gical design could assume regulatory qualities and produce both justification and
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practical governance. However, it is a computationalist oversimplification of law’s
complexity to trust in the power of technology to solve problems of human
interaction. To some extent, software infrastructure can direct behaviour and
prevent conflicts, but, as it is impossible to predict all interactions, the need for
the safety valve of conflict management does not disappear. As the DAO hack
exemplifies, even the supposedly irreversible, trustworthy and fault-free block-
chain infrastructures are not free from conflicts. Although the blockchain
network itself functions as predicted, the possibility of human error cannot be
removed as long as humans are involved in programming individual smart
contracts on the blockchain.
The idea that data-driven technologies could replace law presupposes that law
is simple, that it can be translated into clear-cut rules and programmed into
straightforward commands of if-then-else. However, law is far more complex
than these oversimplifications would lead us to believe, its flexibility and open-
endedness leaving us with much needed room for diversity of interpretation. We
should not overlook this complexity as purposeless jargon meant to protect the
entitlement of lawyers but acknowledge its significance as the result of legal
evolution over hundreds of years, and perceive the logic behind the shift from
casuistic regulation to generalised principles.
What are the normative implications of this justificatory crisis that cannot be
downplayed by a simple reinterpretation of existing narratives or the emergent ‘code
is law’ narrative? Law’s normativity lies in its function of upholding expectations
regardless of disappointment, in the certainty that an expectation is true although it
has this time been proved wrong. Private enforcement challenges the expectation
that only decisions reached in due process are enforced and enforcement is granted
only after this fairness is evaluated by an independent court. The expectation can no
longer be upheld. In addition, the lack of transparency in private enforcement has
implications on the renewal of expectations, as no public precedents are created that
would provide a basis for future expectations. It becomes unclear what exactly we
should expect – confusion about when expectations are met and when they are
disappointed. If no distinction between fulfilment and disappointment can be made,
law’s normativity starts to unravel, and with it the overall trust in the legal system’s
ability to provide stability.
The insolubility of the justicatory crisis leaves us with unclear expectations. If
sovereignty, consent and access to justice narratives fail when it comes to private
enforcement, should the narratives still be preserved as bases for expectations? Or
is there yet another potential source for law’s continuity that follows from the
structural coupling between the legal system and the use of ICT, perhaps by
another interpretation of the ‘code is law’ narrative? It remains to be seen
whether an option for regulating the use of coercion within these new technolo-
gically enabled environments can be found by following a similar logic to that of
blockchain infrastructure, namely decentralised law. This possibility needs to be
examined further in the hopes of developing new governance models that
respond to the new irritant without resorting to such oversimplifications as the
‘code is law’ narrative currently does.
Conclusions 195
Also, the disruptive qualities of dispute resolution technology need to be
explored further in order to understand the transformation of legal practice
taking place, the digitalisation of law. The promise of improved access to justice
presented by some applications is contrasted with malicious irritants that some
new forms of dispute resolution technology represent. In order to distinguish
between these contrary consequences, we need a deeper understanding of these
diverse phenomena and to address them simultaneously separately and as a
whole. A holistic and contextual approach to the digitalisation of law requires a
framework formed by legal technology studies which take the challenge of
technology seriously. Legal technology studies need to actively engage in inter-
disciplinary dialogue in order to ensure the development of legally sustainable
dispute resolution technology.
In order to see beyond these fumbling first steps of theory formation, we
need to look at the present while simultaneously keeping an open mind
about the future. The ways in which we conceptualise technology, the
discourses we use, the threats and challenges as well as the hopes and
opportunities we attribute to technology, shape the use and future develop-
ment of dispute resolution technology. Without the holistic approach to
technology suggested here, we face the danger that unconscious assumptions
about technology impact on how we design the legal framework for the
future development of dispute resolution technology. For example, we could
assume that technology can duplicate human shortcomings, as was the case
with the xenophobic and malicious HAL 9000 computer in Arthur C
Clarke’s novel 2001: A Space Odyssey, or ground our understanding on the
benevolent central computer of the Star Trek: The Next Generation series,
where technology transcends limited human capabilities and provides shelter
and care for its humans. Such assumptions lead to very divergent evaluations
of the feasibility of technology, the potential and the threat. In short,
unconscious assumptions are dangerous. Still, assumptions can be set right
with critical insights into legal technologies.
We need to understand the challenge posed by private enforcement as the
result of fast-paced societal and technological change. Use of dispute resolu-
tion technology increasingly automates legal practices, starting from routine
cognitive labour, with the potential of transforming conflict management
altogether. Surprisingly, there are similarities between legal digitalisation and
the Luddite uprising which originated from the automation of routine
manual labour. Although the pejorative descriptions would lead us to believe
Luddites were against technology per se as well as against all progress, it is
necessary to understand that the uprising criticised the social implications of
automation that hit the underprivileged groups of society the hardest, the
untrained manual labourers. Ridiculing such concerns and calls for action as
supposedly backward attitudes demonstrates ignorance of the negative
consequences of automation. In order to avoid dramatic negative effects of
legal automation, we need to be conscious of the on-going societal and legal
transformation.
196 New ways forward?
Law cannot be made redundant by lines of code, the complexity of law
subsumed into simple rules. Still, new technologies are already having an enor-
mous impact on law, as examples of algorithmic decision-making and distributed
ledger technologies demonstrate. The legal framework is not toothless against the
disruptive challenge of technology. On the contrary, society both reacts and
predicts change through the legal system, through the boundaries law imposes
on future development. With law’s function of providing societal stability comes
the responsibility to ensure responsible legal digitalisation, the fairness of techno-
logical infrastructures. The nuanced perspective of law needs to be taken into
consideration in technological system design, otherwise the impact of technology
is unpredictable. In dispute resolution technology, there is little room for failure,
as the question is about legal protection and access to justice, the ethical
dimension of law. It is of utmost importance that we recognise how technology
affects legal functions and how technological infrastructure can become legally
relevant. The challenge of technology leaves us with the fundamental principles
of law. In the end, the big question is not about understanding technology but
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